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MULTIMODALITY IN THE POETRY OF LILLIAN ALLEN AND 
DIONNE BRAND: A SOCIAL SEMIOTIC APPROACH 
by Maria Caridad Casas 
Abstract 
This thesis develops social semiotic theory by asking it to account for the 
meaning-making practices of African-Canadian poets Lillian Allen and 
Dionne Brand. Its primary aim is to develop the theory, though it attempts 
to describe in new and interesting ways certain moments in these oral / 
written texts at the margins of the literary. The research question, what is 
the relationship between spoken creole and English writing? is an entry into 
the political issues raised by the texts themselves, and larger issues of 
clisciplinarity and the epistemologies of linguistic and literary studies. 
After giving an account of their literary-historical and black feminist contexts 
and an overview of the poetry of Allen and Brand, I look for a post-
structuralist semiotic model of the relationship between letter and sound in 
Derrida's "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing". Finding his 
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version phonetic writing too restricted to account for the practices of Allen 
and Brand, and deconstruction only a partial explanation of Caribbean 
feminist poetics, I develop a critical sociolinguistic / social semiotic account 
2 
3 
of language standardisation, conventionality, and grammar. With the aid of 
Saussure's Cours 4 linguistique generale, I work out the formal properties of 
the sign necessary to account for these, and then go on to explain how they 
work in the texts of Allen and Brand using two social semiotic principles of 
production: "projection" and "embodiment". My thesis is that orality is a 
mode, as is dialect (including standardised language), the English grapholect, 
and the semiotic body. Each of these has certain meaning-making 
affordances not accessible in the others. The writing of Allen and Brand, as 
well as Allen's performance, use each of these modes to create different 
meanings. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
The texts of Allen and Brand dance at the edges of the capacities of 
linguistic description. Since some of them are performed, meanings are 
made in non-verbal ways (e.g., gesture, body-language, vocal sounds that 
are not verbal). Allen and Brand also insist on the black, female body as 
an inerasable presence in their meanings and therefore in their meaning-
making. They insist on using oral language, whether it is recorded, 
performed, or transcribed. They insist that these material realities not be 
folded into dominant categories, such as "woman", or "language"; they 
ask me, as a participant, to consider what these categories hide. 
This is therefore a project with a dual ambition: to work out a suitable 
approach for reading these texts; and to use this process to make 
revealing readings. It asks, what kind of linguistics, broadly conceived, is 
adequate as an explanatory framework for the description of these oral / 
written texts at the margins of the literary? 
In order to focus the argument further, I follow a research question 
thrown up by the texts themselves. Allen writes her poetry, but also 
composes it for performance; many of her poems are in both print and 
audio technologies. The print versions often have phonetic spellings for 
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Jamaican English Creole words. Brand transcribes a light Trinidad 
English Creole, avoiding phonetic spellings but adapting a creole syntax 
and morphology. The written texts of Allen and Brand are therefore an 
ideal, socially-situated test-case for exploring the question: what is the 
relationship between spoken creole and English writing? This question is 
also an entry into the political issues raised by the texts themselves, and 
larger issues of disciplinarity and the epistemologies of linguistic and 
literary studies. 
Though stylistics is considered to be the linguistic analysis of literary 
texts, in this thesis I move from the linguistic analysis of a literary text to 
a social semiotic approach. I build on and expand social semiotics, in a 
search for a metalanguage capable of describing the oral / written poetry 
of Allen and Brand. 
What is the relationship between spoken creole and English writing? 
My interest in the connection between creole sounds and writing came 
from previous literary-linguistic work I did with a thirteen-page prose 
poem by Dionne Brand called "No Language Is Neutral" (Casas "No 
Language"). The task was to look at the writer's movement back and 
forth between Canadian English and Trinidad English Creole (hereafter 
TEC). 
Linguistically, these movements are known as "slides" (Labov 
Language in the Inner City) or "code-switches" (Gumperz). The 
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linguistic approach raised a series of fruitful questions. First of all, the 
linguistic models were from a tradition that focuses on non-literary 
language. The literary equivalent of these switches is called "dialect 
writing". Dialect writing in literary studies is treated unproblematically 
as the written equivalent of the dialect it is supposed to represent, while 
the Standard Written variety that usually contextualises it represents the 
imaginative status of the hero or narrator. This applies throughout 
English literary history, including even colonial literatures: the speaker 
of dialect is lower class, or an outsider; at best, the dialect speaker's 
identity as a member of the group that speaks that dialect is more salient 
than his/her individuality. The Standard Written foil to this represents a 
"classless" speaker or narrator. Often literacy and Standard Written 
dialect are in a strong connotative association, so that another dialect 
represents not just orality in a written imaginative world, but illiteracy'. 
A dialect speaker in English literature is often the buffoon.2 
However, in Brand's poem, the consciousness of the dialect speaker was 
the same as the consciousness of the Standard Written passages. That is, 
the entire poem is written in the first person; it is a lyrical, highly 
personal narrative of the speaker's immigration from the Caribbean to 
Canada, with all of the international class issues this entailed (issues 
embedded in colonial history, in neo-colonialism, and in class, race, and 
1 In short, the fact that literature is written in itself conditions the meaning of 
representations of non-written language. 
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gender oppression). Here was no "standard English" narrator sending up, 
or subtly objectivising, a speaker of dialect; in this highly literary and 
literate text, dialect was central to the thesis of the poem that "no 
language is neutral". Standard Written language is also a dialect, loaded 
with socio-political associations. 
The code-switching model brought this point into relief in a way that a 
literary treatment would not have done. Sociolinguistic descriptions of 
code-switching (Auers; Blom and Gumperz; Gibbons; Gumperz; Myers-
Scotton) describe people in naturally-occurring situations who speak first 
in one language/dialect and then another, switching back and forth either 
during a conversation or according to the situation in which they find 
themselves.3 The fact that I was transposing from a tradition that focuses 
on spoken language (linguistics) into the analysis of a written text, 
though, raised issues that I was unable to attend to within the terms of 
that project. 
TEC is an oral language/dialect: it has no written counterpart. Therefore, 
technically, there can be no code-switching into creole in a written text. 
The transformation that brings TEC speech into English writing is at first 
glance a simple transcription, from systematised vocal speech sounds (an 
2 See also Jaffe and Walton, in which they used Gile's matched-guise technique to show 
that low-socioeconomic status is a strong symbolic referent of non-standard spellings. 
3 Labov's "sliding", a term used to describe American Black youth gliding from Black 
English Vernacular to American English or vice-versa, suggests (within the terms of 
reference of linguistics) that they are not speaking two languages, but sliding between 
varieties of one. 
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inventory of phonemes/morphemes/syntactic patterns) into any system 
for writing phonetically (e.g., the International Phonetic Alphabet). 
However, the further transformation from a phonetic writing system into 
some of the systems of English (spellings and morpho-phonemic 
patterns) makes the writing of creole a double transformation. It is, in 
fact, a transcription/translation, translating TEC as a language partially 
into the English language in order to place it in scribal English culture. 
Each and every word is written in "English", that is, according to the 
spelling rules of standard written English: 
When Liney reach here is up to the time I hear about. 
Why I always have to go back to that old woman who 
wasn't even from here but from another barracoon, I 
never understand but deeply as if is something that 
have no end. ... 	 (Brand  No Language, 24) 
What is not "English" is the grammar (and one special term, 
"barracoon", raising the question of where the lexical boundary can be 
set on a language). This is not bad grammar, but another grammar, 
reflecting another pattern of speech, with its own rhythms and sounds. 
How do we know this is not ungrammatical English (in the formal 
linguistic sense), but a different language? The answer cannot be found 
within linguistics. The division between dialects, the difference between 
dialects and national languages, and the very definition of a dialect / 
language must be placed in a social and political world. At the same 
time, the question makes no sense without reference to specific words 
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and their placement in relation to each other — their patterns of 
distribution, or grammar. 
There are puzzling contradictions and the tensions around Brand's 
written treatment of creole. Her transcription of an oral language with no 
official written code raises the following questions: why did she take the 
trouble to transcribe creole, an oral language into a highly literary work? 
Why did she use exclusively English spellings, staying within the official 
code of standard English? What does her use of creole say; what does her 
spelling of creole words say; what is the message carried by her 
treatment of creole as a code in writing? In the terms of social semiotics: 
if Brand's treatment of creole were a text in itself, what would it say? 
Allen's written Jamaican English Creole 
Then I came across Lillian Allen's 1993 collection of poems, Women Do 
This Every Day. Allen began as a dub (performance) poet, publishing 
versions of her works in print along the way. Like Brand, she uses a 
written version of a Caribbean English Creole sometimes and, at other 
times, an unmarked written English. However, her written version of 
Jamaican English Creole (hereafter JEC) includes phonetic spellings, a 
more common practice for creole poetry. These spellings are meant to 
indicate the sound values of particular words. For example, 
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An' him chucks on some riddim 
an' yu hear him say 
riddim an' hardtimes 
riddim an' hardtimes (63) 
This passage contains some specialised terms, such as terms from the 
subcultures of reggae and dub ("riddim"). It could be argued that these 
are not spelling variations from English, but loan words, just as we might 
use words from the Latin such as subpoena. Other spellings, however, 
are clearly meant to steer the reader to a specific pronunciation 
(pronunciations of very common words like "you" and "and"). Like 
Brand, Allen also uses small markers of JEC grammar to condition the 
"sound" of printed words: in this case, she places what in English would 
be an object pronoun in subject position ("him chucks on some riddim"). 
Because Allen adapts standard English spellings to recreate certain 
speech sounds of JEC, her work seemed to offer a more concrete entry 
into the problem of the relationship between written English and spoken 
creole. As in Brand's case, the dialect "speaker" is not a buffoon or stock 
ethnic character, but the poet, whose Jamaican identity is almost 
equivalent to that of the consciousness behind the passages in standard 
written English. This removes the element of objectification that makes 
dialect writing an inappropriate frame. 
Allen's poetry is so overtly political, so much an act of protest, activism 
and inspiration for social change, that there is no chance to miss the 
message that these spellings are part of a political message — and a 
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political practice. The question of what exactly the conversion is between 
writing and JEC is clearly bound up, in Allen's work, with emancipatory 
politics. For example, as a dub poet, Allen depends on the spoken 
Jamaican word for her effects; so that when she writes poetry, she is 
driven to incorporate those effects somehow on the written page. The 
problem is that the "phonetic" Latin alphabet in which English is written 
is anything but phonetic. In Chapter Three, I make the point that English 
spellings are so highly standardised that their most important function is 
to do with group membership, with power and solidarity within the 
dominant (written) group, and only secondarily with representation of 
sound. Allen's position in relation to this group — the group of "literate", 
English-speaking poets — is conditioned by her membership in another 
group — JEC-speaking political activists. 
It is from the latter position that she is able to criticise the literary 
establishment. Her position/practice raises a number of important 
questions such as: what is the relationship of literature to writing? How 
does this relationship shape the things that can be said in literature and in 
writing, by women, black people, poor people, migrants, and other 
culturally and economically marginalised people? What are the meanings 
that are missing from the written and high literary, from what is normally 
called poetry? Allen's work is partly an attempt to say the things that 
can't be said in written, literary ways, because those ways do not allow 
these things to be said. 
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However, Allen's spellings are also meant to evoke JEC, an oral 
language. Because all Caribbean English Creoles are oral languages, they 
are a powerful symbolic resource for the subversion of colonial 
grammars on many levels. One is the grammar of standard English, 
which is a codification of the verbal patterns of colonial and post-
colonial Britain and neo-imperial English North America. Another is the 
grammar that structures relationships between people of different social 
categories such as class, race, gender, age, and so on. In Chapter Five, I 
look at the properties of signs that allow one to say that the grammar of 
"a language" works in the same way as the grammar of a social category 
system such as "gender" or "race". For it is on this level that there is a 
connection between the oral /written nature of Allen's and Brand's 
poetry and the expression of a black feminist sensibility. In Chapter Two 
I will expand on black feminism. 
Why Social Semiotics? 
In what follows, there is a tension between social semiotics conceived of 
as a type of linguistics and social semiotics as an alternative to 
linguistics. It is as an expansion of linguistics that I develop social 
semiotics in the direction necessary to talk about these texts. 4 
4 Whether the resulting approach can be called "linguistics" will depend on the reader's 
agreement with the statement that linguistics is a range of different approaches to the 
study of "language". 
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Although most linguists would not consider semiotics an "expansion" of 
their discipline, semiotics is a natural direction for linguists who find the 
object of formal linguistics too restricted (by disciplinary-political 
concerns) to be useful in certain applications. The application of 
linguistics — as the study of the structure of language — to poetry seems 
reasonable, but it has not fulfilled its potential within the criteria of 
literature as a discipline because literature is interested in interpretation 
in meaning-making — whereas "meaning" in linguistics is a much more 
limited affair. (On the other hand, in its focus on interpretation, literature 
in the early 21s` century lacks a formal method, in the way in which 
method permeates formal linguistics.) One of the key differences 
between linguistics and semiotics, then, is that formal linguistics does not 
really concern itself with meaning, whereas semiotics both does and does 
not. In Chapter Five I explore the classical Saussurian sign from the 
point of view of several different formal paradoxes relevant to this initial 
contradiction. 
However, a fundamental limitation of classical semiotics is that Saussure 
left undeveloped the social side of his vision of semiotics, which he 
introduced as semiology, "the science of signs as part of social life" (15, 
emphasis mine). Except in social semiotics, this limitation has persisted 
in semiotics and structuralism, so that Derrida's post-structuralist sign 
(Of Grammatology), based on a structuralist reading of Saussure, is an a-
social formalism for the discussion of meaning-making. In Chapter Three 
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I look at the Derridean sign and its possible application to the problem of 
the transcription of creole in the written work of Allen. It is the social 
and political aspects of the problem of creole transcription that cannot be 
grasped using the Derridean sign. 
It is not enough to make a linguistics "social" to make it useful for 
talking about politically-committed texts such as Allen's and Brand's. 
Classical dialectology (Chambers and Trudgill), or variationist 
sociolinguistics (Labov), for example, are "social" in the sense that they 
rely on social categories (class, age, urban / rural, occupational status, 
education, etc.) for their descriptions of language in social life. But these 
categories are unexamined, untheorised; as such, they incorporate into 
these linguistics relatively conservative visions of social organisation. 
These are in turn implicit political analyses, which in both their 
hiddeness and their support of the status quo preserve social inequalities 
(see also Williams). 
Social semiotics developed out of the critical linguistics (Fowler et al.) 
and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, van Dyke) movement in the 
1980s. One of the main objectives of these projects was to focus on the 
ideologies that motivated texts — ideology in the sense of false 
consciousness — and to produce text analyses aware of the specific 
political motivations both in its own operations and in the operations of 
object-texts. 
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A third limitation of traditional linguistics centres on materiality. 
Systems of signs are everywhere in social life, and can be studied apart 
from language. Saussure's original vision of semiotics inspired studies of 
a range of objects as texts in Barthes, Levi-Strauss, and others. That fact 
that these texts are made up of non-verbal signs 	 images, food, music, 
narratives — shows that a linguistic method might successfully be applied 
to non-verbal texts. Semiotics extends its focus beyond the verbal, and 
within a formal paradigm that allows an analysis of both verbal and non-
verbal meaning-making at the same time, in the same text. 
Paradoxically, the fact that their methodological basis was a kind of 
linguistics has stopped many semioticians from considering the very 
materiality of signs. Whereas it is the assumption of linguistics that the 
form and content of a sign are divisible (and linguistics studies form 
only), it is the assumption of literary studies that form is motivated by 
content. That is, the form of a text is shaped by its content, or the content 
intended by the author. In this, social semiotics has adopted the 
assumption of literary studies that there is a motivated relation between 
signifier and signified (see Kress "Against arbitrariness"). But it has 
gone further and included the materiality of the text as a motivated 
signifier. Kress and van Leeuwen call this "the means and processes of 
inscription" (230), rightly pointing out that "the same" text written with 
pen and ink or written with a word processor are not the same text (231). 
It is this last step that makes social semiotics particularly suited to talking 
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about the difference between written and oral versions of the "same" text 
— and about the social meanings created by these different means of 
inscription. 
What is Social Semiotics? 
Theory 
In previous work I undertook on code-switching in Brand's "no language 
is neutral", it became evident that a "code" is anything socially agreed on 
as a separate language / dialect / style / lect / variety / etc. In other words, 
a code is not a linguistic entity, but a social one carried in perceptible 
(verbal) reflexes. However, Brand's two codes were also indexical of 
ethnic identities (Trinidadian, Anglo-Canadian); and also race. These two 
social entities (ethnicity and race) are linked through historical relations 
of power between the British (to whose language these terms belong) and 
peoples of what is now the Third World. In addition, because of her 
political analysis, Brand's perception is that gender is deeply affected by 
co-constructed with -- race (see Black Feminism, Chapter Two); and 
sexuality is also socially constructed within a network of identity 
relations. 
From the point of view of "switching", or meaning-making by reference 
to perceptible codes, all of these referents (ethnicity, race, gender, 
sexuality) are codes in themselves. They are codes just as a language is a 
code in the sense that gender is a system for making sense of the world, 
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as is race, ethnicity, sexuality, age, and others. Like a language, they are 
constitutive (as wholes) of personal identity. Like a language, they 
contain terms that are meaningful only within the terms of reference of 
the system (e.g., "femininity" has meaning in relation to "masculinity"). 
Like languages, they are sets of markers of social identity, conditioning 
the meanings made with them. 
At the very beginning of Chapter Five I give a short account of 
semiotics; I will refer the reader unfamiliar with semiotics there with the 
explanatory statement that a code is a metasign (a type of sign). Social 
semiotics is semiotics informed by a social-theoretical critical position. It 
sees any instance of meaning-making as first and foremost a social event 
embedded in relations of power. 
Kress' version of social semiotics takes interaction as a starting point for 
analysis, rather than structures (of language or meaning); texts are 
understood as collections of signs, signs as social practices. Hodge and 
Kress5 aim to theorise "the social processes through which meaning is 
constituted and has its effects" (viii). These social processes are carried 
out by social subjects as agents of meaning-making, though always 
constrained by their social position and the context of the interaction. For 
Hodge and Kress, "... texts and contexts, agents and objects of meaning, 
5 As I often cite Social Semiotics but rarely the other volume by Hodge and Kress listed 
in the bibliography (Language As Ideology) "Hodge and Kress" from now on will refer 
only to Social Semiotics. 
23 
social structures and forces and their complex interrelationships together 
constitute the minimal and irreducible object of semiotic analysis." (viii) 
In addition, Kress and van Leeuwen see all texts as multi-modal 
constituted through different media, or modes. A spoken text, for 
example, is visual and aural (sound based) as well as verbal. A printed 
written text is visual in the different modes of page lay-out and 
typography, as well as verbal. A complete description of how specific 
meanings are made must include a description of all the modes of the 
text. 
Others' names have been associated with social semiotics, notably 
Halliday (Language As Social Semiotic), Hodge, van Leeuwen, Lemke, 
Thibault, Threadgold, and their students and associates. They certainly 
share the critical social-theoretical orientation crucial to the "social" in 
social semiotics; Lemke, however, takes a slightly more social-functional 
approach, Thibault slightly more text-based in Social Semiotics as 
Praxis, Threadgold explicitly feminist, and so forth. At the same time, 
their interest has been in pushing forward the project of creating a critical 
theory and practice of text analysis that sees "text" as meaning-in-the-
making in socio-political context. 
I have found specific aspects of the social semiotic theory of Kress useful 
as an entry into the work of Allen and Brand. In Social Semiotics, style is 
essentially social in function, by sustaining difference and identity. It 
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corresponds to Labov's use of "style" (in Sociolinguistic Patterns) to 
mean the linguistic features that identify the social provenance of 
speakers. Hodge and Kress take the term "style" further by designating it 
a "metasign", so that style and accent are not only social in origin and 
function, but also central to meaning. As carriers of group identity, 
metasigns declare a specific version of social relations, within a context 
in which language is normally dialogic. Multi-lingual texts are only one 
(obvious) site of negotiation within and between groups. 
For Kress, the doctrine of the motivated sign is central, as I have said. In 
addition, signs can be opaque or transparent signifiers, depending on the 
social positions of the interactants. This makes signs texts in themselves, 
and not the simple tokens described in Saussure. 	 In "Against 
arbitrariness" Kress argues that critical analysis must reject the notion of 
the arbitrariness of the sign prevalent in mainstream linguistics and 
semiotics. In Chapter Five, however, I will try and recover the arbitrary 
sign for social semiotics. 
Methodology 
There is the methodology for "reading" specific passages in the poetry of 
Allen and Brand; then there is the methodology for arriving at this 
methodology. Since this is a project with a dual ambition (to work out a 
suitable methodology for reading texts which constitute a challenge to 
established methodologies; and to then use this new tool to make 
revealing readings), more than half the project is taken up with an 
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argument in support of an emerging methodology. Chapter Three, for 
example, is a first attempt to find a methodology in the sign theory of 
Derrida; it contains a close reading of selected passages in "The End of 
the Book and the Beginning of Writing". This close reading is simply a 
recorded attempt to reason out his meanings. Various branches of 
sociolinguistics aid in my attempts in the same chapter to correlate 
Allen's practice with Derrida's description of the relationship between 
speech and writing. In Chapter Four I turn to the same mix of 
sociolinguistic variation and creolistics to explore social notions of 
verbal error and correctness, and their function both in meaning-making 
and in the social construction of "a language". The strongly interactional 
and discourse-analytic bent of this chapter is social semiotic. 
However, social semiotics lacks the formal resources to account for the 
systemic nature of some kinds of meaning-making. In Chapter Five I turn 
to Saussure's semiotics, which relies on the sign as part of a system, to 
explain how the social-interactional work that goes into creating 
language boundaries on the level of the everyday is a part of more 
general meaning-making dynamics. 
The social semiotics of Kress in its methodology is essentially 
ethnographic. In Chapters Six and Seven, I follow this ethnographic 
approach to read selected passages in the work of Allen and Brand. 
Chapter Six uses the notions of markers and stereotypes, introduced in 
Labov's Language in the Inner City, adopted for social semiotics in 
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Hodge and Kress, and extended here through the production principle of 
projection, for readings of passages by Allen and Brand. 
Chapter Seven takes up a second fundamental production principle, 
embodiment ("experiential meaning-making" in Van Leeuwen's Speech, 
Music, Sound). In Kress and van Leeuwen's social semiotics, it is an 
explanation of meaning-in-the-making according to the physical actions 
actually or potentially made to produce it. To anticipate my argument in 
the next section, I take up the point from feminist theory (and Lemke's 
social semiotics) that semiotic bodies are socially constructed; I argue 
that, in light of this, even physical sensations and actions are experienced 
through a filter of personal, corporeal identity as shaped by power / 
gender / race relations. The implication for social semiotics is that as 
much attention has to be paid to the social ways bodies are shaped in 
their negotiations of meaning with the world as to the way meanings are 
produced through universally experienced, a-social bodies (as 
"experiential meaning-making"). Like Chapter Six, Chapter Seven is a 
reading of selected passages in the work of Allen and Brand in the light 
of both preceding theory and simultaneous discussion of production 
principles in social semiotics. 
Summary of the argument 
In Chapter Two I introduce the poetry of Allen and of Brand by placing 
their work in Caribbean literary-historical context and in the context of 
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Black American women writers, and finally in the context of black 
feminism. The point of black feminism is that in other feminisms all 
women are not really equal; ignoring the effect of race on the position of 
a woman perpetuates the implicit racism of society at large, which 
"erases" blacks in the same way it "erases" women by assuming a white, 
male point of view. My argument is that this may also lead to an 
awareness of the contradiction between the contingency of all social 
categories (but especially gender and race) and the concreteness of 
physical characteristics that seem to define them (especially skin colour, 
in the poetry of Brand). 
This preliminary work gives the reader a cultural and textual context for 
the following argument. Recall that the guiding question of the argument 
is, what is the relationship between spoken creole and English writing? 
An obvious place to start is with phonetic spellings; here, with an 
imagined moment when a performance poet such as Allen wants to re-
produce Jamaican English Creole in written form. The primary, taken-
for-granted connection between a standardised letter and its sound is 
precisely what is at issue in dialect writings. 
In Chapter Two I look for a model for thinking about the formal 
relationship between speech and writing in order to understand as 
precisely as possible how Allen's spelling choices might create a specific 
political and social position against a matrix of standard English 
spellings. Since this is a roughly deconstructive project, in Chapter Three 
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I approach Derrida's "The End of the Book and the Beginning of 
Writing" (in Of Grammatology) with the expectation that a post-
structuralist model of the sign based on writing° would help track the 
relationship between speech and writing. 
My hopes for the explanatory power of Derrida's sign are frustrated, 
however, by the narrow view of meaning which informs the premise of 
his argument. Derrida's arche-writing is based on the following-through 
to its conclusion of an overly-simplified version 	 an ethnocentric 
version 	 of phonetic writing? Although he argues against this 
ethnocentrism in several different guises (logocentrism, phonocentrism, 
the metaphysics of presence) and he identifies it as a key problem in the 
Western metaphysical tradition, he believes he is forced to remain within 
it (Writing and Difference 280-81). 
In thinking about orality and literacy in relation to Derrida's work, I 
began to see more concretely how creole as an oral language might have 
a profoundly destabilising effect on certain codes. Dub poets such as 
Allen make a fallacy of Derrida's arche-writing through an emphasis on 
"versions", on local meanings, and on the materiality of their poetry. In 
her writings Allen is careful to retain the status of the ephemeral 
6 In polemic opposition to linguistics, which has claimed to be based on sound. 
7 Since Dcrrida's work has been taken up at very theoretical levels in American literary 
scholarship, one might think that this is a mis-reading of Derrida to start with; but in 
"The End of the Book" Derrida's justifies "the necessity of the communication between 
the concept of arche-writing and the vulgar concept of writing submitted to 
deconstruction by it."(60) 
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"version" for the printed poem. Creole spellings invoke local -- 
contingent, historical -- knowledges through linguistic stereotypes, and 
they use the power of a very strong norm (standardisation of the English 
spelling code) to strengthen the meaning of deviance from the same 
norm. Although Derrida's post-structuralist sign does not, in the end, 
explain the relationship between creole speech and English writing, it 
does push forward a far more contextualised approach to the question of 
why Allen's transcription of Jamaican English Creole (hereafter JEC) 
"works" in making certain meanings in her written texts. She uses verbal 
stereotypes of Jamaicanness to signal 1) a cultural and political position 
outside the written standard, and 2) specific speech sounds. 
These two "meanings" of written creole are inseparable because of the 
social semiotics of highly standardised languages such as English. The 
use of creole evokes its speakers, who hold a certain position in the 
postcolonial Anglophone world. At the same time, any verbal utterance, 
spoken or written, takes part in the positioning of its speaker by reference 
to standards of error / correctness. These are two different poles of 
reference for relative meaning: conformity to a norm and cultural 
identity. The situation of creole speakers in relation to writing in fact 
combines the dynamics of both, for recreating creole through English 
writing demands breaking norms of correct writing (orthographically, 
morphologically, and syntactically). 
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Chapter Four is a discussion of methodology in the light of these 
preliminary findings. It looks more closely at the description of certain 
Caribbean English Creoles as a set of dialects which can be arranged on a 
continuum between two poles, the local English standard and the local 
creole (e.g., Standard Jamaican English and Jamaican English Creole). 
However, the local creoles incorporate many lexical and other elements 
of standard English; so it quickly becomes evident that at least for 
creoles, continua are in fact not entities but a set of social practices in 
which speakers in a single community use two idealized "languages" 
(e.g. a Standard and a creole) as points of reference for a huge amount of 
communicative variation. It is a small step from dialect continua to the 
realisation that, if there really are such entities as bounded languages, 
they are mythical — or semiotic. 
A treatment of languages as semiotic entities is a focus on a language as 
a popular notion, and the perception of the distinctness of a language as a 
result of a group-member's need to symbolise a standard (in the non-
linguistic sense of the word) and to position themselves in relation to it. 
The rest of the chapter explores the implications of this in the 
development of an interactional approach to text analysis rather than an 
approach based on the notion of "language" as an abstraction of a 
discreet language. 
The description of a text through its "language" rests on a description of 
that language through a grammar, and this in turn depends on a notion of 
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grammaticality: an utterance is either grammatical, that is, belongs "in" a 
language or it doesn't. But if there is no such thing as "a language", but 
only an idea of a language, then these grammaticality judgements have 
more do with a social standard (notions of error / correctness) than with 
"a language" in itself; and it is very easy to show that, without an entity 
by which to judge correctness (such as a bounded language) such 
judgements are social rather than absolute. That is, "correctness" in 
verbal meaning-making is generated not by reference to a standard 
(national) language, but by the relative social status of speakers. It is the 
higher-status speaker who speaks correctly. 
The boundaries of a language (or other codified verbal entity such as a 
grapholect, or written version of a language) are where judgements of 
correctness are the same as judgements of inclusion on two different 
levels. On the first, marginalised or lower-status speakers are marked by 
their usage as Other, while their status marks their usage as such. In other 
words, there is a double play characteristic of semiotic phenomena in 
which material distinctions (usage) both create and are created by mental 
(and in social semiotics, social) distinctions. The boundary of a language 
is thus a crucial site of status-negotiation between participants in any 
exchange. 
On another level, judgements of correctness are also judgements for the 
inclusion or exclusion of any particular item or pattern "in" the language 
/ code of the community. Thus, in any exchange (including the 
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production/consumption of literary texts), this boundary, this attention to 
marked items, functions not just as a mediator for the positioning of 
writer and reader in relation to one another, but also as a joint re-
definition of the language / boundary — and a re-creation of the code. 
But if there is no such thing as "a language", what is this "code"? Since it 
is a term from formal semiotics, in Chapter Five I go to Saussure's Cours 
linguistique generale to find out. In Cours a code is a "system" — a 
term that will become useful for working out the relationship of implicit 
codes to each other and to the terms within them (signs). I find evidence 
in Saussure for two different and seemingly contradictory models of the 
sign — the sign as unitary, and the sign as a duality. However, both 
aspects of the sign are necessary to explain how the sign works and how 
it functions in a system. 
Every sign is really a sign-function during which two symbolic systems 
are generated at the same moment and only for the purposes of the 
immediate interaction. In order to do this, the two systems must be 
closed systems. What creates a sign-function when they are 
simultaneously generated is the strength of the boundary between the 
signifier and the signified, which is constituted from the boundaries of 
the closed systems. 
This is the very same boundary that speakers in social interaction 
negotiate in establishing their standing through verbal error / correctness; 
33 
they make reference to the perceived boundaries of a national language 
(whether some verbal pattern is "inside" the language or excluded by the 
language i.e. incorrect), or to some sociolect as a sub-set of the language. 
It is also the boundary between material phenomena (such as grapheme 
and phoneme, or thought and sound, as in Saussure's example). Material 
phenomena are always semioticised in social terms. 
The implicit references to systemic boundaries in the everyday 
deployment of social categories such as national language, "race" and 
gender, the boundaries people use to position themselves and each other 
socially, are the very same boundaries that constitute these categories; so 
that, contrary to the common-sense belief that these categories "exist" 
transcendentally, Saussurian semiotics can show that they are constituted 
and re-constituted as systems in every moment of interaction. The same 
applies to modes such as languages, the voice, writing, the semiotic 
body; by looking at the sign, we can see that material distinctions are 
socially-defined and maintained. 
This last insight explains how materiality, such as ink on paper or vocal 
sounds, becomes semioticised as modes: from this point of view a mode 
is a socially-constructed, bounded set of potential (material) signs, acting 
as a sign in itself and inevitably participating in different discourses. A 
dialect (including a national language) is a mode; a grapholect is a mode; 
a voice is a mode (especially in literary studies); a body is also a mode. 
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From the formal model in Chapter Five we can take away some 
explanations of how meanings are made in production. In Chapter Six I 
look at projection, a practice that relies on the very same perceived 
boundaries of dialects I have been theorizing. Brand makes full use of 
code-switching of various types and on various levels to make meaning. 
When applied to modes (speech and writing, in this case) as well as 
dialects the model begins to make better sense of transcribed creole not 
as written, but as written to be read as if heard. That is, the very same 
formal and social semiotic principles that come into play in the making 
of meanings across two "languages" come into play in the making of 
meaning by reference to different juxtaposed modes. Allen's phonetic 
spellings rely on the same principles of projection, with the added 
element of visually-iconic markers of difference from the orthographic 
standard (such as "dun" (done); "yu" (you)); these visual reminders 
create the same differences in mode by reference to a matrix of standard 
English spellings. 
The move from considering the written texts of Allen and Brand as 
multilingual to multimodal (although still written) opens up an enormous 
range of material connections in their texts. Although still written, their 
poetry is also oral; if oral, then also embodied; if embodied, then also 
participating in discourses of race, gender, sexuality, and a host of other 
systems of social organisation and individual identity. But crucially, 
seeing the semiotic body as a mode (that is, as a resource for making 
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certain meanings that cannot be made in any other way) allows certain 
meanings to be made in the English grapholect that cannot be made in 
any other way. 
In Chapter Seven I take up this and further insights from Chapter Five in 
relation to embodiment and codes of identity: what I call social category 
grammars. Like the grammars of languages, social categories are not 
transcendent and immutable, but constructed in interaction in the 
everyday (i.e., in texts such as Allen's and Brand's). "Race" is the name 
of a set of grammars that includes the terms black, white, Asian, Latin-
American, Oriental, and so forth, in different combinations, including 
some potential terms and ignoring others according to the history of a 
particular place. These are not essential terms — there is no such thing as 
"a black" or "a female" — but relative terms — "black" as "non-white", 
"female" as "non-male". People behave as if these terms are "true"; and 
that is the fundamental insight of semiotics. 
The term "metasign" from Social Semiotics is useful as a way of 
remembering the contingent qualities of these codes: their constituent 
signs, which are very often embodied (dress, posture, skin tone, voice 
quality, and so forth) are signs about signs, that is, they are indications of 
how signs denoting content are to be read; they are not (just) signs in 
themselves. In other words, instead of "whiteness", there is a quality or 
style of "white" conditioning all meanings made under its aegis. The 
analogy to keep in mind here is that of the popular notion of "a 
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language" — the content of an utterance may be comparable in French or 
English, but the mode is different — making the meaning different. And, 
just as speakers' negotiation of the boundaries of "a language" is a way 
both of establishing their relative status as well as mutually re-creating 
the language, speakers negotiating their identity in terms such as 
"American" or "black" are taking part in the re-creation of these systems 
of identity metasigns while negotiating relative status. 
This last step is crucial as an explanation of the role of embodiment in 
the poetry of Allen and Brand. Their aim is not to destroy discourses of 
race and gender, which would not only be an impossibility but also a loss 
to their sense of self; their aim is to bring these discourses, which 
circulate in embodied signs, into both literary culture and the written 
mode. 
Work done in the area 
While there have been no major critical studies focusing on the language 
of African-Caribbean women's poetry, in recent years there has been a 
fair amount of activity focused on Afro-Caribbean women writers in 
diaspora (Chancy, Hoving). Prior to that, the focus had been more 
generally Caribbean women's writing, collected in for example, Wisker, 
Cudjoe, and Davies and Fido; and on "Black women's" writing as a 
rather arbitrarily defined corpus encompassing African-American, - 
Caribbean, -British, and -Canadian writing in all genres (e.g., Nasta). 
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Fiction tends to receive more attention than poetry: there have been a 
number of articles and at least one book-length study of West Indian 
women's fiction (O'Callaghan). Female dub and reggae poets and 
calypsonians are excluded from these literary groupings, with one 
exception: Cooper's Noises in the Blood: Orality, Gender and the 
`Vulgar' Body in Jamaican Popular Culture. 
An academic in literary studies, Cooper in this book ventures onto the 
more slippery terrain of theorising and "reading" Jamaican oral 
performances and song lyrics. Texts by Louise Bennett, Jean Binta 
Breeze, and the Sistren Collective receive attention (only Jean Binta 
Breeze is a dub poet); the remainder of the performers in the study are 
men. Cooper looks at Jamaican verbal art, both written and as embodied 
performance, in the light of current literary and feminist theory. Her 
thesis is that oral and scribals culture are a continuum for verbal artists in 
Jamaica, and that the functions of orality in Jamaican popular culture 
include an attempted reversal of colonial hierarchies of gender, ethnicity 
(African vs. European) and "taste". It is a thesis similar to my own 
(about the connection between grammars of language and those of 
gender and race), developed in a more generalised, post-modern 
discourse. 
8 I borrow this term from Cooper, who uses it in a general way through her collection 
of essays to mean the discourses and practices of written literary texts (in the specific 
context of Jamaica). See "literary" in Terms, below. 
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Cooper considers the question of the transcription of creole: "...Popular 
orthographies for Jamaican depend exclusively on English orthography: 
colonialism inscribed."(12) Like Habekost, she points out that a perfectly 
consistent phonetic spelling makes reading difficult "for readers literate 
in English. The words on the page look strange; they don't 'sound' 
[create subvocalisationsl like they would in English" (12). This is an 
interesting reversal of my experience with Brand's transcription, which is 
not phonetic however; and it is true that Allen's phonetic spellings very 
occasionally seem to thud (sub-vocally). My best guess is that readers 
subvocalise their most familiar orthographic system and have trouble 
`hearing' the sounds of others. Cooper supports the project of writing 
creole, however, experimenting with various systems in her own 
writing.. 
Separate articles can be found on the work of Allen and Brand, although 
Allen's work tends to receive more attention from reviewers of her 
performances and albums than from literary critics. Even Rogal's article 
in Books in Canada says more about performance poetry as an alternative 
to high literature than about Allen's texts in themselves. There is, in 
effect, a telling silence about Allen's actual texts in the serious literary 
and academic press. 
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An exception is Eldridges's analysis of the race and international class 
politics of Allen's poetry and its critical reception. Eldridge is an 
academic working in cultural studies; and of the writings on Allen's 
work, this is the most critically sophisticated. Its location in disciplinary-
methodological space is at a junction of political analysis, contemporary 
history, and text analysis, inspired by the cultural studies of Paul Gilroy 
and Stuart Hall. Deeply embedded as the text analysis is in commentary 
about the contemporary political and social issues that motivate Allen's 
texts, it is perhaps the only satisfying reading of Allen's texts from a 
literary point of view, in that it interprets her texts insightfully and 
thoroughly, with attention to performed aspects of meaning as well as 
purely verbal ones. Significantly, it does not use the traditional tools of 
the literary critic, either of literary theory or of close reading. Eldridge's 
article is a partial answer to one of my questions, which was, what 
approach is adequate to talk about Allen's texts (and implicitly, why is a 
traditional literary / language-based approach not sufficient)? The essay, 
however, is mostly silent on the issue of Allen's treatment of standard, 
written English, and her transcription of sound. 
In the popular music press, there have been a fair number of reviews of 
Allen's work (e.g., Tompkins, Carr, Doran), especially in two the years 
in which she won Juno (Canadian pop-music industry) awards (1987 and 
1988). In the Fall 1988 issue of MUSICWORKS, an interesting interview 
with Allen by Bartley gives insight into the genesis and spirit of dub 
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poetry, especially as created by Allen, and into her philosophy of 
meaning-making. One of Allen's responses, about dub and about 
phonetic spellings, is referred to in Chapter Six. 
Habekost's rewarding book-length study of dub poets, Verbal Riddim, 
can perhaps best be described as pop-musicological. It contains two 
chapters in which Allen's work (with that of other,  dub poets) receives 
attention. His interpretations are interesting for the equal attention he 
gives to the written and performed versions of the same poem (e.g., 
Allen's "I Fight Back", 148-58). For example, he makes remarks about 
Allen's choice to render the written version of "I Fight Back" in standard 
written English, without phonetic spellings, even though on the 
Revolutionary Tea Party album the poem is performed in JEC. One line, 
quoting a white ethnic Canadian, is performed in standard Canadian 
English; Habekost makes the interesting point that the original, Jamaican 
persona replies to this white speaker in standard Canadian English as 
well. But this is a passing observation; my own interests would pursue 
this observation to ask, what meanings are made at that point by Allen's 
changes in code? Even more fascinating, how does Allen make decisions 
as to what to render as JEC in writing and what to present in a neutral 
written standard? 
Habekost also gives attention to the transcription of dub as performance, 
and to the transcription of "Patois" (JEC). The inconsistencies in the 
transcription of creole, even in the work of one poet, can be accounted 
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for by the need to compromise between "dialectal authenticity and 
lexical intelligibility" (107), (though it can also be "carelessness". 
Habekost takes the performance as the basis for the transcription.) 
Habekost summarises the issues in the debate about standardizing a 
creole orthography in Jamaica. He ends with a quote showing Linton 
Kwesi Johnson's transcription, which, he says, "not only use[s] Patois as 
a means of linguistic/oral resistance to the standard form of (colonially 
rooted) English, but ... also effectively transfer[s] this idea to the page in 
an endeavour to make visible the African base of [his] language." (107- 
108),This is the "deviance" role for phonetic spelling I have mentioned. 
Brand has been given more attention by literary critics (e.g., 
Sarbadhikary, Zackodnick). Among the most developed literary-critical 
commentaries is Hunter's essay, which points out that, in common with 
two other Trinidad-Canadian women poets, Brand's work paradoxically 
depends on hegemonic modernist poetics (of fragmentation) to develop 
an alternative position from which to articulate her experiences of racism 
in Canada. Kaup focuses on the literary-historical position of Brand and 
other West Indian writers in Canada, tracing their evolution from 
expatriate writers to members of Canada's literary community. Both are 
silent on the technical choices made by Brand in rendering TEC in 
writing. 
Meira uses a Lacanian approach to read "hard against the soul", Brand's 
lesbian love poems in No Language Is Neutral, creating an extended 
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reading focused on Brand's treatment of the body I her writing. Her 
perception of the body in Brand's poetry is perhaps similar to mine: 
the binary as a structural device is replaced by the fold so that 
there is consequently no distinction made between subject and 
object, context and content and finally between body and gaze... 
she refuses all such significations so that the writing subject is 
collapsed within the body of the text (89). 
She concludes: "... Brand's writing constructs the female body as a site 
of performance, whether of the gaze or of the voice, the 
embodied/enacted textual body, the body constructed by language..." 
(91) These descriptions redound with mine, but they are embedded in a 
different approach to description (Lacanian) which makes her 
explanations for these characteristics of Brand's poetry quite different. 
The contrast is interesting. 
In sociolinguistics, the current climate of acceptance for critical 
sociolinguistics in the UK has facilitated my own construction of a 
bridge between sociolinguistics (especially interactive sociolinguistics) 
and social semiotics, one which furthers my thinking about the textual 
practices of Allen and Brand. LePage's work on "acts of identity" has 
been enormously influential, both on my MA research as well as its 
expansion and development here. Rampton and Hewitt also do 
ethnographic work at the borders of languages, and of identity groupings; 
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however, they do not look at written texts, and the connection they make 
between language and identity as processes is less carefully articulated as 
a theoretical statement than LePage's. Sebba's work on a specific creole 
in the metropolis (London Jamaican) is useful as general background, 
bearing out my own findings in the practice of Brand; however, his work 
on creole spellings in the UK "Phonology meets ideology" has direct 
relevance for my interests here. 
Following Street's "ideological" analysis of literacy practices, he 
examines the approaches to phonetic spellings taken by contemporary 
British Creole writers, from data in his Corpus of Written British Creole. 
He points out that certain phonetic spellings, such as "k" for /k/ where 
English would use "c" (e.g. in "kool") have no function in indicating a 
different sound value for the grapheme, but do have symbolic meanings 
linked to the indexicality of the reference: not-English (he calls it 
"distance", or, following Kloss, Abstand). In contrast to "autonomous" 
approaches to orthography, which argue for orthographic systems for 
oral languages based on learnability or accessibility through 
neighbouring systems, an "ideological" approach to orthography would 
take these sorts of practices into account. 
It is a great article, and I have not done full justice to it here; however, in 
this research I start from Sebba's observations, arrived at independently, 
and use them as premises in an argument for something a little different, 
or perhaps larger; that an "ideological" (social semiotic) approach to 
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written creole in some texts by femininist African-Caribbean writers 
reveals principles of meaning-making that are applicable more generally. 
Another more recent article about the ideological aspects of spelling is 
Jaffe's introduction to the special issue of Journal of Sociolinguistics on 
orthography (November 2000). She covers much of the same ground, 
very quickly, that I do in this research, without of course, finding 
implications for social semiotic theory. 
In social semiotics, Kress is the primary influence, and this thesis is an 
elaboration of his work in Social Semiotics (with Hodge), especially 
Chapter Four "Style as Ideology". Less to the foreground in this thesis, 
though still influential, is his work in Reading Images (with van 
Leeuwen); and the ideas in this thesis were developed while Multimodal  
Discourse was under development, so although there are few explicit 
references to Multimodal Discourse and its terms, a close reader of both 
texts will see the parallel paths of research. At the same time, my aims 
were both smaller in scope (what is going on in the space between creole 
and writing for Allen and Brand?) and different in disciplinary 
orientation (how can this work help bring together linguistics and 
literature?). 
Other social semioticians have been mentioned above: Lemke, Thibault, 
Threadgold, Halliday. Halliday's Social Semiotics was an important 
point of departure for many social semioticians; in the twenty-five years 
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since its publication, in which social semiotics has been pushed forward, 
many functional linguists, ethnographers of communication, and critical 
discourse analysts have also made particular concepts in it their point of 
departure. One example is Halliday's notion of anti-languages. I do not 
apply it to creole because it appears to me that creole is more than an 
underground sociolect, even in diaspora; and because it leads to the same 
one-dimensional text analysis as code-switching, neither of which 
account for the connections between language, mode, and gender / race 
evident in Allen and Brand's texts. Creole spellings might be considered 
attempts at a written anti-language; but again, mode is not considered in 
Halliday's anti-language, and my focus has been the oral / written 
political relationship. Consideration of this relationship deconstructs 
unitary entities such as "an" anti-language, although in Chapter Four I 
mention anti-languages briefly as an example of the connection between 
prestige — even covert prestige — and the shape of "a" language. 
Thibault's Re-Reading Saussure would seem to be of central importance 
for Chapter Five, which contains close readings of passages in 
Saussure's Cours. I agree with many of Thibault's readings, and with the 
project of reclaiming Saussure for social semiotics; I disagree with 
Kress' reading of Saussure in Social Semiotics (seeing more honest 
ambiguity in the Cours than Kress allows for). However, I found in the 
end that my own purposes in re-reading Saussure dictated a different 
path through these ambiguities than Thibault's. 
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Threadgold's Feminist Poetics was helpful in suggesting connections 
between social categories, linguistic categories, and levels of 
metalanguage; and of the importance of including the gendered, raced 
body in a materialistic theory of meaning-making such as social 
semiotics. It led to my further researches in Butler, black feminism, and 
to much of my attempt in Chapter Seven to connect bodies, grammars, 
and meanings. Threadgold's writing on metalanguages, and on 
linguistics as a metalanguage, was also supportive of my own thinking 
represented in this thesis by the notion of grammar as a powerful, 
meaning-making contradiction in terms; and of its essentially 
representational character. 
Terms 
Diaspora: this word in its generic spelling can refer to several historical 
dispersals of a people. Throughout this thesis, unless indicated otherwise, 
it refers to the emigration of a large number of people (in roughly 1950- 
• 1985) from the formerly-English Caribbean to London, Toronto, and 
New York. 
Orality: In my usage, orality is a mode. Here I am using a distinction 
presented by Gregory and Carroll between the actual material of the 
message (the medium) and the "distinctive set of linguistic features 
associated with a particular, recurring relationship" (38). That is, a text 
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such as script can be in a written medium but an oral mode if it employs 
many of the linguistic (syntactic, lexical) features usually associated with 
speech. Speech is the medium; orality is the mode. 
Mode: Mode is employed in this thesis to mean a socially-defined 
constellation of means of inscription as one material genre, or mode, e.g. 
film, photography, writing, page lay-out; but also the semiotic body, the 
voice, gesture, etc. Mode is also a term in the most recent work of Kress 
and van Leeuwen (Multimodal Discourse), defined as 
...semiotic resources which allow the simultaneous realisation of 
discourses and types of (inter)action. Designs then use these 
resources, combining semiotic modes, and selecting from the 
options which they make available according to the interests of a 
particular communication situation. 
Modes can be realised in more than one production medium. 
Narrative is a mode because it allows discourse to be formulated 
in particular ways (ways which personify and dramatise 
discourses, among other things), because it constitutes a 
particular kind of interaction, and because it can be realised in a 
range of different media. 
It follows that media become modes once their principles of 
semiosis begin to be conceived of in more abstract ways (as 
`grammars' of some kind). This in turn will make it possible to 
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realise them in a range of media. They lose their tie to a specific 
form of material realisation. (21-22) 
Literacy: I use "literary" in the traditional sense, with connotations of 
high literary culture, in order to retain its etymological link with 
"literacy" and the written mode. "Orality" includes both the mode and 
any works that would be called "literary" if they were written. This 
avoids the oxymoronic "oral literature" and retains the link between 
writing, literacy, standardisation, and the British nationalist-imperialist 
projects associated with training in literacy, literary canonisation, and 
literary education. I do not use the term "literacy" to mean control of 
specific cultural knowledge or social practices (Street). 
Contingent: implicitly contrasted to transcendent or a-historical; as 
contingency, a quality of temporariness, but also dependence on and 
interconnectedness with numerous features of the social space that 
together construct meanings at any given moment. 
Creole: I am aware that with this term I am eliding the difference 
between many different English-based creoles9 in the Caribbean, as well 
as their diaspora counterparts. (See Sebba for a description of London 
Jamaican, popularly known as "creole" among its users.) However, since 
my remarks are most often about the relationship between any one of 
these historically and lexically related languages and standard written 
9 Not to mention the French-, Spanish-, Dutch-, and Portuguese-based Caribbean creoles. 
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English, I use "creole" to designate the generic political entity. 
Depending on the context of use in the following chapters, "creole" 
means either London Jamaican or one of the Caribbean English Creoles 
used either in the Caribbean or in Toronto. I reserve the proper name 
Caribbean English Creoles when connoting their status as autonomous 
linguistic entities within the discipline of linguistics. 
Black. Although I find this term racist, I use it because it has the widest 
currency amongst the poets under discussion. I find it racist because of 
the connotations of the colour black in European culture (the unknown, 
the negative, the impure, etc.), which are emphasised when one considers 
that "[B/b]lack" is used in the UK and the U.S. to designate recent 
immigrants from many parts of the world besides Africa. This creates the 
lexical sets: black/non-white/not-us and white/us, which is the semantic 
structure of the dominant group. "Black" is the American spelling; it is 
most often spelled with a lower case ("black") in the UK. 
Western. Again, a compromise term denoting Europe and its settler 
colonies (Canada, the United States, Australia are the largest UK settler 
colonies), which have become the sources of hegemonic culture in the 
Third World. Of course it ignores the fact that the "settler colonies" are 
merely extreme forms of the European invasions of established cultures 
all over the world. 
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"Race" is almost always in quotes to remind the reader that this is a 
purely social, and very shifting, category. It is not a scientific category 
in biology the human species has no sub-divisions by race, unlike 
spiders, which species contains several races. 
Positioned practice, a term from Thibault's Social Semiotics as Praxis, 
one of whose concerns is subjectivity in social semiotics. It is a useful 
term for "person" when I wish to emphasise the embeddedness of 
subjectivity as a practice in the social categories I discuss in Chapter 
Seven (see also Thibault Social Semiotics 8). 
Poetics is the philosophy of literary meaning-making; I most often use to 
refer to a specific philosophy (e.g., the poetics of Allen). 
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Chapter Two 
LITERARY CONTEXTS 
In Chapter One I sketched a set of contrasts between linguistics and 
literature. Linguistics is here considered a range of different approaches 
to the study of "language", which is the object of study that all the 
different types of linguistics have in common (as well as being the 
construction of the discipline). Literature must be distinguished from 
literary studies, which is the discipline; literature is its object, constructed 
in the same way as the object of linguistics (i.e., circularly, by the 
discipline for its own consumption). My approach is to inhabit the space 
between these two disciplines, using each to look at the other. 
This strategy is suggested by the texts under analysis. The poetics of 
Allen and Brand are partly driven by their perception of a gap between 
the nature of their own expressive strategies and (especially in the case of 
Allen) those considered literary or acceptable. Many times this gap is 
seen as a lack of participatory legitimacy; in many cases they feel their 
"language" (both national and personal) is constrained by dominant 
socio-political forces permeating their world. These are the forces arising 
out of European colonisation and neo-colonial cultural and economic 
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exploitation. Brand especially is aware of a dominant "language" whose 
function is to silence alternatives. 
But my dual approach is also necessitated by the diverging 
epistemologies of linguistics and literature. Stylistics is traditionally the 
application of linguistics to literary texts. However, to "apply" linguistics 
uncritically to literary texts almost certainly misappropriates the 
linguistics, as well as creating a reading that falls below the standards of 
a bona fide literary reading. By that I mean that in literary studies one 
reaches for the most plausible readings of texts, with (often) no 
prescribed method; this creates the condition for very rich readings, 
readings that cannot hope to be equalled by an approach developed 
within linguistics for another object of study (e.g., dialects; the structure 
of a national language; code-switching; Universal grammar). In order to 
"do" both disciplines at the same time, I have found that, as a linguist, I 
must explore fully the cultural context of the text in my analysis: this is 
one defence against reductive readings. 
In this chapter, then, I discuss the literary-historical context of the work 
of Allen and Brand. I set their work in Caribbean literature to start with, 
gradually narrowing the focus to other African-Caribbean women poets, 
and then looking at Black American feminist literature and politics as 
explanatory contexts. I discuss a common theme of exile amongst 
women African-Caribbean poets in diaspora, excluding those who have 
settled in the United States. Next, I supply an overview of the themes and 
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concerns in Brand's poetry as a corpus; and then of Allen's. Finally, I 
describe two important literary/semiotic innovations that have influenced 
the work of contemporary African-Caribbean women writers: nation 
language, and dub poetry. 
Literary-historical context 
Because Allen and Brand are African-Caribbean, as well as Caribbean-
Canadian, I set their work in the Caribbean canon and in diaspora. 
Below, I discuss their poetry and politics in relation to those of Black 
American feminists. 
Perhaps the strongest canonical 1() influences on contemporary Caribbean 
poets are Derek Walcott and Edward Kamau Brathwaite. Both are 
African-Caribbean poets, one relatively Eurocentric in style and 
thematics (Nobel Laureate Walcott), the other steadfastly Afrocentric 
(Brathwaite). Writing from an educated middle-class position within the 
Caribbean since the mid-fifties and sixties, they have been internationally 
recognised as talented and sensitive poets, but they have not been 
particularly interested in re-examining dominant structures of patriarchy. 
The conflicts that give energy to their writing are about race and class, as 
these have been constructed by the official history of the Caribbean. 
10 This historical schema refers to works published and considered canonical because of 
their inclusion in Caribbean Literature course syllabi, especially in North America; 
women of African descent in the Caribbean have been writing all along, but 1) 
publication has been overwhelmingly dominated by men, and 2) poets working in 
nation language like Louise Bennett have until recently been excluded from the canon. 
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Phrases such as "the people" and "the African race" in Brathwaite's 
seminal epic-poetic narrative of the African-New World diaspora The 
Arrivants refer exclusively to men. 
Brathwaite and Walcott belong to Birbalsingh's "third stage" of English 
Caribbean literature, which lasted from roughly 1965 to 1980 (although 
both remain active). According to Birbalsingh, writers at this stage 
espouse post-Independence interests, in contrast to their predecessors, 
who were concerned with probing their predecessors' colonial outlook. 
The post-1980 generation on the other hand, Birbalsingh's "fourth 
stage", are concerned with their experiences as citizens of the "external 
frontiers" of the English-speaking Caribbean: London, New York, and 
Toronto (xi-xii). Although Birbalsingh does not say so, most of the 
diaspora poets of the 1980's are women. 
Most of these women poets live and work in Canada (e.g., Dionne Brand, 
Claire Harris, Nourbese Philip, Lorna Goodison, Olive Senior) and 
England (Merle Collins, Grace Nichols, Amryl Johnson); but within the 
English Caribbean, poets such as Lorna Craig and Opal Adisa Palmer 
have also established themselves. This grouping has been recognised in 
the critical literature l 1 . However the literature almost always excludes the 
women dub poets (see below for a description of dub). Within the self-
defined enclave of dub poetry, a strong group of poets (Lillian Allen, 
11 See Cudjoe, Davies, Davies and Fido, Williams, Wisker, Thompson, Mordecai and 
Wilson, Hoving, Bloom, and Chancy. 
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Ahdri Zhina Mandiela, Afua Cooper, Jean Binta Breeze I2, among others) 
developed very similar themes and concerns to those of the women poets 
who distribute their work primarily in print. Of these, Allen was 
performing in Canada in the seventies, although her commercial debut 
album Revolutionary Tea Party was not released until 1985. Her first 
commercially-distributed collection of print poems, Women Do This 
Every Day, was published in 1993. 13 
Female and black 
The concept of the simultaneity of oppression is still the 
crux of a Black feminist understanding of political reality 
and, I believe, one of the most significant ideological 
contributions of Black feminist thought. (Smith, xxxii) 
We ... find it difficult to separate race from class from sex 
oppression because in our lives they are most often 
experienced simultaneously. (Combahee River Collective, 
275) 
Although the gender stereotypes that pressure relations between people 
make them complex, it is a fair generalization to say that Black men have 
12 Breeze spans generic boundaries, having begun as a dub poet and moved into a less 
restricting sphere of poetry in any style. 
13 There are many other women writing poetry in the Caribbean and in the Caribbean 
diaspora (see Espinet). The fact that they are not included here by name contributes to 
the manufacture of "literature" as a body of texts created by positioned subjects. It also 
highlights the fact that the written literary is created by the positioned-practices of 
editorial selection, and relatively wide distribution. 
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often tried to maintain a patriarchal relationship to Black women; and 
white feminists have often maintained a race hierarchy amongst women 
by ignoring the effect of race on their theory and praxis (for example, see 
Smith xxv). The special point of view of black feminism is not just that 
Black women are doubly oppressed, but that race and gender, as 
simultaneous oppressions, create a special position for Black women in 
which they are often excluded from the identity "woman" (often meaning 
white women exclusively; in itself it is a non-raced term); while also 
excluded from the identity "Black". 
In Inessential Woman, Spelman uses the example of a 1986 New York 
Times article about "women and Blacks" in the U.S. army to illustrate 
this point, which she calls the "ampersand problem" in feminist thought. 
In the article, it is clear that the 'women' referred to are white, the 
`Blacks' referred to are male (114) . She makes the point that since it is a 
group of men and women who are being contrasted, it makes no sense to 
see Black women as a composite of the two categories. The category 
`woman' in this usage excludes Black women, while "the men in 
question are not called men. They are called `Blacks'." (115) 
This leads to further insights. The first is that it is impossible to 
participate in a system of race metasigns without also participating in a 
system of gender, and vice versa. In "Black Women: Shaping Feminist 
Theory", hooks writes: 
...Black men may be victimized by racism, but sexism 
allows them to act as exploiters and oppressors of women. 
White women may be victimized by sexism, but racism 
enables them to act as exploiters and oppressors of black 
people. Both groups have led liberation movements that 
favour their interests and support the continued 
oppression of other groups. Black male sexism has 
undermined struggles to eradicate racism just as white 
female racism undermines feminist struggle. As long as 
these two groups or any group defines liberation as 
gaining social equality with ruling-class white men, they 
have a vested interest in the continued exploitation and 
oppression of others. 
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Black women with no institutionalized "other" that 
we may discriminate against, exploit, or oppress often 
have a lived experience that directly challenges the 
prevailing classist, sexist, racist social structure and its 
concomitant ideology. This lived experience may shape 
our consciousness in such a way that our worldview 
differs from those who have a degree of privilege 
(however relative within the existing system). It is 
essential for continued feminist struggle that black women 
recognize the special vantage point our marginality gives 
us and makes use of this perspective to criticize the 
dominant racist, classist, sexist hegemony as well as to 
envision and create a counterhegemony.... (145) 
hooks is imagining a way out of all sorts of oppressions based on "ism-s" 
— that is, she draws a connection between anti-racism and anti-sexism 
movements through their common strategy of shoring up their power 
base by identifying with one set of oppressions in order to escape 
another. She is right to point out — and this is a point that can most easily 
be perceived through the lens of system-based semiotics — that as long as 
these movements exploit any Other, they contribute to the system they 
seek to change. This is a point that is applicable to all North Americans 
(and British — hooks is writing exclusively of the United States); no 
American can escape their participation in systems of oppression based 
on race, class, gender, ethnicity, and so forth, just as they cannot escape 
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their positions at different intersections of these systems. The point of 
view of black feminism is inclusive in its insistence on confronting the 
oppositions of "female" (male) and "black" (white) and pointing out that 
every term depends on its opposite (this semiotic dynamic will be 
discussed at length in Chapter Five). 
In Inessential Woman, Spelman goes on to discuss "somatophobia" (fear 
of and disdain for the body) (126), arguing that in Western culture both 
women and Blacks, independently, have been identified with the body, in 
a view of the body as essentially negative, more animal-like and sexual 
in a scheme of values that disdains the body. I would add that politically-
conscious Black women are in a unique position to understand the role of 
somatophobia in the oppression of both Black men and white women; 
and to understand the contingency of the basis for that oppression. Faced 
with the contradictions of being black but not female and female but not 
black, the social underpinnings of the meanings of a "black" body and a 
"female" body become much more salient." 
Though these signifieds are culturally relative, in lived experience their 
meanings are part of the body-as-self. Given the somatophobia of 
14 A further contribution to the perception of the contingency of social categories 
specifically by African-Caribbean women in diaspora is their experience of 
displacement from one set of local social categories to another. As is the case for other 
immigrants, often the first social reality they have faced is a new social positioning, in 
this case as a different kind of black woman in a different set of social category 
grammars (see theoretical section for more on social category grammars). The 
transferrals and transmutations that "race" signs and their referents undergo when social 
subjects are displaced has been brilliantly explored by Fanon within the framework of 
psychoanalytic psychology (1986). 
60 
European male culture, black women run the risk of carrying a double 
burden of self/body-hatred, by constantly confronting the damaging 
aspects of representing a range of negatives. The following extract from 
Brand's "no language is neutral" describes the subject-position: 
...A woman who 
thought she was human but got the message, female 
and black and somehow those who gave it to her 
were like family, mother and brother, spitting woman 
at her, somehow they were the only place to return to 
...and it was 
over by now and had become so ordinary as if not to 
see it any more, that constant veil over the eyes, the 
blood-stained blind of race and sex. (No Language 27) 
Brand plays with names for the social subject here, starting with 
"woman", from whose point of view woman and human are 
synonymous. However, all meanings made around her and to her, 
meanings which are aggressions in themselves ("spitting woman / at 
her"), make her "female and black", that is, the opposite of human, that 
is, animal (by virtue of the semantic implications of the conjunction 
"but"). In the last few lines Brand shows the circularity, the mundane 
nature of these meanings, by capping her narrative with an unstable 
referent for "now", so that the narrative past tense is modified with the 
phrase "it was over by now". People think they "are" somatic meanings 
(those meanings entailed by race and sex) in a timeless way. 
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As Black Power and other movements have done in the New World, 
African-Caribbean feminist poetics turns the object of prejudice into one 
of pride 	 in this case, pride in the body. However, these bodies are 
female, and it is this particularity of experience that flowers into a strong, 
female sense of self. Brand has written with attention to the link between 
racism as an issue of physical appearance and sexism as a force that 
targets the female body, while showing the effects of social and political 
oppression on her sense of body-as-self. She identifies as Black lesbian, 
which is a complex resolution to a wide range of difficult positions. 
Allen's poetry is also strongly woman identified, though her political 
protest is on behalf of those who are oppressed for any reason: race, 
class, age, immigration, and others. As performance, however, it clearly 
locates poetry in her own body. Her favourite piece is "Birth Poem" (p. 
interview), a re-enactment of her labour-and-birth experience in sound 
and movement. 
Exile 
The Black American feminist and African-Caribbean feminist response 
to sexism within the Black Power movement developed roughly 
concurrently and with many cross-influences. An important literary 
influence on the African-Caribbean women poets that has not so far been 
noted is the contemporary work of African-American women writers, 
such as Morrison, Lorde, Angelou, Cliff, Walker, Marshall, Brodber, and 
hooks. Brand and Allen have named some of these as their influences 
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(e.g. Brand qtd. in Morrell, 170). Although I would include American 
Michelle Cliff in my literary-historical grouping, other Caribbean women 
poets who have acculturated in the United States (such as Audre Lorde) 
do not write about the same things in the same ways and their work is not 
therefore, to my mind, quite comparable (notwithstanding Davies 59-60). 
For example, the theme of exile in the writings of this generation of 
Caribbean women in diaspora is poignant and acute. African-Caribbean 
women have emigrated through most of the twentieth century because of 
political/economic oppression, but this generation has articulated a 
strong sense of dispossession (see Chancy 3-7). Their position as black 
women in Canada, for example, is not one of alienation just because they 
are excluded from economic opportunities as female and black, but 
because the transition from outsider/emigre to insider "Canadian" was in 
many cases (and for good reason) made only very slowly. The same 
thing happened in England in the nineteen seventies and eighties. 
Emigration to the United States did not produce this extended sense of 
geo-political alienation. 
Exile is, among other things, an emotional state. Chancy describes the 
social and emotional position eloquently, starting with a subjective 
definition of exile as: "irrevocabBe]...an irreparable fissuring of self 
from homeland" ( 2). Exile arises from whatever 
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makes remaining in one's homeland unbearable or 
untenable: ... poverty enmeshed through exploitative 
labor practices that overwork and underpay; social 
persecution resulting from one's dehumanization because 
of color, gender, sexuality, class standing...; the flickering 
wick of hope extinguished through despair. Such 
indignities lead to suicide, violence, more poverty, a 
vicious cycle of hopelessness, or, finally, self-imposed 
exile, that is, emigration. (2) 
The response of many women writers from the Caribbean, including 
Allen and Brand, has been to politicise this dispossession, to extend the 
experience of exile as/because female and black into an awareness of 
how oppressions based on race, class, gender, and sexuality function 
together. This awareness is not just awareness of oppression; its flip side 
is a renewed awareness of self through a focus on the Black, female 
body, its position in the world and its power to make new meanings. 
Chancy sees this as a route to accepting "what it has meant for Afro-
Caribbean women to take control of their bodies, their lives, and, in order 
to do so, to have removed themselves from their roots... for, if the 
Caribbean islands represent for most the site of home ...they also 
represent in part what they have had to flee." (6-7) There are reflexes of 
these meanings throughout the poetry of Allen, Brand, and a sizable 
group of others; the only American among them is Michelle Cliff. 
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When I started this project, heavily influenced by Brand, the poets I 
focussed on were still (or had written their most dynamic work) working 
out their relationship with the metropolis. Although some (such as 
Brand) were not recent arrivals, the emotional energy of their poetry was 
based on the shock of displacement into very specific times and places 
(Toronto, Calgary, Brixton, Coventry) and on a sense of disillusionment, 
outrage at the local racisms, loss, and nostalgia for the Caribbean. In the 
years since, their position has evolved. Brand, for example, has published 
another collection of poetry and two novels (Land to Light On; In 
Another Place, Not Here; At the Full and Change of the Moon), which 
show her much more at home in the cold white North; her position is 
now very much more of hybridity, a term from a different paradigm of 
subjectivity (Bhaba). 
Allen has always felt herself a hybrid (p. interview), relatively at home in 
the metropolis and in the Black Power movement; however, in her most 
recent collection of print poetry, she displays a more introverted persona 
in poems of identification with the Canadian landscape (see, for example, 
"Song for Newfoundland", Psychic Unrest, 59). The dub poets 
Mandhiela and Cooper seem always to have been more or less at ease as 
Jamaican-Canadians: according to Allen (p. interview), they are the 
"second-generation" of Canadian feminist dub poets. The British poets 
Nichols and Amryl Johnson are also, at this point, at home in Black 
Britain, while Breeze, who went back and forth between Jamaica and the 
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UK for the sake of her work, did not confront the challenges to her 
identity in quite the same way. 
The themes of dispossession, exile, and alienation I have traced in the 
larger grouping of African-Caribbean feminist poets of the diaspora as 
well as Allen and Brand are therefore those of a specific historical 
moment for social subjects at a particular intersection of political and 
social forces, rather than any essential "blackwomaness" that transcends 
time and place. It is important to repeat: these are not essential poetics of 
women, of African descent, of Caribbean identity, of lesbian identity, or 
of any such contingent groupings; these are the poetics of a particular 
experience lived in the late 20th century, resolved through the terms of 
reference of that time and place. 
Brand's work: an overview 
Brand was born in Guayguayare, Trinidad in 1953, emigrating to Canada 
in 1970. She is a critically-acclaimed Canadian poet and public 
intellectual. She published early in magazines and in 1978 with a small 
piess, going through a hierarchy of bigger and more prestigious literary 
presses until her seventh book of poetry won the Governor General's 
Award for Poetry in 199715. Meanwhile, she also published short stories, 
alternative journalism, and non-fiction arising directly out of her political 
involvements with the black and feminist communities in Toronto. Her 
15 The Governor General's awards are the most prestigious literary awards in Canada. 
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four films and documentaries include Older Stronger Wiser (1989) 
produced by the National Film Board of Canada, Studio D. It is an oral 
history of / by older black women in Ontario; Chancy gives an 
eyewitness account of its emotional reception by the African-Canadian 
community in Halifax, Canada, adding that it contributed to her own 
awakening to the personal realities of racism / sexism against African-
Caribbean women in Canada. 
Since first being short-listed for the Governor General's Award in 1990 
for No Language Is Neutral (her best book of poetry), Brand has written 
another book of poetry, two novels and published two collections of 
essays. 
In the rest of this section I will trace the themes and styles of her poetry, 
as it is her poetry that is the most relevant to this project, but also 
because poetry has the longest trajectory in her work. The earliest 
collection, 'Fore Day Morning, contains many of the themes and styles 
of later work; but her political commitments (Marxism, anti-racism), 
though evident, are not as much a driving force as in later poetry. The 
strong feminist anger of the later poems is not evident. Several familiar, 
related images are here, however: the old black woman, careless of her 
naked body, appropriating the right to sit on a tropical beach by herself 
and bathe; and the soucoyant, a supernatural, female being from the 
folklore of Trinidad who rolls up into a ball of fire at night, leaving her 
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skin behind. There is also the trope of slavery, here as later personalised 
and linked to skin colour: 
No, I see the ship of sugar in your eyes, 
My blood like sweat on your hands clasped in prayer. 
No this is life you color less, gutless...! 
My reality! 
The nightness nestles up against my skin, 
We two, we live in unison. ("Past" 29) 
There are also a couple of poems that have the conversational style and 
strong voice of later poetry, in which irony and wit play a large role. 
Finally, in terms of technique, there is the synaesthesia evident also later 
("Paint moonlit nights, / lay on like whispers, colours thick, / orange 
inflections of half promises..." (22)), with a facility for transcribing 
creole in evidence, although only two poems are "in" creole (one the 
interior monologue of the old woman on the beach, another an embodied 
memory of tropical rain). There is one phonetic spelling ("yuh"), which 
is not in the "creole" poems. All other poems are in standard, but also 
literary, English. Many poems are memories of tropical scenes, 
experiences, landscapes. 
Primitive Offensive, published four years later, begins to show the more 
acute analysis of class, colonialism and race that creates some of the 
huge emotional projection of Brand's poetry. The conflict of race and 
gender allegiances which perhaps obscured her earlier political analyses 
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also gives way to a direct condemnation of black male violence. Graphic, 
sometimes shocking images of the violence of political oppression and 
poverty add to the emotional volume. Line breaks (which I think are 
Brand's particular technical brilliance, apart from her vivid voice) begin 
to count for something. The mode is standard written English, but the 
style is less literary than before. 
Winter Epigrams and Epigrams to Ernesto Cardenal in Defense [sic] of 
Claudia, a collection of two poem cycles, shows Brand in control of her 
technique. Each set of poems is a dialogue, the first with the Canadian 
winter, the second with Ernesto Cardenal. The "Winter Epigrams" are 
witty, fine-grained, inward-looking descriptions of Toronto life and 
WASP culture and attitudes through her own relationship to winter; the 
poetic persona is sometimes self-mocking about this relationship, e.g., 
"Just to sabotage my epigrams, / the snow fell, / these three days, / softly. 
/ 	 / no one can be thinking of how to oppress anyone else / they will 
have to think of how silent it is" (41)16 . 
The epigrams to Ernesto Cardenal include (tongue-in-cheek) Marxist 
feminist queries ("How do I know that this is love / and not legitimation 
of capitalist relations of production / in advanced patriarchy?", 12), 
liberal feminist statements ("...so they still think I should be in charge / 
of the refreshments", 14); statements describing the "bitterness" of the 
struggle against racism in solidarity with black men (35); and against 
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racism in the mainstream feminist movement ("you say you want me 
to... / to what? / no I can't tap dance / at the International Women's Day 
rally." (47)) All of the epigrams are witty, short, disciplined; the 
language is relaxed, perhaps spoken in mode, but not creole. 
Chronicles of the Hostile Sun (1984) contains descriptions based on 
Brand's work in Grenada during the Revolutionary government's tenure 
and the American invasion of 1983. There are poems in standard (dialect 
and mode) of the island's human and physical geography, intertwined; of 
the politics of the neo-colonial Caribbean; and poems describing the 
American invasion, and Brand's experience of Canada immediately after 
her return. The sense of existential and political dislocation in these 
poems is very strong; in most of her poetry Brand voices the Caribbean 
immigrant experience, but these latter poems contain a concentrated 
moral indignation linked to the disorienting gap between the privileged 
(oppressors) and the oppressed. 
In between the two sections containing these poems is a short section of 
poems, "Sieges". It contains a long poem, "Amelia", describing her 
grandmother in the following terms: "...she withered and swelled / and 
died and left me / after years of hiding, / 	 / swimming in the brutish 
rain / at once she lost her voice / since all of its words contained her 
downfall. / she gargled instead the coarse water from her eyes / 	 / 
breathed, in gasps / what was left in the air / after husband and two 
16 The references in these two paragraphs are to the numbers of the epigrams. 
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generations of children." (24) The following poem, "I am not that strong 
woman", contains the lines: "I am the one with no place to live / I want 
no husband / 	 / I want nothing that enters me / screaming / claiming 
to be history..." (26) In "Amelia continued", "I am in love with an old 
woman / who bequeathed me a sentence or two / "don't grow up and 
wash any man's pants / not even out of kindness" ..." (28). 
No Language Is Neutral develops this radical feminist position, though 
not in isolation from all of the other themes Brand is concerned with 
(partially noted above). These are completely beautiful poems: some are 
lyrical love poems to a lesbian partner; some are poems to older women 
with whom she feels in feminist solidarity (including "Amelia still"); and 
there are a couple of poems, "return I" and "return II", in which the 
landscape of Trinidad is perceived / re-imagined and re-created in female 
terms; in effect, Brand writes a female language of description in these 
poems ("return I" receives a fuller treatment in Chapter 7, below). "return 
II" skilfully and unobtrusively weaves TEC syntax in and out of its lines. 
The title poem, "no language is neutral", is a lonOrose-poem, which 
Brand has said (in Listening for Something) is her attempt to explain her 
lesbian coming-out. In fact it reads like both autobiography and a 
summary of themes and concerns, feminist, Marxist, anti-colonial, anti-
racist, with a stress on history, memory, the relationship between 
landscape and the identity of a people, and the alienation of the 
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Caribbean immigrant in a cold Toronto. It is, finally, a writer's witness to 
her artistic coming-of-age. The poem ends: 
... I have come to know 
something simple. Each sentence realised or 
dreamed jumps like a pulse with history and takes a 
side. What I say in any language is told in faultless 
knowledge of skin, in drunkenness and weeping, 
told as a woman without matches and tinder, not in 
words and in words and in words learned by heart, 
told in secret and not in secret, and listen, does not 
burn out or waste and is plenty and pitiless and loves. (34) 
For the first time since 'Fore Day Morning Brand uses written creole, in 
some of the most evocative passages in Canadian poetry. I will discuss 
her transcription of creole; suffice it to note here that her transcriptions 
are contained in a number of poems in this collection as well as in Land 
to Light On, her last collection of poems. 
Allen's work: an overview 
Allen's career has been a double play of performance and publication. 
The cultural space she occupies together with other dub poets is unique 
in Canada, and it sometimes requires a push against the literary as a 
centralising, homogenizing force. In the following "One Poem Town", 
she characterises Canada's literary establishment as elitist and 
exclusionary by virtue of its orientation to the written; and (perhaps) 
written because of its intention to exclude: 
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Hey! Hey! Hey! 
this is a one poem town 
keep it kool! kool! kool! 
on the page 
`cause, if you bring one in 
any other way 
we'll shoot you with metaphors 
tie you cordless 
hang you high in ironies 
drop a pun `pon you toe 
and run you down, down, down 
so don't come with no pling, ying, _Ong 
ding something 
calling it poetry 
`cause, this is a one poem town 
and you're not here to stay 
Are you? 
(Women Do This 117) 
In this (printed) poem Allen equates the coldness / passionlessness / 
bloodlessness of the written mode with its medium, the page. The 
Western literary figures she lists ("metaphors", "ironies") are the 
semantic effects of written language rather than the sound effects of oral 
poetry (in performance or writing). She also makes the point that the 
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word "poetry" is both defined by and synonymous with the poetic 
practices of the dominant players ("so don't come with no pling, ying, 
jing / 	 / calling it poetry"). These dominant players are characterised 
by the central trope of the poem as the smug burghers of a Western town 
that is, there is a close link between the centralising practice of high 
literature and the central cultural and social positions of its practitioners. 
The plingyingjing poet is a newcomer greeted with the same negative 
attitude expressed by the stereotypical injunction to immigrants: "Go 
back to where you came from!" The coda ("Are you?") can be either a 
menacing final threat against the poet (as in one recorded sound version, 
"One Poem Town", Conditions Critical), or, as a sly projection by the 
plingyingjing poet, a sign of doubt from the kool poets. 
Allen was born in 1951 and grew up in Spanish Town, a neighbourhood 
of Kingston, Jamaica, emigrating in 1969 and settling in Toronto in 
1974. She published her first book of poems, Rhythm an' Hardtimes in 
1982, and subsequently recorded the cassettes Dub Poet: The Poetry of 
Lillian Allen, as well as De Dub Poets with Clifton Joseph and Devon 
Haughton. In 1986, she made the album Revolutionary Tea Party and in 
1987 Conditions Critical with members of the Canadian band Parachute 
Club; both albums won Juno awards for best calypso/reggae in 1987 and 
1988. Women Do This Every Day: Selected Poems of Lillian Allen was 
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published by the Women's Press in 1993 and in 1999 Psychic Unrest (by 
Insomniac Press).17 
Allen champions those who are oppressed because they are black (of 
African descent), because they are poor, or because they are female. 
These conditions do not always intersect in one subject in her work; there 
are poems about black men, poor men, refugees and refugee families, 
women of no specified colour, victims of social assistance bureaucracy, 
homelessness, and police brutality. Sometimes, however, they do 
intersect, and the contradictions can be painful: 
Oh gee OJ 
Oh say can you see 
I swear 
I would never take a pen to OJ 
pour out anger and fear 
Nothing can be as terrible as being murdered 
nothing can be as painful as losing a loved one 
nothing can be as dread as poverty's noose 
nothing is as ugly as racism 
noting is simple in a fucked-up America 
being woman and black 
with no relief in sight 
17 This is not a comprehensive, but a representative listing of Allen's work, as much of 
her earlier written poetry was self-published, and numerous poems are reprinted as 
different versions (although under the same title) in different collections. She has also 
produced audio-tapes along the same principles; clearly the version is an important part 
of her aesthetic. 
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(Psychic Unrest 21-22) 
There are also poems about the larger picture: international and neo-
colonial politics ("I Fight Back"), politics of racist and capitalist 
oppression ("Freedom is Azania (South Africa Must Be Free)"); 
environmental politics ("Born to Log", "Redwood"), feminist politics 
("Battle Scars") and different encounters with the spirit of protest and 
revolution ("Nicaragua", "Conditions Critical", "Why Do We Have To 
Fight", among others). The breadth of the targets of her protest are linked 
by her socialist feminist political analysis, which sees capitalism at the 
root of international racism and ubiquitous sexism. Black women are 
doubly oppressed: "a woman's work is not recognized / if she be black 
makes it doubly-dized" ("Why Do We Have To Fight"; all references to 
poems in Women Do This) 
Allen's poetics both nurture and feed from her conviction about the 
primal connection between physical and political/spiritual realities. Her 
1993 collection, Women Do This Everyday, is bracketed by two poems 
which she has said (in Performance; Personal interview) are among her 
favourites. The first is a feminist ballad, "Nellie Bellie Swellie", in which 
she tells the story of a young girl raped by a village man, then hidden 
away as her pregnancy becomes evident and finally sent away to give 
birth to the rapist's child. This specific narrative is illustrative of the 
social position of young women during Allen's adolescence in Jamaica. 
The double standard and the shame about woman's sexuality contrasts 
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with the pride and happiness of the last poem in the collection, "Birth 
Poem", which in print is minimal but in performance is the extraordinary 
dance/chant/song of a woman in labour. In this performance of the 
realities of childbirth, the female persona's "labour" is physically 
illustrated in its sense of physical work; and the pride she takes in the 
newborn is the climax of the labour and song. 
Allen has said that "giving birth is the most important thing a person can 
do in life" (Performance). In "Revolutionary Tea Party", a chanted poem 
of solidarity for the working class, "work" is used in the sense of anyone 
who "labours": "We who create the wealth of the world / [and] only get 
scrapings from them in control" (Women Do This). In other words, the 
"labour" of carrying and giving birth to a child is comparable to labours 
of the working class. But since women of all classes "labour" in the 
sense of give birth, there is an unrecognised kinship between women and 
the working class; indeed, between all those "who create with yu sweat 
from the heart" (134). The traditional work of the labouring classes, the 
work of giving birth, raising, and supporting a child, the work of the 
artist, the work of the political activist: these can all be consecrated as 
labours of hope for a better future. 
Allen has also said that having a baby is like making a revolution 
(Performance). A revolution is a break with history, with a time line. 
This connection between reproductive labour and revolution stresses the 
redemptive aspects of childbirth. Finally, revolution is motion (Allen, 
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Performance). Here revolution must be taken as part of a cluster of 
important concepts in Allen's work (and in dub poetry in general) which 
comprises revolution / motion / emotion / riddim. I will expand on this 
below. 
Nation language 
Nation language is the language which is influenced very 
strongly by the African model, the African aspect of our 
New World/Caribbean heritage. English it may be in 
terms of some of its lexical features. But in its contours, 
its rhythm and timbre, its sound explosions, it is not 
English, even though the words, as you hear them, might 
be English to a greater or lesser degree. (Brathwaite 
1984:13). 
In essence, Brathwaite is referring to Caribbean English Creoles, coining 
the term "nation language" to negotiate complicated ambiguities in the 
naming and definition of the Caribbean English Creoles as nascent 
languages. 
All the women dub poets and many of the more high literary African-
Caribbean women poets of the nineteen-eighties and nineties are aware 
of the aesthetic and political possibilities of nation language. There has 
scarcely been a young woman Caribbean poet who has not used nation 
language at some point. It is also worth pointing out the influence of 
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Louise Bennett (who has performed and written her work since the late 
nineteen-forties almost exclusively in Jamaican English Creole) on many 
Jamaican poets, performance and otherwise. As Cooper has pointed out, 
the space between the oral and the scribal, performance and print, in 
Jamaican popular culture is a "literary continuum along which both 
`performance' and 'non-performance' poets operate [today]" (81). This is 
applicable to most poets of the Anglophone Caribbean. 
Caribbean English Creoles are "oral" languages because it has been 
difficult for them to develop an officially recognized standard variety or 
a grapholect (e.g., Written Standard Jamaican Creole) in functional 
competition with Standard English. The creoles continue to be associated 
with speech, both in the English Caribbean and in diaspora. Although the 
relationship between orality and creole in writing is complicated, the use 
of creole in Caribbean poetry remains one of the most important aesthetic 
/ political / technical features of formerly-English Caribbean writing. 
Standard written English is not just the metaphor of an ideological 
centre; the technical linguistic, graphic, and graphological choices these 
poets make in writing nation language are the product of a complex 
social relationship with the body of norms called "English". In that 
sense, every time a creole-speaking poet sits down to write, they must 
not only choose between two poles of reference in their "English-
speaking" linguistic world (creole and English), but, if attempting the 
transcription of creole through English, they must negotiate a middle 
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way between reproducing the creole as "broken" English with iconic 
signs (e.g., the "breaking" of morphemes, a practice of many male dub 
poets) and fashioning a new written "language" unintelligible to English-
speaking readers. D'Costa ("Expression and Communication"; "The 
West Indian Novelist") has written from the creole-speaking writer's 
point of view on this middle way; her experience has been that, in order 
to be accessible to non-Caribbean readers, she is able to use only a few 
markers of JEC. 
Dub Poetry 
Dub poetry is a performance genre that developed under the inspiration 
of reggae, both politically and aesthetically. Its combination of 
syncopated rhythms, attention to the beat and in both writing and 
performance, and emancipatory activist content is what makes it 
characteristic. Dub is 
..."WORD, SOUND & POWER". This self-proclaimed 
credo of the dub poets points to the double dimension of 
the art form: dub poetry epitomises the antagonism 
between writing and orality, between WORD as text and 
WORD as SOUND. Dub poetry is neither a literary genre 
nor exclusively a musical style. Yet it is almost everything 
in between. ...On all occasions the SOUND of the spoken 
WORD gives rise to a musical "riddim," the central 
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formative aspect of the genre. Yet the POWER of dub 
poetry, though most obvious in the context of a live or 
recorded performance, is prevalent also in the written 
text 	 if one knows how to trace it. (Habekost 1993:1) 
In the dub community it is common to draw a connection between the 
rhythms of Jamaican speech and the rhythms of dub. "The rhythms of 
Jamaican speech, sustained by and reflected in the musical beat, 
constitute the dub experience." (Habekost 92) In describing her methods 
of composition, Allen says that she relies on the sounds of JEC words as 
much as their denotations in creating a poem (Bartley). 
According to Habekost, "riddim" has larger connotations in Jamaican 
popular culture. It is a specialised term central to reggae as well as dub; 
in Jamaican popular culture it connotes " the heartbeat of the people,' or 
the pulse of life.' Moreover, riddim... is frequently associated with 
violence, blood and pain; but, at the same time, it can be 'food' for the 
suffering people..." (93) Habekost adds that repetition in dub, as a 
technique for achieving riddim, harks to an African philosophical 
conception of time: 
While the European poetic tradition tends to conceal the repeating 
constituents of its forms, the black tradition emphasizes them as a 
crucial means of distinct improvisation and extemporization; they 
become an expression of one of the fundamental formative 
principles of black culture, which is based on the idea of 
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circulation and cyclical development, as opposed to the European 
principle of progression. (94) 
Revolution in Allen's conceptual cluster: revolution / motion / emotion / 
riddim, is both a cycle, based on the word's etymology (from the Latin 
revolvere, from re + volvere, to roll, turn) and an interruption of the 
European "forward march of progress", a cut in the linear time line. 
Motion is riddim in the sense of (rhythmic) dance, physical motion, the 
motion of the body, but also the rhythms of the body, its heartbeat. 
Emotion is also motion, but a more organic motivation for political and 
moral decision-making than the measured linearity of reason. 
In "De Dub Poets", Allen describes the genesis of dub poetry: 
[I]n the dance halls of Jamaica, competing sound systems with 
speakers the size of refrigerators would vie for the biggest 
crowds. DJs — the mighty U-Roy, Big Youth, and I Roy — chanted 
their messages over the instrumental versions on the flip side of 
popular [reggae] songs. DJs were so totally marginalized (reggae 
was not completely accepted for air-play on the island's radio 
stations until the late seventies) that they talked about anything 
and everything in the society — from the private and personal to 
social and political taboos... 
The studio mixers of the music, meanwhile, became 
conscious of the way in which the live DJs worked with the 
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music. They attuned their techniques to create re-mixed versions 
of the instrumentals. The mixers' techniques of echoing, repeats, 
fades, dropping in and out of instruments to create internal 
rhythmic dynamics [characteristic aural features of dub], caught 
the imagination of the emerging dub poets. (17) 
It is an interesting though rarely acknowledged fact that about half of the 
best dub poets are women, and that most of the these feminist dub poets 
are living and working in Toronto rather than England (London is the 
centre of the Jamaican diaspora). What is feminist dub? Dub poetry by 
women of African-Caribbean descent whose lyrics implicitly redirect the 
meanings of the male-centred pop-musical and dub industry. Dub poetry 
by women tends to be socialist-feminist or womanist in its politics. The 
group includes performers such as Jean Binta Breeze, Lillian Allen, Afua 
Cooper and Ahdri Zhina Mandiela. 
Allen has been called the birth-mother of dub because of her role in 
establishing dub poetry in Canada and internationally in the nineteen-
eighties and early nineties (Allen "360 Degrees Black"). But she is also 
in my opinion the best of the dub poets, surpassing the better-known 
male poets Oku Onuora and Linton Kwesi Johnson in the breadth of her 
political analysis, and surpassing the other women dub poets in mass 
(popular) appeal. 
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Chapter Three 
ORALITY / LITERACY AND THE DERRIDEAN SIGN 
What challenges are posed when a performance poet such as Allen wants 
to re-produce Jamaican English Creole in written form? When she 
"commits" her poetry to the page (Women Do This 9), she is faced with 
the paradoxes of working in a "phonetic" alphabet which, in English, is 
anything but phonetic. Instead, English spellings are so highly 
standardised that their most important function is to do with group 
membership and power, and only secondarily with the representation of 
sound. 
In this chapter, I look for a model for thinking about the formal 
relationship between speech and writing in order to understand as 
precisely as possible how Allen's spelling choices might reflect specific 
political, social, and historical conditions and desires. For these texts 
especially, the model must allow a certain amount of slippage between 
signifier/letter and signified/sound (from modified English spelling 
system to creole sound). Since this is a roughly deconstructive project, I 
approach some of Derrida's texts, particularly Of Grammatology, with 
the expectation that a post-structuralist model of the sign based on 
writing will help track the relationship between the oral and the written. 
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Orality and literacy 
The relationship between orality in these texts and creole as a symbolic 
resource is intimate and multidimensional. Since it has been difficult for 
creole to develop its own written code, it is associated with spoken 
registers. Spoken creole is a powerful carrier of group identity, especially 
within the metropolis (Hewitt; Rampton; Sebba). The representation of 
(creole) speech in writing therefore reinforces the symbolic force of 
creole by confronting two of the most powerful forces of English 
imperialism: its national language; and literacy in its script. 
The symbolic use of creole language in the metropolis negotiates social 
relations through a complex network of intertexts. By evoking its 
speakers, the representation of creole in written poetry creates an 
intersection between these texts and images of creole speakers in the 
mass media and in different discourses. These images are complex: they 
include the romantic, with its roots in Montaigne's noble savage; youth 
culture, with the covert prestige of its "sound", house music, rap, and hip 
hop; reggae as a culture, lifestyle, and protest tradition; and other images 
of creole speakers as the underclass, the poor, and the Other. All of these 
connotations are the baggage that make creole a strongly marked "other" 
language. 
As for literacy in the Latin alphabet, it was a favoured tool of 
colonisation by the British Empire, both through missionaries, and 
through the working styles of colonial administrations. The latter had a 
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preference for establishing colonial bureaucracies consisting of specially-
trained local agents. This "special training" was a training in English 
literacy. 
The task of learning to read and write is partly the memorisation of 
prescriptive spelling rules. If a learner employs an orthography different 
from the standard, their "literacy-ness" will not be understood as such, 
since an important marker of literacy in the European languages is 
control of standard spellings. Those who do not employ any standard 
code correctly "are classified as imperfect members of the dominant 
group, or as members of [the colonised] group one of whose defining 
features is their imperfection." (Hodge and Kress, 82) An important 
consequence for colonial administrations is that prescriptive spelling 
rules in written English create a powerful group boundary between the 
coloniser and the colonised. 
This boundary is the site of struggle in these particular texts. The use of 
eye-spellings and other markers of difference in print declares an 
alternate version of social relations, making concrete a resistance to 
exclusion on its own terms. The fact that this struggle goes on in the 
narrow field of English spelling reflects the particular history of creole: 
its birth as a hybrid language (Holm) and its survival in close contact 
with standard English. 
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These are the historical circumstances in which creole eye spellings and 
syntax are deployed as strategies of anti-colonial (even postcolonial) 
resistance; but this is still a description of semiotic relationships at a 
fairly general level. What is the semiotic relationship between the actual 
letter and sound in a written text? And how does the intervention of 
another interest in this relationship leave its own trace? The next section 
considers the written-spoken relationship at this level of detail. 
The grapholect English 
In semiotic modalities involving words, the medium always affects the 
typical patterns of syntax (order of words) and lexis (word-choice) of the 
language. We do not write the way we speak, and we certainly do not 
speak the way we write, even though, technically, it is the same 
"language", e.g. English (Gregory and Carroll). In Spoken and Written  
Language, Halliday has shown that the syntactic patterns of spoken 
English are much more complex, with far longer chains of clauses in one 
"sentence", than written English. At the same time, a complete unit of 
thought in spoken English does not necessarily have both the subject and 
verb required in written English. 
There is, then, provisionally, that which one may call Written English 
and that which one may call Spoken English. Written English 
corresponds to Ong's grapholect: 
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[A] national written language has had to be isolated from 
its original dialect base, has discarded certain dialectal 
forms, has developed various layers of vocabulary from 
sources not dialectal at all, and has developed also certain 
syntactical peculiarities. This kind of established written 
language ...[is] a `grapholect'. (107). Where grapholects 
exist, 'correct' grammar and usage are popularly 
interpreted as the grammar and usage of the grapholect 
itself to the exclusion of the grammar and usage of other 
dialects. (108) 
Ong is abstracting from the wide range of types of written language to 
posit an idealized written language. However, it must be said that in each 
medium (spoken and written) there are in practice many registers, or 
degrees of formality and functional styles, so that ritual language such as 
liturgy and formal greetings are spoken, while stream-of-consciousness 
writing (closely imitating casual speech and thought) is written. Each of 
these versions presumably has a written/spoken counterpart. We can 
always read aloud what we have written; in a poem such as Allen's "The 
Subversives" (partially quoted in Introduction), the taped oral version is 
very close in syntax/lexis to the written version. Other written texts can 
be spoken precisely as written. 
However, registers are closely associated with a typical medium. 
"Casual" is associated with speech; "formal" with writing. "Formal" 
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liturgy is precisely that which is read directly from a page; the written 
medium has preserved each and every word, and they have become 
typical of that register (e.g. King James English). "Casual" writing is 
reserved for the imitation of speech or thought in fiction (even the 
imitated speech/thought of the narrator) and for personal notes and 
letters. It is as if the imitation of some of the features of spoken English 
in written English brings with it an associated level of informality. The 
distinction that Ong makes between the "language" of standard writing 
and that of a wide range of other diatypic varieties is in practice, if not in 
principle, workable. 
Let us start then, with a distinction between first-order writing, which is a 
typical pattern of syntax and word-choices (the grapholect), and second-
order writing, or the translation into writing of a more typically spoken 
style. I say "translation" because even in highly verisimilitudinous 
transcriptions of thought by skilled novelists such as James Joyce and 
Virginia Woolf (as monologue, or self-speak), it is always a 
representation/translation rather than a transcription. A faithful 
transcription of a real monologue or conversation reveals numerous 
hesitations, false starts, filler words and expressions, that are edited out 
of Joyce and Woolf s imagined monologues. The representation of 
speech or verbalised thought in writing demands a certain type of editing 
to accommodate the product (the final text) to the medium. 
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Partly this is because the activity of reading is different from that of 
listening to speech. Words and morphemes are recognised as whole units 
rather than composites of letters (unless a wholly new word is in the 
text). And, "sentences are not perceived as linear sequences of 
independent lexical units, but rather, key words are selected and 
relationships established to their environments through morphological 
and syntactic particles." (Hellinger 1986:65) Many of these key words, in 
addition, are not "read" phonetically 	 they are merely recognised 
visually. It is extremely important for efficient reading that words and 
morphemes (such as "is", "and", "the" "-tion", "-ty") remain visually 
consistent for pattern recognition; and that syntax, also, not deviate 
wildly from the typical patterns of the grapholect (which has, as Ong has 
argued, a syntax of its own). 
Thus second-order writing is a translation, not a transcription.' 8 But what 
happens when a writer wants to represent certain sounds in writing? We 
have seen that the patterns of spoken syntax and lexis can be represented 
in writing (with the aid of conventions). What about spoken sound 
patterns, typical of a marked dialect, for example? This would be a third- 
18 Transcriptions such as those written by conversation analysts, which include the length 
of pauses, laughter, and sometimes intonation, could conceivably be called third-order 
writing. Like second-order writing, such a transcription is a written version of speech. 
However, this type of transcription can convey a range of styles depending on 
situational context. It captures the word-order of spoken language, but can also 
"transcribe" the speech of a pastor reading liturgy -- that is, transcribe speech read from 
writing meant to be spoken at a very formal level. Thus, formal linguistic transcriptions 
using the graphic signals agreed on by a community (i.e., a community of phoneticians, 
ethnographers, conversation analysts, etc.) to convey specific aspects of a text of 
interest to that community are not located on the same style/medium axis as first- and 
second-order writing. 
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order writing: if first-order writing is the grapholectal pattern of syntax 
and word-choices, and second-order writing is the translation into writing 
of a more typically spoken lexicogrammatical style, then third-order 
writing is the attempt to represent sound-patterns. This is closer to the 
task of the poet in writing creole, as in, for example, Allen's "Riddim An 
Hardtimes": 
An' him chucks on some riddim 
an' yu hear him say 
riddim an' hardtimes 
riddim an' hardtimes 
music a prance 
dance inna head 
drumbeat a roll 
hot like lead 
Mojah Rasta gone dread 
natt up natt up 
irie 
red 
(Women Do This 63-64) 
In this text Allen has chosen to represent some sounds phonetically but 
not others. For example, the word "chucks" in the first line, Allen 
pronounces in a taped oral version as "chooks", with a rounded vowel, 
rather the Canadian English "chnks"19 or "chaks". This is the most 
common strategy that creole speakers employ when writing: the 
I 9[A] roughly corresponds to the vowels in Canadian English "duck", mud", etc. 
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orthographic base is English, with only a few adaptations used to convey 
specific sounds. Often the variations are unsystematic and inconsistently 
spelled (Hellinger 60-62). This is not "phonetic" writing in the way that 
one normally conceives of the term (and in the way that Derrida does as 
well). 
There is a stability in the spellings of this text, however 	 the stability of 
the standard English spellings. English orthography must be one of the 
most standardised and policed of semiotic systems. If the modern 
grapholect of English, as Ong writes, "has been worked over for 
centuries... by normative theorists, grammarians, lexicographers, and 
others," (129) so has the orthography of English, as codified in printed 
dictionaries since the sixteenth century. This was the time of the 
discovery of printing; the standardisation of spelling was not only 
fostered by the technology of the printing press (Steinberg), but also, 
according to Ong, "[p]rint produced exhaustive dictionaries and fostered 
the desire to legislate for "correctness" in language." (130). 
In English, the wide distance between the "one sign, one sound" rule of 
phonetic writing and the actual spellings is due to drastic sound changes 
in spoken British English from the time the first presses were invented. 
Our present-day spellings reflect pronunciations current in the sixteenth 
century. Subsequently, even as spellings were being standardised, final 
e's in speech became silent, most long vowels changed in value (due to 
the Great Vowel Shift, see Millward 218-220), and r's became silent at 
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the end of stressed syllables (although they remain in North America). 
These are only a few of the major changes in the sound of British 
English since the early Renaissance. None of them are reflected in 
spellings. 
Superficially, this analysis of the speech-writing relationship is similar to 
Of Grammatology's in that it sees writing as having a tenuous 
relationship to the speech it is supposed to "transcribe". Derrida's route 
to the same conclusion, however, incorporates the formal doctrine of the 
sign. It is therefore worth tracing his argument in order to find a more 
precise formal model for the speech-writing relationship. 
Derridean writing 
Of Grammatology begins with a statement of intent to establish a science 
of writing, of "grammatology", because it has been neglected in 
linguistics, and because it would correct the "logocentric" bias of 
Western scholarship. By logocentric, Derrida means a bias towards the 
spoken word in linguistics; and therefore towards a conception that the 
most developed and "civilised" writing is phonetic. 
"Exergue" introduces the first chapter as a "meditation and painstaking 
investigation on and around what is still provisionally called "writing'"' 
(4). The meditation is carried out on the phrase "signifier of the signifier" 
as a description of phonetic writing. Although Derrida does not go into 
detail, the phrase "signifier of the signifier", in relation to "phonetic" 
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writing, is conceived to work on these principles: a letter is the signifier 
of a sound: for example, the grapheme "t" signifies the sound [t]. A 
simple example of a sign, one might say. The problem is that the 
grapheme "t" is not sound itself — it is only the signifier of the phoneme 
[t]. [T] in turn has no meaning in itself 	 it is only the smallest unit of 
sound possible in speech, i.e., another signifier. Letters in writing are 
thus the signifiers of the signifiers20. (This is the most common notion of 
phonetic writing. The International Phonetic Alphabet is based on the 
same principle of one letter/one sound equivalence.) 
Derrida then describes "signifier of the signifier" as a movement rather 
than a static state such as a sign. This is because he begins to realise there 
is no signified that is not always already a signifier. This has been 
discussed already in this chapter with the analysis of the grapholect 
English, and second- and third-order transcriptions of speech in writing. 
From this point of view, however, everything in which we find 
meaning 	 film, football, political strategy, any semiosis 	 is "writing" in 
the sense that the mode is always a signifier for another mode or level of 
meaning, which points to another level again and again. There is no sole 
signified: there is only the perpetual movement from signifier to 
20 "...even if one wished to keep sonority on the side of the sensible and contingent 
signifier (which would be strictly speaking impossible, since formal identities isolated 
within a sensible mass are already idcalities that are not purely sensible), it would have 
to be admitted that the immediate and privileged unity which founds significance and 
the acts of language is the articulated unity of sound and sense within the phonic. With 
regard to this unity, writing would always be derivative, accidental, particular, exterior, 
doubling the signifier: phonetic. "Sign of a sign," said Aristotle, Rousseau, and Hegel." 
(Grammatology 29) 
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signifier. Derrida coins a term, "arche-writing", to refer to this more 
general principle of meaning-making . 
Armed with the powerful concept of arche-writing, Derrida then draws 
on the tension between one's conception of phonetic writing (the 
"vulgar" concept of writing, 56) as derivative, a secondary semiotic 
system, and his discovery that arche-writing actually gives each semiotic 
modality 	 speech and writing 	 an absolute autonomy. This is because 
there is no way of bridging the formal gap between signifier and 
signifier. It is partly in order to explore the radically autonomous aspects 
of writing as semiosis that he in fact goes further, and privileges 
"writing" (now arche-writing) over speech. "Writing" is the perfect 
metaphor for semiosis, he says: it is the most obvious demonstration of 
the general semiotic principle that there is no signifier, no originary, only 
the movement from symbol to sign, and only the perpetual trace. 
One will have noted a slippage towards the end of this argument, from 
writing as a specific technology of a specific time and place, to arche-
writing as a new term that describes a theory of meaning-making. As I 
discover while reading closely this text, the argument goes along 
carrying an ambiguous sense of the word "writing". Yet Derrida takes 
pains to point out 	 and he is right to do so 	 the contiguity between all 
aspects of "writing", from the phonocentric, "vulgar" notion of how the 
technology works, to the highly philosophical arche-writing: "I have 
already begun to justify this word ["writing"], and especially the 
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necessity of the communication between the concept of arche-writing 
and the vulgar concept of writing submitted to deconstruction by it."(60) 
Vulgar vs. arche-writing 
What exactly is the link between the common-sense notion of writing as 
phonetic and arche-writing? Since the answer is difficult to isolate within 
the circularities of Derrida's style, the best approach seems a close 
reading. In order to spot the exact moment of transition between the 
"vulgar" concept and a more philosophical conception of writing, I find 
that I must search back and back. The passage on pages 6 and 7, under 
the subtitle "The Programme", seems a promising start: 
By a slow movement whose necessity is hardly 
perceptible, everything that for at least some twenty 
centuries tended toward and finally succeeded in being 
gathered under the name of language is beginning to let 
itself be transferred to, or at least summarised under, the 
name of writing. (6) 
I find, as in most other passages on these pages, that key words must be 
searched for in the text that comes previous to the passage under 
examination. In this case I wonder if any special features have already 
been attached to the words "everything" , "language", and "writing" that 
can make better sense of this sweeping statement. 
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The second of the three terms, at least, "language", can be referred to a 
small passage in the previous section, which is part of the opening 
paragraph for Chapter One: "at present [the problem of language has] 
invaded, as such, the global horizon of the most diverse researches and 
the most heterogeneous discourse, diverse and heterogeneous in their 
intention, method, and ideology."(6; italics in original) As evidence, 
Derrida offers "The devaluation of the word "language" itself, and 
how...it betrays a loose vocabulary". But is the over-extended use of the 
word "language" evidence that "the problem of language" has "invaded" 
the horizon of as Derrida implies) every research and discourse? Rather 
than evidence, it seems a concomitant event. Not only the question of 
which could be cause and which could be consequence is left open, but 
also that of controls: are there any other (unmentioned, unnoticed) 
phenomena that accompany this movement? 
Thus, as far as identifying terms goes, "the problem of language" so far 
is unglossed but central. As a lay reader and a linguist, I take the 
philosophical statement that there is a "problem" of language on trust, as 
the following are a part of my lifeworld: the problem of language and 
meaning in literary texts, and the problem of language in a philosophical 
tradition of semantics (which includes propositional logic and speech 
acts). 
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Later in the same paragraph, there is a description of language that is 
reminiscent of Eco's unlimited semiosis21: 
...a historico-metaphysical epoch must finally determine 
as language the totality of its problematic horizon. It must 
do so not only because all that desire had wished to wrest 
from the play of language finds itself recaptured within 
that play, but also because... language itself is menaced in 
its very life, helpless, adrift in the threat of limitlessness... 
(6) 
Knowing what comes later, I can easily decode "all that desire had 
wished to wrest from the play of language", as, in essence, the 
transcendental signified. But again, the word "language" is left 
tantalisingly unglossed. 
In the search for Derrida's "vulgar" concept of writing, and how it relates 
to arche-writing, I press on: 
...the concept of writing 	 no longer indicating a 
particular, derivative, auxiliary form of language in 
general...the signifier of the signifier—is beginning to go 
beyond the extension of language. In all senses of the 
word, writing thus comprehends language. (6-7; italics in 
original) 
21 Eco 68 
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What is language, here? If it is semiosis, as implied in the use of "play of 
language" in previous passages ("It must do so not only because all that 
desire had wished to wrest from the play of language finds itself 
recaptured within that play..."), then where does writing finally take up 
residence? Does it reside in a transcendental space, beyond the 
previously posited totality of the "problematic horizon...a historico-
metaphysical epoch must finally determine as language" (6)? In this case, 
the argument is positing an expanded horizon, which writing offers, 
beyond the "play of language". That is, perhaps, and paradoxically, the 
desire weaving through the rhetoric of these two pages - that there is 
some transcendence over the "threat of limitlessness". 
A small meditation follows on the phrase "signifier of the signifier" (7). 
The phrase describes a movement rather than a static state such as a 
sign. There is in fact no signified that is not always already a signifier; 
and "The secondarity that it seemed possible to ascribe to writing alone 
affects all signifieds in general...There is not a single signified that 
escapes, even if recaptured, the play of signifying references that 
constitute language." (7) The flow of this statement again depends on 
several ambiguities, which achieve its rhetorical passage between writing 
and the expanded horizon of language while leaving the logical passage 
less than clear. Whereas writing earlier had "designated" the "signifier of 
the signifier", it is now a "signified". This movement is justified by the 
contents of the small meditation on the signifier of the signifier. Writing, 
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like all other signifieds (that is, everything that has meaning, as an 
object, in semiosis), is subject to the "play of signifying references that 
constitute language." 
But the metaphorical movement from "vulgar" writing to all other 
elements of semiosis, here labelled "language", is what seems to 
constitute the relationship I wish to explore. It is a relationship of 
analogy: the feature of writing, or the characteristic of writing, that is 
"secondarity", is also a feature/characteristic of "all signifieds in 
general"; and "all signifieds in general" enter the play of "language". 
Here, "language" is the totality of the "problematic horizon" of our 
epoch. The next logical step, then, as in a syllogism, is the conclusion: 
therefore, writing is language, which is the totality of the horizon of our 
(historico-metaphysical) epoch. Note, however, that writing, by this 
analogy, does not go beyond the "extension of language". It does not so 
far, as Derrida has stated, "comprehend" language. It is only analogous 
to language, working on the same principle of secondarity. 
Con/version 
And yet, creole transcription suggests that secondarity is not a 
characteristic of writing. Writing is like any other semiosis in its 
acquisition of immediate significations; in its engulfment of secondarity; 
and in its move to complete identity, from symbol to sign, and, within the 
sign, from binariness to the collapse of the signifier/signified distinction. 
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In the previous exploration of writing within the traditions of register and 
dialect variation, I stressed its autonomy (from a phonetic point of view). 
But, in fact, there is a relatively stable sound system to English spellings. 
As Millward points out, 
The fact that most of us spell most words correctly is 
evidence of this. Moreover...the conversion of spelling to 
sound is highly predictable. Most of us know how to 
pronounce most of the new words we encounter in 
reading. For example, when I asked a group of thirty 
native speakers to say the nonwords lape, morantishly, 
permaction, and phorin, there was virtual unanimity in 
their pronunciation, including even the placement of 
major stress. (203) 
The key word here is "conversion". The speakers she tested have 
internalised the rules of this conversion from spelling to sound in order to 
decipher the pronunciation of the new words. In order for the conversion 
rules to operate, each of the two systems the rules link (sounds and 
spellings) must be internally consistent. What is not required is that the 
connection between the two systems be more than arbitrary, in the 
Saussurian sense. 
A speaker of Jamaican, Indian, and Australian English will produce 
different sounds from the same combinations of graphemes. They will 
produce them systematically, according to their internalised orthographic 
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grammar; but it is never the case that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence, across all users of the same grapholect English, between 
the graphic signifier and the spoken signified. What is regular is the 
system of differences between the grapheme clusters; there is another 
system of differences among the phonemes; and, as in Saussure's wave 
analogy, there is a "mysterious process" by which the two systems, when 
put together, "evolve divisions": 
The characteristic role of a language in relation to thought 
is to supply the material phonetic means by which ideas 
may be expressed. It is to act as intermediary between 
thought and sound, in such a way that the combination of 
both necessarily produces a mutually complementary 
delimitation of units. Thought, chaotic by nature, is made 
precise by this process of segmentation. But what happens 
is neither a transformation of thoughts into matter, not a 
transformation of sounds into ideas. What takes place, is a 
somewhat mysterious process by which 'thought-sound' 
evolves divisions and a language takes shape with its 
linguistic units in between those two amorphous masses. 
(Saussure 1 I 1 ) 
I am suggesting this as an analogy for thinking about phonemes, not as a 
model of language. The same "mysterious process" that Saussure 
envisions segmenting thought-sound would act to link sound patterns to 
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graphic signs. Every English dialect has its own inventory of phonemes, 
related to, though slightly different, from the others. 
These sound patterns, or phonemes, are quite close in nature to 
"thought"; as Saussure explains elsewhere, when linguists speak of 
phonemes, they are speaking of a conceptualised sound rather than a 
sound "in the raw". This is because phonemes as such have no physical 
reality. They are aggregates of different but related sounds that are 
conceptualised by speakers of the language as one sound: 
Phonemes are no more than convenient symbols for 
groups of allophones. Phonemes represent a form of 
linguistic knowledge. Even though we never pronounce a 
phoneme, only its allophones, there is ample evidence that 
speakers mentally store the phonological system of their 
language in terms of phonemes. It is not surprising, for 
example, that English spelling uses only one letter for 
both [I] and [I]...Generally, spelling systems ignore 
phonetic variation that is non-distinctive. (O'Grady and 
Dobrovolsky 63) 
For example, Canadian English speakers have two sounds which they 
conceptualise as one. In words such as "loud", "loot", "lottery", they 
pronounce the first sound [I] (called a dark I, with the back of the tongue 
raised); in words such as "lead", and "leek", they pronounce the first 
sound [I]. Neither is a version or a variation of the other; they are both 
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real sounds, which Canadians think of as one. They do not often perceive 
these sounds as different, since the difference creates no meaningful 
variation in the words. For example, [layt] and [layt] do not have 
different meanings. 
However, English distinguishes [r] and [I] as separate phonemes; they 
are the distinguishing sign between the words "right" and "light", and the 
distinguishable meanings of "right" and "light" in turn help to maintain 
the perceived difference between the sounds [r] and [1]. It is in fact due to 
the contingencies of history 	 the dominance of the European scholarly 
tradition in the twentieth century 	 which codifies this distinction into the 
"International" Phonetic Alphabet. If the alphabet had been devised by 
Japanese speakers, the IPA grapheme "r" would perhaps have been 
visually presented as a member of the "1" family 	 with a diacritic by the 
"1" perhaps. 
In the same way that different groups of European speakers have 
different values for the Latin alphabetic grapheme "r" (e.g., Spanish 
trilled /r/, French uvular /r/, the English "flap" version of /r/), different 
groups of English-dialect speakers have different values for the English 
grapholectal sign "a". In both cases, the dialects can be mutually 
unintelligible. What matters is not the raw sound, but its role in 
anchoring a segment of difference in the total phonemic inventory of the 
dialect. (I will take up formal aspects of this in Chapter Five). 
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Deconstruction 
As "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing" continues, it 
makes an interesting statement about the relationship between phonetic 
writing and arche-writing. Before taking it up, I would like to call 
attention to a major element in alphabetic writing systems. English 
orthography is based on a large number of sight units, morphemes which 
are pronounced differently but spelled the same. Examples are the plural 
marker "s" (pronounced variously as [s] in "cats", [z] in "cars", and [az] 
in "judges"); the past marker "ed" (pronounced [d] in "played", [t] in 
"worked", and [ad] in "hunted"); and consistent syllable spellings in 
alternations such as "electric/electricity" gilektrik1/[ilektrisiti]) which 
facilitate sight recognition of meanings but do not belong in an 
alphabetic system of the type Derrida envisages as "phonetic" writing. 
The most prominent of morphophonemic devices, according to Venezky, 
are the vowels a,e,i,o,u, which remain visually consistent in order to 
preserve the sight-meaning correspondence of their morphemes, but 
represent different sounds in environments such as "sane/sanity", 
"meter/metric". In English, there are fourteen different phonemes (plus 
all of their allophones) represented by these five visual vowel signs. 
In many cases visual morpheme representation is a product of diversity 
in pronunciation not just over time but over space. An American knows 
the visual sign "bar" is pronounced [bar]; a Briton, with the same 
certainty, knows it is pronounced [ba:]. The Briton notes the written "r" 
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as a clue to the meaning of the grapheme "bar", but treats it is a graphic 
signal of meaning only, without ever comparing his knowledge to any 
others' system of phoneme-grapheme correspondence. 
Derrida treats graphic signals of meaning, without mediation through 
sound, as features of superior systems of writing and as signals of the 
limitations of "phonetic writing": 
I have already alluded to theoretical mathematics; its 
writing 	 whether understood as a sensible graphie 
[manner of writing] (and that already presupposes an 
identity, therefore an ideality, of its form, which in 
principle renders absurd the so easily admitted notion of 
the "sensible signifier"), or understood as the ideal 
synthesis of signifieds or a trace operative on another 
level, or whether it is understood, more profoundly, as the 
passage of the one to the other 	 has never been 
absolutely linked with a phonetic production. (9-10; 
emphases in original) • 
The paragraph points out first of all the impossibility of escaping the 
identity of signifier and signified ("absurd...the 'sensible signifier'"); but 
then attempts a reformulation of that sign relationship as a "synthesis" of 
signifieds; or as the product of sign activity on different "levels"; and 
finally, as the movement of a trace from one of these levels to the next 
and the next... It is still not clear why this type of writing challenges the 
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"ideal of phonetic writing and all its implicit metaphysics" (10), unless 
Derrida, together with the thinkers he is criticising, conceives of phonetic 
writing as a one-to-one relationship between letter and sound, in which 
the grapheme is merely a "detour for the purpose of the reappropriation 
of presence", as he describes the metaphysics of the alphabet (10). 
Adds Derrida: 
But beyond theoretical mathematics, the development of 
the practical methods of information retrieval extends the 
possibilities of the "message" vastly, to the point where it 
is no longer the "written" translation of a language, the 
transporting of a signified which could remain spoken in 
its integrity. (10; emphasis in original) 
Presumably, by "practical methods of information retrieval", he means 
methods such as those used in computerised library catalogues, where 
pushing a button on the keyboard is a sign of the command "go to the 
next screen"; or computer programmes, whose languages depend on a 
relatively small group of tokens signifying similar commands, as well as 
on elements of a simplified syntax. There is no difference, however, 
between this aspect of these languages and the grammatical functions of 
any natural language; the word "is" in English, to take a powerful 
example, means "a link of identity is hereby made"; it has no other 
meaning, even in philosophical statements such as "God is". The point is 
that the nature of English sight spellings and of orthographic signifieds 
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across diverse English dialects renders problematic the assumption that a 
"'written' translation of a language [is] the transporting of a signified 
which could remain spoken in its integrity." 
There is thus a weakness in Grammatology's representation of 
"phonetic" alphabetic writing as a phonemic transcription of spoken 
sounds.22 But why does it matter that there is an overly-narrow working 
notion of phonetic writing as a first step in Grammatology's argument 
for the perpetually evasive signified? If this narrow version of phonetic 
writing, this phonocentrism, is a straw man, surely there is no point in 
knocking it down? 
The phonetic writing presented in Of Grammatology is not just a straw 
man. It is the foundation of the argument for the perpetually evasive 
signified, and the argument itself is a demonstration of the formal 
principles of deconstruction. Arche-writing 	 the deferral of meaning 	 is 
based on following through the implications of the original phonocentric 
"phonetic" version of writing which Derrida argues against. He shows 
that it is untenable by bringing the logic of secondarity 	 that a letter is a 
signifier of a signifier 	 to its furthest conclusion 	 that the signified is 
never reached, either in phonetic writing or in any other kind of 
"writing". 
22 Perhaps a more nearly phonetic alphabet exists in French, or rather, French spellings 
seem more regular to speakers of French such as Derrida. But my observations about 
the relationship between a standardised orthographic code and its relation to dialects 
holds for French as well. 
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This is an argument whose conclusion—that writing is autonomous 
contradicts its premise 	 that writing is completely phonetic (i.e., 
dependent on a simple one-to-one relationship between letter and sound, 
in all environments). And yet, the conclusion depends on its premise for 
validity. If writing were not conceived of as phonetic to start with, there 
would be no ground for establishing its autonomy. If one concedes that 
contradictions can be true 	 and I do—then the argument is airtight. 
Unless: writing is not autonomous. Unless one argues against both sides 
of the contradictory formula: that the technology of writing is not the 
simplified phonetic one that is presented in Of Grammatology and that 
writing is not a code which is independent of historical time and place 
for its meaning. 
What happens when a dub poet wishes to write her songs? 
When a speaker of creole chooses to write a text in an English-based 
orthography that is nevertheless distinctive for being not-standard, what 
they are doing is calling attention to a perceived difference in two 
dimensions. The first is standardness: any deviation from the standard is, 
as I have said, a powerful signal of the meaning potential "Other". 
The second dimension is cultural identity on a phonetic level: the written 
text of "Riddim" contains graphemes for key, identifying sounds of 
Jamaican creole (e.g. "yu", an iconic representation of the shortened but 
tense vowel Jamaicans use in the second person pronoun). Writers of 
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creole seem to feel that "identification of a text as creole must not rest on 
morphological, syntactic and lexical clues alone" (Hellinger 62). That is, 
creole writers seem to feel that an important creole identifier is its sound. 
However, only a few phonetic spelling variations are necessary to 
suggest a dialect in writing. Speech communities use "stereotypes" to 
identify social groups (Labov, Language 248), which are the linguistic 
variables that are popularly ascribed to a group, both internally and 
externally. Compared to the number of features that really distinguish 
dialects from each other, the number of stereotypes necessary to suggest 
a dialect are really very few. 
For example, this is the novelist Chaim Potok's rendering of French 
with the help of French stereotypes: 
"Mrs. Levy," I said. "Where do the wife and two children 
of Lucien Lacamp live?" 
"Wife and one child. The other child died." 
"I am sorry to hear that." 
"She had the asthma. They live now on the Rue 
d'Aboukir in the Second Arrondissement...." 
"Thank you," I said. "I am in your debt.-  (Potok 197) 
The stereotypes of French in this text include the use of the definite 
article in front of the name of an illness and of a street, a periphrastic 
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possessive, and frequent, unfamiliar politeness formulae. Although the 
text is in English, stereotypes of French convey the intention of the 
writer to signal that the language is French. Note that variations are both 
symbolic and mimetic (in the sense that they imitate real French phrasal 
structures). In the same way, only a few stereotypes of creole in "Riddim 
An' Hardtimes" convey an impression of creole. 
Speakers who feel the need to convey certain sounds within a highly 
standardised orthography such as written English necessarily feel 
themselves to be bi-dialectal (and not just to control different styles and 
registers), and have attached one set of sounds to the standard English 
orthography. This is because they are aware that the orthography is 
meant to represent an internally consistent inventory of sounds; they 
conceive of dialects/languages as unitary. They also have a sense that 
another highly identifiable and "focused" (LePage "Projection") set of 
sounds needs expression in a grapholect. They are, in practice, expanding 
the registers of the creole, making it and making for it a written language. 
The emergence of European written languages, as Ong and others have 
pointed out (e.g. Alleyne and Garvin), has involved the consciousness by 
vernacular speakers of the status of the speech community as a nation 
state, and the desire to dignify the vernacular with the roles and functions 
formerly associated with a separate, written language (in the case of the 
European vernaculars, Latin; see Winford for a comparison of Caribbean 
creole speech communities and classically diglossic situations). Bound 
up with all of this, in the case of a very standardised grapholect, is the 
choice of representing the creole as "deviant" (in the context of 
standardisation). Deviance in this context is a strong signal that the new 
writing is not the same as the old, which is represented as a whole by the 
standard orthography. 
The sociolinguistic situation of JEC is that most speakers of it control at 
least one other dialect of English and sometimes more: 
Nearly all speakers of English in Jamaica could be 
arranged in a sort of linguistic continuum, ranging from 
the speech of the most backward peasant or labourer all 
the way to that of the well-educated urban professional 
[who speaks Standard Jamaican English]. Each speaker 
represents not a single point but a span on this continuum, 
for he is usually able to adjust his speech upward or 
downward for some distance on it. (DeCamp "Social 
Factors" 82) 
However, the continuum can be correlated with other features besides 
social class, education, and geography. Functional varieties can also be 
placed on the continuum: writing is associated with the end of the 
continuum closest to Standard Jamaican, while protest songs and oral 
genres such as dub are associated with the end closer to "the speech of 
the... labourer." Making the distinction more concrete, it can be said that 
orality is in the dialect of one end while literacy is in the dialect of the 
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other (a dialect, not coincidentally, much closer to the grapholect in 
syntax and lexis).23  
The transplantation of Caribbean creoles to the metropolitan speech 
communities creates a wider range of dimensions on which to draw 
symbolically, as well as a more emphatic division between speech types. 
With some interesting and important exceptions (see Rampton), the use 
of creole is restricted to members of a specific ethnic group. This 
reinforces its status as a distinct linguistic entity. However, the fact that 
this language is excluded from the print mass media and other vehicles of 
mainstream literacy means that those of its poets who wish to participate 
in central institutions of literacy 	 and who wish to participate in 
literature as an institution of power 	 must somehow create the creole 
through the medium of written English. 
Therefore, Allen's representation of JEC in "Riddim An' Hardtimes" is 
both a defiant gesture and a technical coup de force. She does succeed in 
aurally evoking, to some extent, a certain set of sounds. She cannot have 
done it, however, without reference to very specific, even ephemeral 
public knowledge: the sound of Caribbean creole in diaspora in the 
1990's. Spelling deviations thus partake of the "play of signifying 
references" (Derrida 7) within particular times and places. 
23 This is an idealisation for the present purposes; one important function of the 
continuum model is to emphasise the artificiality of dialect boundaries. 
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For much of her career Allen thought of herself primarily as a 
performance artist, and she is very aware of the differences in essence 
and technique between oral and written versions of the "same" text. In 
the Preface to her 1993 publication of selected poems, she writes, 
Because words don't (always) need pages, I have 
published extensively in the forms of readings, 
performances, and recordings. I have been reluctant to 
commit my poetry to the page over the years because, for 
the most part, these poems are not meant to lay still. 
As I prepared poems for this collection, I was required to 
"finalize" pieces I had never imagined as final. Like a jazz 
musician with the word as her instrument, reading and 
performing these poems is an extension of the creative 
and creation process for the work... (Women Do This 9) 
Her emphasis on the process of creation, on "versions" rather than on a 
final written artefact, is part of a resistance against language forms that 
are relatively rigid. Fighting social structures symbolised or even 
propagated by writing as a Derridean metaphor, she subverts the process 
of codification of her signs by creating multiple oral versions. 
There is never any spoken version of a text that is not its own text, with 
features that make it not an object on the same order as the "phonetic" 
part that corresponds to a text written in alphabetic script. For example, 
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at the end of each of the last two lines of the first stanza, in performance 
Allen draws out the last syllable of "hardtimes" and raises her voice 
steadily in pitch, so that each line ends on a shriek: 
An' him chucks on some riddim 
an' yu hear him say 
riddim an' hardtimes 
riddim an' hardtimes 
Then a third line of "riddim an' hardtimes" is added, before music starts, 
and a final line of "riddim an' hardtimes", with the same final shriek, is 
added on top of the music. The final syllable of the fourth repetition of 
"riddim an' hardtimes" then echoes until there is a final silence. These 
sounds, not "language" and not included in the written version, make the 
oral "Riddim an' Hardtimes" a different sign. 
Dub poetry is a protest genre. A shriek is an eminently transparent 
signifier (Kress 1993) of protest. Other sounds, expressing essential 
experiences of a female body, are used to break taboos about women's 
experience, to make an emotional link with female listeners, or simply to 
speak in a way that short-circuits the codings of a male-dominated world 
in a dominating language. 
Conclusion 
Deconstruction essentially displaces the links made by a phonocentric 
sign; its method is to constantly remind the reader that these links are not 
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made by the necessity that the metaphysics of presence claims for them. 
It carries out this project in constant awareness of the interests of the 
status quo served by as-yet undisplaced links of signification; but it does 
not have a logic to re-establish links. Its project is therefore perpetually 
reactive. And, as necessary as'the first step(of destabilising meanings to 
any resistance against oppression, the aims of resistance must include a 
subsequent rewriting – a reconstruction—of the links between specific, 
historical signifiers and the experiences of the present day. 
Because all Caribbean English Creoles are oral languages, they are a 
powerful symbolic resource for the subversion of colonial grammars at 
different levels. One is the grammar of standard English, which is a 
codification of the verbal patterns of colonial and post-colonial Britain 
and neo-imperial English North America. Others are the grammars that 
structure social relations: class, race, gender, age, and so on. These 
categories in themselves are culturally and historically relative: the term 
"race" is embedded in the history of European expansion and 
exploitation, while "gender" (as opposed to sex) is central to a long-
standing system of patriarchy. In the following chapters I will make the 
connection between grammars of language and grammars of gender and 
race. 
25 Here, DeCamp conflates the speakers with the samples. To describe the speech of a 
community in terms of discrete "varieties" placed on a spectrum, all that is necessary 
are several different samples, all of which may be from one speaker. However, the scale 
should compare the same thing along its length: either idiolects (speakers) or samples of 
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Chapter Four 
WHAT IS A LANGUAGE? 
On Methodology 
Language is subject to highly political symbolic appropriations, as we 
have seen. One of the strongest appropriations, in the European tradition 
at least, has been in the service of standardisation. Standardised systems 
in turn are intimately involved with relations of power: non-standard 
regional and class dialects are living systems nourished by resistance to 
all the tangible, daily implications of standardisation. 
As both consequence and cause, the common-sense notion of writing as 
phonetic is a powerful symbolic vehicle for spelling standardisation: the 
notion itself is the upholder of the standard. That is, without a belief that 
there is a very necessary and inevitable connection -- a metaphysics of 
presence 	 between letters and sounds, the possibility of alternative 
spellings could be imagined; once imagined, they are a challenge to the 
myth of "phonetic" writing, and thus to standardisation. 
In this chapter, I turn again to the metaphysics of presence that fuels the 
standardisation of verbal patterns. I will propose that speakers' 
awareness of social difference and social change encourages their 
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perception of an idealized code, or a language. This perception is crucial 
in interaction between members of a group as semiotic tokens of attitude, 
position, identity, and even of the inferential content of messages. An 
analysis of languages as semiotic entities is a focus on a language as a 
popular notion, and the perception of the distinctness of a language as a 
result of a group-member's need to symbolise a standard (in the non-
linguistic sense of the word) and to position themselves in relation to it. 
Allen, and as we will see later Brand, manipulate this social and semiotic 
dynamic in order to make the meanings they do. In order to place their 
written version of creole in a position that is not within the English 
grapholect, but in some kind of meaningful relationship to it, they must 
uphold the English system of spelling, morphology and grammar while 
at the same time dislodging it enough to position themselves as both 
different and as having a certain identity. That is, they cannot just be 
outsiders (deviant); they must also be identified as creole speakers. Their 
stereotypes must make their meanings within the English grapholect, to 
readers accustomed to written English. 
The chapter is an application of a specific version of social semiotics 
(Hodge and Kress Social Semiotics, Hodge and Kress Language As 
Ideology, Kress "Against arbitrariness", Kress Before Writing) to these 
sociolinguistic questions. It treats macro-level questions of language 
variation and change by reference to micro-level interactions. 
118 
Creole continua 
The classic definition of a creole is largely historical: a creole is a pidgin 
(a simplified language adapted for use between two groups of speakers 
who cannot otherwise understand each other) which has become the 
native language of a group, that is, the language children learn first as 
they grow up. A recent textbook on pidgins and creoles contains this 
rule-of-thumb definition: "A creole has a jargon or pidgin in its ancestry; 
it is spoken natively by an entire speech community..."(Holm 66). 
The language originally simplified is called the "lexifier language" 
because most of the vocabulary of the related pidgin/creole is from that 
language. The morphology and syntax of the creole, however, can be 
quite different from the lexifier language. Some linguists consider 
creoles to be mixtures of two or more languages; others see creoles as 
having diverged from the original (lexifier) language, and developed 
rapidly into what one would normally call a separate language. 
In the case of the Caribbean English Creoles, the fact that the original 
pidgin and Creole speakers were African as well as European has given 
linguists some idea of the origin of their syntax 
	 According to Holm, 
Boretzky has shown that there are widespread parallels between the 
phonology and syntax of certain West African languages and the Atlantic 
Creoles (66-7). Caribbean English Creoles, then, are probably a mixture 
of some features of the syntax and phonology of several West African 
languages together with the lexicon of English. 
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When a creole remains in direct contact with its lexifier language, a 
"restructuring continuum" sometimes develops. As a collective, speakers 
employ a wide range of variation that, over time, restructures both the 
creole and the lexifier language (Miihlhausler 11). Individual speakers 
also control more styles than is usual in non-creole communities. 
DeCamp was the first to apply the word "continuum" to describe this 
type of creole variation (see Chapter Three, p. 111) 
Theoretically, as I have said, there is a "pure" creole and also a non-
creole variety, but in practice these are rarely, if ever, heard in continuum 
communities (Rickford 22). In Trinidad, where the creole (Trinidad 
English Creole) is quite close to the local English standard there is no 
"pure" extended creole: every utterance includes elements that are not 
necessarily creole as well as elements that are undoubtedly creole 
(Winer). 
One example of this mix can be found in paragraph four of Brand's "no 
language is neutral". As a text it is cohesive, a narrative of the 
Trinidadian grandmother's dream; yet it has both creole forms, non-
creole forms, and, most predominantly, forms that are shared by both 
codes: 
This time Liney done see vision in this green guava 
season, fly skinless and turn into river fish, dream 
sheself, praise god, without sex and womb when sex 
is hell and womb is she to pay... (No Language 25) 
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Thus the Caribbean English Creoles do not fit easily into the linguistic 
concept of a "dialect", "system", "language", "variety", "lect", "style", or 
any other word denoting particularity (hereafter "code"). DeCamp's later 
comments about the device of a scale in relation to the model of a 
continuum illustrate his difficulty with conceptualising the continuum 
from the point of view of discrete dialects: 
The linguistic variation in Jamaica is, of course, not 
literally a continuum, for the number of speakers is finite. 
Furthermore, the number of variable linguistic features is 
limited. By calling it a continuum I mean that given two 
samples of Jamaican speech which differ substantially 
from one another, it is usually possible to find a third 
intermediate level in an additional sample. Thus it is not 
practicable to describe the system in terms of two or three 
or six or any other manageable number of discrete social 
dialects. ("Toward a Generative Analysis" 354)25  
According to DeCamp, "The same linguistic features that distinguish 
styles can, and frequently do, also distinguish dialects. Furthermore 
many speakers have mastered two or more social or even geographical 
dialects, and they switch from one to another exactly as they switch 
between formal and informal styles" ("Locus of Language" 49) Variation 
in these creole-speaking communities seems to correspond more easily to 
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Labov's notion of style-shifting, in which speakers use variables that 
correlate to different social classes according to their own social class 
and the formality of the situation (Labov Social Stratification) 
However, because of our awareness of the history of English Creoles in 
the Caribbean and their co-existence with Standard English, the 
continuum model throws into high relief the question, "what is a 
language?" In 1974, DeCamp asked the question, "Where do we find a 
language: in the mind of the individual speaker or in the speech 
community?" (46) This question is crucial to creole continua, he added, 
"where differences between languages, dialects, and styles are difficult to 
distinguish and where these three concepts seem to merge as only 
relative terms within some larger system." (46) 
The terms that DeCamp does use: "system", "speaker", "sample", 
"variety", "feature", are particulate. They correspond to his use of the 
term "discrete social dialect". As in folk-theoretical notions of language, 
he depended on the notion of "a language" (or dialect, variety, speaker, 
etc.), but his data seemed to contradict it: 
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Assume, too, that each sample is relatively homogeneous, 
or may be subdivided into homogeneous sub-samples; this 
is a necessary but indeed questionable assumption, for a 
speaker's stylistic level keeps varying during an 
interview, no matter how hard the interviewer tries to 
keep the atmosphere of an interview constant. ("Toward a 
Generative Analysis" 354) 
Other field linguists in the English Caribbean also observed great 
variation in the language used by speakers. In 1980 LePage suggested a 
multi-dimensional continuum model that would explain the nature of 
variation he was observing in Belize. He made this analysis of the 
language of three informants in Cayo District: 
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Neither the linguistic description of such speakers, nor of 
the collective corpus of texts culled from their utterances, 
is scaleable... because there is not two-dimensional linear 
progression from basilect to acrolect. One can only 
characterise their behaviour in terms of co-ordinates 
referring in a relational way to neighbouring cultures or 
internal models. The neighbouring cultures, such as 
Guatemalan Spanish or Coastal Carib, or Belize City 
Creole or teacher's English are again in their turn related 
to other cultural models such as Castilian Spanish or 
Island Carib or West Indian creoles or West Indian 
Educated Standards, or Standard British or American or 
written English. (as qtd. in Rickford 26-27) 
Further fieldwork and analysis convinced LePage of the validity of this 
approach. In 1985, together with Tabouret-Keller, he published an 
account of language variation and change, introducing the notion of the 
"focusing" (homogenisation) and "diffusion" (proliferation of sub-
varieties) of dialects based on available community models for ethnic 
identity. Codes (as expressions of ethnic identity; that is, "languages") do 
not have rigid boundaries, and continua exist wherever there is instability 
or change in the self-image of the community. Since there may be more 
than two models of identity available to a community, the continua may 
have more than two poles. 
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Thus, the range of "mixing" between the poles can be infinite; but at the 
same time, there exist in the minds of speakers idealized, bounded 
varieties that give meaning to variation, that tell readers "this is more 
creole" or "this is more English"; and these idealisations are thought of 
as relatively invariable. Research into creole-community variation in fact 
depends on the existence of these idealized "languages" in the 
perceptions of speakers. The focus of interest in these studies is not just 
the flexible range of variation that does in fact exist in multilingual 
communities, but on the implicit references by speakers to idealized 
codes. 
In 1992 Carrington suggested an alternate model for "creole space" 
which looks like 
an integrated mass of soap bubbles, each of which has the 
unusual feature of a penetrable skin. The feature allows 
clusters of bubbles to penetrate one another without 
bursting. Some bubbles will be spherical, others elliptical; 
some will have the top bulge of hot-air balloons, others 
the bottom-heavy appearance of rain-drops; yet others 
will tilt sideways, elongated in whatever direction the 
wind blows, much like the soap bubbles leaving the wire 
hoop of the child/linguist. The overall shape of the mass 
would be arbitrary and irregular.... (98) 
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Carrington is a native speaker of a Caribbean English Creole. In the same 
article he also draws attention to the way in which creole variation is 
determined by networks of communication: since speakers use creole 
according to addressee as well as situation, variation determined by 
communicative networks is an important element of social interaction. 
Carrington's view is reminiscent of Halliday's perspective on language 
as a social semiotic, with verbal patterns (texts) that encode, or even 
create, situations: 
Language actively symbolises the social system, 
representing metaphorically in its patterns of variation the 
variation that characterises human cultures. This is what 
enables people to play with variation in language, using it 
to create meanings of a social kind... from backyard 
gossip to narrative fiction and epic poetry. (Language as 
Social Semiotic 3) 
Carrington's "arbitrary and irregular" boundaries to a language would in 
this case not be arbitrary, but reflections of concrete situations in social 
space. The case of creole-speaking communities is just an extreme 
example of what happens in every community: the very idea of a 
language shapes verbal patterns so that they become redundant with the 
social structure of the speech community. 
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In sum, patterns of variation are both symbolic and functional: 
communicative networks shape that variation, and the variation in turn 
"symbolises" or reflects the structure of those networks. Once they have 
become symbolic in this way (not a chronological progression, but a 
logical one), they are also functional: they are deployed to make 
meanings "of a social kind". 
What is a language? 
Popularly, "a language" would be defined this way: it has boundaries 
(i.e., some item or rule is either "English" or it isn't); it is spoken 
by/belongs to an ethnic group or nation; and speakers of it understand 
one another but do not understand speakers of a different language 
(unless they are multilingual). But in language contact situations (such as 
creole continua) there are many items shared by two or more languages, 
and it can't therefore be the case that "a" language has fixed boundaries; 
nor is it true that speakers always understand one another through dialect 
differences; and an entity recognised socially as one "language" can 
define more than one ethnic group to itself (e.g. American and British 
English). 
Language boundaries are policed through notions of error and 
correctness. Although in practice there is no such thing as making a 
"mistake" in speech or writing (Kress Before Writing), in the abstract, 
error and correctness are considered absolutes. The idea of a standard of 
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correctness in relation to rules that define "a" language allows people to 
work out their social relationships against that backdrop. The tokens (the 
words, sounds, grammatical or morphological rules) that they talk about 
in order to work out these relationships enter "the language" (i.e., 
"English") according to the social position of speakers involved in the 
exchange. By entering "the language", they become its rules. (This is 
because rules are the abstraction of verbal patterns; but I will get back to 
this later.) 
Suppose a writer to the editor of a newspaper complains about a 
grammatical "error" in the paper. If the editor can muster enough 
authority in her reply, then the contested usage becomes, retroactively, a 
part of the language rather than an error; but if the editor cannot, or 
cannot appeal to institutions such as grammars or usage guides, then the 
letter-writer succeeds in re-defining the boundaries of the language. Not 
only that; the new boundary to "the language" (that is, their estimation of 
where the boundary is) marks in a very concrete way the relationship 
between letter-writer and editor. The new usage becomes almost a 
historical marker of the transaction that took place between them, in their 
joint redefinition of the boundary. 
I say re-definition because every exchange is a re-definition, even if it 
seems to one or both of the participants to be a defence of norms. "The 
language" is constantly being re-defined in this way, as well as in 
numerous unremarked exchanges between speakers. In the example of 
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the letter-to-the-editor-writer, the notion that there is a wrong way and a 
right way to speak or write "a" language allows her to enter the 
metalinguistic (about the language) exchange in the first place. In turn, 
the correctness/error social principle about usage implies that there is "a 
language" in which items belong or don't belong. 
The exchanges do not have to be metalinguistic: consider a lecturer using 
a word a student has never heard before; the student will introduce it into 
her speech in the indicated way, and if she has enough authority among 
her peers, they will introduce in their speech as well. This happens very 
often within the smaller speech communities that are academic 
movements, schools, and disciplines. That is how new, "specialised" 
words are added and old words are dropped. A specialised lexicon can be 
considered a map the nodes of power within a group. As speakers 
interact in exchanges unavoidably imbricated in power, their usage, their 
"language", contains the concrete tokens that allow them to position 
themselves, contest the position of others, and generally take part in the 
flux of power/solidarity within the group. 
In a larger speech community dictionaries, grammars, and usage guides 
are normally important fixers of error and correctness. Their authority is 
sometimes limited with counter-appeals to notions that contest them, 
such as the notion of local speech communities, or legitimised "variation 
from" a language (e.g. "that's an American spelling") or the notion of a 
special framing context (e.g., to a publisher's copy-editor: "it's poetic 
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license"). "Street language" or antilanguages are particularly fluid 
because the covert prestige that underwrites new words coined by 
speakers of high status must be asserted and defended constantly; we can 
think of these speech communities as having super-heated or accelerated 
relations of power, perhaps under pressure from the contextualizing 
community of legitimacy. 
Although speakers may be aware of the fuzzy boundaries of "languages", 
they behave as if the differences they perceive are categorial rather than 
not. For example, villagers on the border between the Netherlands and 
Germany speak mutually intelligible dialects. But on one side of the 
border they say they are speaking Dutch and on the other side of the 
border they say they are speaking German. This is in spite of the fact that 
there are more similarities between them than between the local variety 
on the Dutch side and Standard Dutch and the local variety on the 
German side and Standard German (Wardhaugh 27-8). There are similar 
continua at the borders of France and Italy and France and Spain; and in 
each case "languages" are similarly distinguished. 
Thus the second criterion 	 that a language defines a social group—is 
interwoven with the idea of the boundedness of a language; for the 
"language" is as bounded as the group is. The fuzzier the boundaries 
allowed on the group, the fuzzier the boundaries allowed on the notional 
language; but if the distinction between social groups must be very clear, 
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very small verbal patterns then become definitive. This principle will 
become important to my discussion of projection in Chapter Six. 
Intelligibility - the third criterion - is interconnected with the first two. 
There are relationships between varieties in which the speakers of one do 
not understand the speakers of the other, although the speakers of the 
second understand the speakers of the first (e.g., Swedish and Danish; 
Wardhaugh 28). These asymmetrical relationships of intelligibility have 
to do with an estimation of collective openness or standing towards 
another group. Not surprisingly, educated evaluations of lower class 
speech in British English is that it is "unclear" or "restricted"; of upper 
class speech, that it is "precise". These subjective measures of 
intelligibility incorporate, again, the relative standing of the speakers (a 
speaker using lower class speech to another member of the group 
presumably would not describe her speech as "unclear"). 
But intelligibility is also important in the error/correctness principle. In 
the case of the letter-to-the-editor-writer, when the principle is invoked 
(i.e., "you made a mistake"), the letter-writer is probably concerned 
about several issues having to do with boundaries. Often such an "error" 
signals to the letter-writer that changes which she has identified as 
incorrect and therefore often as uneducated, foreign in ethnicity or 
variety, or simply inappropriate (to the context, although often this type 
of error is not considered a matter of context), have "entered" or crossed 
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the boundaries of the language as she perceives them26. In defending the 
boundaries, she is not only defending a principle of exclusiveness, but 
also of stability, one being inextricable from the other in this case. And 
in defending stability, she is also defending clarity 	 a point often made 
in defences of conservative usage. A defence of "clarity" is a defence of 
intelligibility for an in-group. 
We can deduce, then, that varieties diverge into what becomes ultimately 
an unintelligible "other language" (this could take many centuries or 
perhaps just a decade or two) when clarity/correctness is not defended; 
and it is not defended when it is more important to identify speakers as 
non-members, that is, when verbal markers (Hodge and Kress 262; see 
also Labov Sociolinguistic Patterns) are needed in order to signal 
distinctions which have become important. I will elaborate on this 
process below. For now, suffice it to note that, although there is no such 
thing as an "error" in verbal patterns, there are usages which are not 
intelligible to all speakers. But again, they will be often be associated 
with particular, identified styles and provenances (many speakers of 
British English can identify Cockney but not understand it); a truly 
unintelligible usage is rare from a social semiotic point of view. 
26 Note that the boundary of the language is not portable: its place differs according to 
mode and context, so that, although a certain usage may be "in" the language in an 
informal spoken greeting ("hiya, howya Join'?"), in writing the same usage is not 
correct English (hiya is not an English word). 
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Intelligibility is an experience of semiosis that cuts close to the bone. 
Confronted with a stream of sounds or marks on a page which are 
interpreted as "meant to be meaningful but completely unintelligible", 
and with no interpretative clues to base a reading on, most speakers will 
feel 1) frustrated, 2) defensive, 3) threatened, and/or 4) put off. Perhaps 
that is why, in the continuum between unintelligibility and clarity, social 
evaluations are mostly negative: if you sound strange but can be 
understood, you are either speaking a dialect, or you are mentally 
deficient, or you are a child (see also Hodge and Kress 82). "Dialect" 
very often has a pejorative connotation. This, again, depends on the 
relative status of speakers 	 immigrants, travellers, or any speakers aware 
that speakers of usages around them far outnumber them, will feel the 
four things I listed above as well as a powerful motivation in decoding 
and re-producing others' verbal patterns. This leads to another type of 
asymmetrical mutual intelligibility. 
In situated verbal exchanges, speakers do not produce unintelligibility, 
nor do they interpret anything as "meaningless " except as a last resort. 
Back to the letter-to-the-editor example: If the copywriter had actually 
used a verbal pattern that was not socially inappropriate but truly 
unintelligible, there was probably a (communicative) reason for it. 
Chomsky's famous example of a grammatically correct but meaningless 
sentence: "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" -- does actually have a 
meaning. It is an example of "meaninglessness", and therefore it conveys 
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the correct meaning. Chomsky's point, that on the mimetic plane (Hodge 
and Kress 5) the sentence "has" no meaning, is actually also erroneous 
the sentence "has" meaning in the appropriate context (a book of poetry); 
but in a monograph on the science of linguistics, its meaning is 
paradigmatic (as an example of semantic non-sense) rather than mimetic. 
The sorts of "performance errors" Chomsky appeals to (Aspects 3) in 
order to make a distinction between competence and performance are 
also usually very meaningful. Hesitation phenomena, pauses, and 
repetitions in a monologue fulfil an important role in creating emic 
rhythm and clause-internal stress; the same "errors" in conversation are 
crucial in turn taking and the creation of links (agreement, interruptions) 
between speakers. 
Finally, let's take an example that seems an undeniable "error": I am 
typing a letter to the telephone company, and I hit the "R" key instead of 
the "T", creating the opening line: "Ro whom it may concern:" I will 
type up to a dozen or so more keys in order to go back and fix the error 
on my word-processor; while tapping keys, I will hold the thought in my 
mind that the letter must be changed to the "correct" one, otherwise the 
telephone company will not take the rest of my letter seriously, and 
perhaps neglect my request or give it a low priority. 
Although hitting one key instead of another was not "wrong" in isolation, 
it is the context, on several different levels, that creates the motivation 
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for me to go back, erase it, and hit another. On the first level of context, I 
know that a "T" is expected at that spot rather than an "R" 	 such 
distributional rules being syntagmatic, which create a context for each 
graphemic sign. But the force of this syntagmatic rule rests on the force 
of a different level of context 	 the social expectation that everyone will 
conform to this rule if they can 	 and if they don't then they are "rule- 
breakers" and not full members of the group, not "one of us". "Us" as a 
group is an internalised abstraction of the body of rules. In practice, "us" 
consists of all those who, noticing the "R", read the meaning "broken 
rule". 
Why isn't breaking the rules the same as making an error? Because 
breaking the rules is an event motivated by the participants' interest. 
Rule-breaking exists in a universe of choice, of free will; the constraint 
on this free will is, as I said, the participants' interests, which are in turn 
constrained by their social positions. In changing my typed "R" to a "T", 
I made the choice of not breaking a rule. If I had made a choice of 
breaking a rule, I would have left the "R", perhaps with an interest in 
signalling my busy life, or my disdain for bureaucracies. 
If I did not notice the typed "R", then I did not make an error (recall that 
"us" consists of all those who, noticing the "R", read the meaning 
"broken rule"). Further, if the reader does not notice the "R", then no 
error has been made (an error is a social event, not an empirical fact). If, 
on the other hand, the reader does notice the "R", they will then interpret 
135 
the interest behind this broken rule.27 If they read the "R" as an error, 
they will have disallowed my innovation. If they read it as an innovation, 
with attendant meanings, it enters their language. Their imagined social 
position in relation to me, the writer, will have a large impact on their 
decision. 
Conventionality and uniqueness 
How can the string "Ro whom it may concern" enter "the language" of 
an individual? For, surely, there is a difference between unique signs that 
make meaning in unique contexts, and that body of highly conventional 
signs thought of as "the language"? At what point do unique signs gain a 
wider circulation? Where is the dividing line between unique 
signs/contexts and conventionalised ones? 
Every meaning must have an element of uniqueness and also an element 
of repetition. This applies to meaning on every level, whether we look at 
the formal structure of the sign or at an intricately structured visual or 
musical text. Every utterance, therefore, seems to the speaker to be 
unique as well as conventionalised and to the reader to be the same, 
although they may read different things in the "same" utterance or text. 
The uniqueness of signs, and meanings, rests partly on the fact that every 
context of meaning-making is unique, and that meanings are made as an 
27 The issue of the reader/writer relationship is also a part of semiotic phenomena of 
language boundaries, but will not be taken up here. 
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inseparable amalgam of text and context. For example, "Can I have a cup 
of coffee?" has vastly different meanings depending on the social 
positions of speakers, their social/physical space (restaurant, home, 
street), time of day, previous events, etc. From a three-year old, it may 
mean, "I would like to remind you that I am a member of this family 
too." No analysis of meaning-making can bypass a description of the 
context of an utterance. 
But the uniqueness of signs depends also on the fact that every speaker 
and reader is unique, with a unique social position and set of motivations 
and interests. In principle, any conventional sign can be co-opted by the 
speaker/reader to mean something new (Kress6”Against arbitrariness" 
176). Unconventional signs (scribbles, seemingly random body 
movements, seemingly unmotivated sounds) are more obviously carriers 
of unique meanings. The point in that case is the same, but from the other 
side: there must be some aspect of repetition, similarity or difference, 
some patterning produced or read, for these meanings to be possible. 
As I have said, the "rules of the language" – the patterns built up by 
repetition and social convention when supported by specific relations of 
power 	 are re-defined in every exchange. Innovation—a change in the 
rules 	 is constant. But in order to have both uniqueness and repetition, a 
certain proportion of conventionality must be maintained in all 
exchanges. Since social relations depend on the exchange of symbols, the 
exchange of symbols always affects these relations (Lemke "Action"). 
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Social and semiotic exchanges are then inseparable, and a necessary 
degree of conventionality in verbal exchanges supports/produces a 
necessary degree of stability in the socio-cultural system. 
Although patterns are not rules, rules are easily deduced from patterns. 
The presence of a new element in any verbal pattern necessarily changes 
that pattern, and also the rule deduced from it. As Saussure puts it, 
... the language system as such is never directly altered. It 
is in itself unchangeable. Only certain elements change, 
but without regard to the connexions which integrate them 
as part of the whole. It is as if one of the planets circling 
the sun underwent a change of dimensions and weight: 
this isolated event would have general consequences for 
the whole solar system, and disturb its equilibrium...It is 
not the system as a whole which has been changed, nor 
one system which has engendered a second. All that 
happened was the element in the original system changed, 
and that sufficed to bring a new system into being. (84-5; 
emphasis mine) 
It is in this sense that we can say that the entry of a new element in a 
language both changes the rules and becomes (part of) a new rule. As a 
new rule, it is the element that "brings a new [language] into being". 
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Linguistic rules are thought to bind the language from the outside, rather 
like a national border, but in effect change works from inside out. If rules 
are re-defined in every exchange, innovation at the "deepest" most 
conventionalised level of "a language" is effected through unique signs 
in unique contexts. 
Rules 
By allying themselves to a set of verbal patterns called "French" or 
"Finnish" (which can be described or defined with rules), speakers 
constantly re-create those patterns. This reinforces their ability to 
discriminate the set of patterns that follow the implicit rules and those 
that don't. The fact that wordings are patterned, and that a finite set of 
rules can temporarily be abstracted from these patterns (temporarily 
because the patterns are always in a process of change), doesn't mean 
that the rules "exist" 	 only that speakers, by maintaining patterns, 
behave as if rules exist. 
Speakers also behave as if the rules are quite fixed. Folk-theoretical 
notions of language (as well as theoretical linguistics, whose 
foundational assumptions are based on these notions) would assign to 
verbal rules two important and related functions: 1) as characterisers of a 
language, i.e., French, Swahili, Tagalog can each be distinguished from 
the others by its own specific set of grammatical, morphological, and 
phonological rules, so that French "is" its constitutive rules; and 2) an 
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internalised set of tools, so that all speakers who "know" the rules can 
make meaning with those rules. 
In theoretical linguistics, an important function of the rules is to delimit a 
circle, similar to that of a Venn diagram, which contains the set of all and 
only all of the correct patterns of a language (Chomsky Syntactic  
Structures). This device from set theory captures especially well the first 
of the three popular criteria for identifying a language: boundedness. 
However, as we have seen, boundedness is closely related to the other 
two criteria, collective identity and mutual intelligibility. I should like to 
stress again that the Venn diagram is what speakers (and linguists) 
imagine to be the case; and, since they behave as such, it is, semiotically, 
the case. However, the important element of innovation comes in when 
we realise that verbal patterns outside the circle are not necessarily 
meaningless. 
In order to make the sentence "It was sunny and the seagulls careened 
above the boat", the speaker patterns words from which certain rules of 
word order and morphology can be deduced. But the speaker can, in 
addition, make the sentence "Twos brillig and the slithy toves / did gyre 
and gimble in the wake", a string both intelligible and recognisable as 
derived from the first sentence. However, this second verbal pattern 
could not be created from the same rules deduced from the first. It is 
made by transforming the patterns of the first with a small set of 
analogies, oppositions, and other simple conversions. In order to read it, 
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the reader must know the patterns of the language as well as be able to 
follow simple, innovating transformations (e.g., brilliant —> brillia 
brilliy —> brillig). 
The "rules" are thus only one aspect of every utterance, and not 
necessarily the most basic, the first, or the most important aspect. 
"Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" has a certain meaning in a 
certain context, though it lies outside the boundary/circle created by the 
constitutive rules of a language. Its context must be a book of poetry, or 
other social context in which innovation is sanctioned. 
Much of everyday speech, as well as poetry and song, may at any one 
moment lie outside the imaginary boundary created by the rules at that 
moment. In the conception of speakers, the inside of the circle contains 
the patterns that can be said, (c.f. Halliday Introduction xxiv) -- those 
that are believed to be sanctioned and productive of social cohesion and 
intelligibility. But they also understand verbal patterns that flirt with the 
rules, invert the rules, even break the rules with no reference to the rules; 
patterns that, strictly speaking, can't be said, but which are produced and 
understood anyway. 
A good example is this poem by Gertrude Stein: 
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A CARAFE, THAT IS A BLIND GLASS 
A kind in glass and a cousin, a spectacle and nothing 
strange a single hurt colour and an arrangement in a 
system to pointing. All this and not ordinary, not 
unordered in not resembling. The difference is spreading. 
(461) 
Sometimes avant-garde poets flirt with the socially defined boundary 
between error and innovation in texts that present the reader with 
distressing choices. The reader must choose between: admitting failure as 
a reader with a confession that they do not read the text as innovative, 
but as error-ridden or meaning-less; or joining the establishment in 
proclaiming the 'innovation' as poetic, aesthetically pleasing, interesting, 
powerful, etc. Nine times out of ten, readers choose the latter, since the 
poet has the sanction of scribal culture (writing), cultural centrality, and 
in some cases canon-membership (e.g. Stein). 
Poetry, dramatic dialogues, written imitations of thought or speech, 
sermons and other oral performances, are all possible contexts for 
breaking the rules of written language. They take part in social 
institutions—literature, theatre, religion 	 legitimising verbal (and social) 
patterns that break the rules. This explains why literature, theatre and 
religion are as socially powerful as they are, in their different ways. They 
temporarily re-define social relations and their attendant power 
configurations, recontextualising verbal patterns so that error/correctness 
is based on a different 	 varying, fluid, and very local 	 set of criteria. In 
turn, the criteria for error that prevail in each of these local communities 
are more visibly set by relations of power between their participants. 
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Without some legitimising institution, however, the same "innovations" 
are "mistakes". The difference between the two is that innovation is 
sanctioned and error is not. Error is a disallowed innovation. It is 
therefore necessarily disallowed after its production, and it is disallowed 
by the reader28. 
Both "error" and innovation produce verbal patterns that lie outside the 
rules. Each may produce exactly the same patterns, breaking the rules in 
the same way. The error judgement depends on both participants' context 
in time and space, their relative social standing, the mimetic content of 
the message... in short, their interest (Kress, "Against arbitrariness" 172) 
in allowing or disallowing a perceived rupture of the rule-space. One 
component of the process, however, is always the working-out of power 
relations. 
What is a grammar? 
But where do these implicit rules "live"? The rules of "a language" are 
thought to be transcendent, immutable; yet they are also thought to be 
capturable with the aid .of formal devices such as paradigms and other 
taxonomic arrangements (as in systemic-functional linguistics), with 
rules of calculus (e.g., transformational-generative rules and move 
28 I use this term as shorthand for the participant in the verbal exchange (either spoken or 
written) who is on the receiving end of the message but who takes a much more active 
role in making meaning out of the message than is suggested by temm such as 
"receiver", "recipient", or even "addressee". The producer of a text can also be its 
reader, as when, for example, I notice the "R" in "Ro whom it may concern". I may 
disallow this innovation myself, and simply read it as an error which I then fix. 
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alpha), with statistical methods (such as quantificational variationist 
methods), or with topographic representations and symbols (as in 
connectionist neuro-pathway mapping). The resulting text or map is 
called a "grammar". 
A grammar is a text that abstracts general structures from verbal patterns 
and recasts them with one or another of the formal devices I just 
mentioned. Typically, but not always, the abstraction of these patterns is 
done by segmenting and categorising the verbal patterns of written 
language (i.e., "parts of speech") as a prelude to describing the 
distribution of these parts in relation to one another. A traditional English 
grammar uses a nomenclature borrowed from Classical Latin for parts of 
speech and their relations to each other. Twentieth-century grammars, on 
the other hand, in their attention to formal relations of meaning common 
to all languages, imply a relationship of homology (formal mimicry) 
between the formal patterns of the grammar and their object 
"language" 	 whether "language" is considered a mental configuration 
(e.g. Universal Grammar) or a cultural system (e.g. Systemic-Functional 
Grammar). 
The word "grammar" is also used for the reification of these descriptive 
grammars, so that it often refers to an imagined a priori system thought 
to exist "behind" verbal patterns. This system would be similar to the 
inferred patterns in natural events (e.g., the "laws" of mechanics, or of 
meteorology), with verbal usage as the analogy to nature. Metaphors of 
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mechanical and computational design are often also used to talk about 
this grammar that lies "behind" verbal patterns: 
The grammar is the central processing unit of a language, 
where meanings are accepted from different 
metafunctional inputs and spliced together to form 
integrated outputs, or wordings... It is always difficult to 
keep grammar in focus of attention, because it is a purely 
abstract level of coding with no direct input-output link 
with the outside world... (Halliday Introduction  xxxiv-
xxxv) 
The similarity of this approach to that of the natural sciences is obvious. 
The neo-classical philosophical roots of the natural sciences create the 
assumption that natural phenomena are rule-governed; and that the role 
of the scientist is to observe these phenomena and perceive, or tease out, 
the order in apparent chaos. During the European Enlightenment, the 
laws of a rational system replaced the laws of God as the Prime Mover. 
In the same way, the role of the linguistic scientist is to describe the 
"laws" (in the sense of rules) that structure verbal patterns. 
It is not uncommon to conflate this second sense of grammar as an a 
priori structuring principle with the sense of grammar as a written 
abstraction of posited rules, i.e. the descriptive grammar. In systemic-
functional linguistics, an influential school in the formation of social 
semiotics, Halliday often conflates the difference between the two senses 
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of "grammar". Hence, the second paragraph of Introduction to Functional 
Grammar states: 
It is a short introduction because, despite any illusion of 
length, it is no more than a minute fragment of an account 
of English grammar. Anything approaching a complete 
grammar would be hundreds of times this length. In fact 
there can be no such thing as a 'complete' account of the 
grammar of a language, because a language is 
inexhaustible...(xiii) 
This slippage between the two meanings of grammar takes place over 
three short sentences. The first "grammar" is the a priori system "behind" 
the verbal patterns of English: "it is no more than...an account of English 
grammar". The second is the next usage, in, "a complete grammar would 
be hundreds of times this length". That is the second meaning of 
grammar 	 the description, a special kind of text written by a linguist in a 
special language with special notation. The conflation also works in this 
paragraph through terminological substitution, so that in the third 
sentence, the two kinds of grammars can be placei in relation to each 
other by substituting "account" for "descriptive grammar": "a 'complete' 
account of the grammar of a language". 
From Halliday's remarks on the "complete account of the grammar", we 
can see that both types of grammars share with "a language" ("English" 
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in this case) the qualities of boundedness, stability through time and 
space, and transcendence. 
Conclusion 
Against this analysis, the object "language" has a very real existence, but 
not as a collection of clausal structures. Just as "a language" is a 
symbolic device for working out relations of power, the linguist's 
generic object "language" is deployed by writers of grammars in the 
negotiation of relative standing. I have heard linguists say, "That's not 
language", when faced with unfamiliar or unwanted data or formulations 
of data. The phrase is reminiscent of the one used by writers of letters to 
the Editor; they protest that such and such is "not English", as if English 
has unmoveable boundaries in time and space; and as if those boundaries 
are not the very ones being contested by the writers themselves. The 
meaning of the term "language" (i.e., what phenomena should or should 
not be covered by this term) is both assumed by and constructed by 
different mainstream linguistics in their descriptive models. But more to 
the point, it takes enormous social power to call one's own object of 
analysis in linguistics "language", for the term is hotly contested and 
defended. In disciplinary battles over this collective object of analysis the 
real battle is political and the power to invoke the symbolical object 
"language" goes to the victor. 
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I shall use the term "grammar" in opposition to its strong connotations of 
stability and transcendence. Although people think of a grammar as the 
baseline of correctness, a grammar must change at the same rate as the 
language (or system of signs) that it describes — which is sometimes quite 
fast. Therefore, as I have stated, correctness becomes a moving target, 
settling exclusively on users with high status. It is these who are in the 
best position to control grammatical rules as markers, although the 
grammar is continuously subverted by (low-status) users with covert 
prestige. All the while, a metaphysics of presence (Derrida Of 
Grammatology) controls the notion of grammar, so that the fluidity of 
grammars remains hidden to their users. 
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Chapter Five 
A SIGN THEORY 
In the previous chapter I explored creole continua, discrete languages as 
social symbols, and language boundaries. Speakers create language 
boundaries through notions of error and correctness, but only in relation 
to the context and to the configurations of power in the situation. 
However, social semiotics lacks a formal model for this kind of system-
oriented meaning-making. 
My aim in this chapter is to create such a model of semiotic — that is, 
symbol using -- behaviour. It is a way of describing the dynamics of the 
realities that speakers set up which are not empirical, but are nevertheless 
structured by their behaving "as if' (as if there are such things as 
languages; as if there is a one-to-one correlation between grapheme and 
sound). If I can describe the sorts of dynamics that these symbols 
undergo, then I can also approach the work of Allen and Brand with a 
firm grasp of how the integrity of a range of notional "languages" as 
systems guide their textual rebellions. 
Focusing on the sign rather than the phoneme, the morpheme, or the 
clause, also allows me to think "linguistically" about two or more 
systems of meaning-making at the same time: about the differences 
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between them, about the translation and transliteration of one to the 
other, and about similarities in meaning across differences in mode 
(speech / writing, verbal / vocal / performed). It also implicitly allows me 
to pick up where I left off, at Derrida's post-structuralist sign. Having 
rejected the post-structuralist sign, I go back to the original structuralist, 
Saussure, whom Derrida was writing against. 
Semiotics and the sign 
I have used the word "symbol" loosely up to now in order to put off an 
explanation of the technical term "sign". And yet, a sign is initially very 
simple: "A sign is everything which can be taken as significantly 
substituting for something else" (Eco 7). Further on, Eco elaborates, 
I propose to define as a sign everything that, on the 
grounds of a previously established social convention, can 
be taken as something standing for something else. In 
other terms I would like to accept the definition proposed 
by Morris (1938) according to which "something is a sign 
only because it is interpreted as a sign of something by 
some interpreter".... Semiotics, then, is not concerned 
with the study of a particular kind of objects, but with 
ordinary objects insofar (and only insofar) as they 
participate in semiosis. (16; emphases in original) 
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The condition that the sign means something "on the grounds of a 
previously established social convention" raises the social aspect of 
semiotics, and the issues I discussed in Chapter Four: what are the limits 
of innovation in social meaning-making, is there really a stable set of 
social conventions, and on what basis do they evolve and change? 
But Morris' definition adds another aspect. Traditionally, a science is 
defined by / defines its object of study (e.g., language (linguistics), 
insects (entomology), genes (genetics)). Saussure, the founder of 
semiology/semiotics, described semiology as "a science which studies 
the role of signs as part of social life... the nature of signs and the laws 
governing them." (15) However, in Morris' definition, a sign is not an 
object, but an interpretation. In this interpretation, objects have an 
instrumental function only, as participants in the interpretation. 
According to a recent reference work on literary theory, the underlying 
concern of semiotics is semiosis, or the production and interpretation of 
signs (Stout). 
In Social Semiotics, Hodge and Kress define semiotics as "The general 
study of semiosis, that is, the process and effects of the production and 
reproduction, reception and circulation of meaning in all forms, used by 
all kinds of agent of communication" (261). This definition completes a 
historical move from Saussure's science, defined by its object of study 
(the sign), to semiotics as a convenient label to designate the study of 
semiosis as "the circulation of meanings". It is true to the spirit of the 
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semiotics of Peirce and Eco, but it side-steps formal issues to do with the 
relationship between semiosis and the sign. The definition substitutes 
"meanings" for "signs"; what is the relationship between the two? 
A final important point is that, with "signs" as an object defined by its 
science, the role of the observer of these signs is that of a non-
participant; that is the role of the scientist. However, with "meaning" as 
the endpoint of the study ("...the process...of the production... of 
meaning"), the role of the observer becomes an issue. Some would say 
the role of the observer is central in the production of meaning. 
Kress' discussion of the transparent sign in "Against arbitrariness" 
begins to account for the positions of participants in semiosis, including, 
implicitly, that of the observer. He points out that the relationship 
between a signifier and signified is always completely accessible to a 
particular person in a particular place and time with a particular interest. 
The issue here is one of analytical positioning: since the reader / 
interpreter (the observer) is usually not the subjectivity creating the 
signs, "meaning" is a theoretical construct that makes a link between 
system and subject(ive) meaning. I will take this up in a later section. 
The Saussurian sign as a duality 
Saussure's Cours Q linguistique generale is often considered the 
foundation of modern semiotics, semiology, and linguistics. Saussure's 
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definition of the sign is "a two-sided psychological entity, which may be 
represented with the following diagram" (66-7): 
  
• 
  
  
  
Figure 1: Saussure's initial model of the sign 
But this is only the beginning of Saussure's description of the sign; 
concept / sound pattern it is essentially a bridging step between the 
"naïve view" that a sign is a link between a "thing" and a "name" (66), 
and the subsequent discussion of the sign as an arbitrary link between 
signifier and signified'`. The essential points Saussure is making here are 
that 1) there is duality involved, and 2) the sign is a psychological entity. 
Saussure's psychologising of the sign allows a step back from the 
empirical world and a step towards signs within their systems. It is also a 
move away from what Eco calls the "referential fallacy" (58). The 
referential fallacy is the supposition that there is a necessary 
correspondence between the "thing" part of the sign and a "real state of 
29 In fixing the terminology, "[wie propose to keep the term sign to designate the whole, 
but to replace concept and sound pattern respectively by signification and signal" (67; 
emphasis in original). In later semiologies, signal and signification become signifier and 
signified. 
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things to which it] corresponds"). The difference between Saussure's 
"concept" and the "thing" of the naïve view is that a "concept" is an 
internalised version of a thing, not meant to refer to the real world. 
The referential fallacy obliterates a distinction which is crucial when 
considering representation, between the represented and the 
representation. This distinction must be in play at all times, for the 
decision to consider the relationship between one entity and another as 
representational creates a cyclical dynamic. As soon as the idea of 
representation enters the picture, the "realness" of things becomes an 
issue. 
Representation is like the serpent in the garden of Eden: once it is 
introduced, there is no going back. What if we are fooled into believing 
something is "real" when it is "only" a representation? How can we 
know if the represented thing is "real" if we know it through its 
representation? Which is the more "real"? 
For example, a line drawing of an apple is a representation of a "real" 
apple; but only of certain of its aspects, and the "real" apple remains 
apart from its representation with all its roundness and sweet apple-smell 
intact. That is how we know the difference between a drawing of an 
apple and the real apple. But the drawing of the apple is also a "real" 
thing, which can be represented with a photograph of the drawing, or a 
verbal description, or even a sound sequence (as in Disney's Fantasia). 
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So right away, we are dealing with two "real" entities in the original 
representational relationship (line drawing and apple), each of which can 
be the represented in their own right. Going the other way, the "real" 
round, sweet-smelling apple that we perceive is a representation of a 
certain bio-chemical phenomenon, selected elements of which are 
"represented" to us through our senses. We cannot know other 
characteristics of the apple beyond what we perceive ourselves. A bat 
will perceive an apple in another way. Every represented is also a 
representation. 
What we are left with is simply a distinction, always kept when 
considering representation, between any object as representation and any 
other as represented — in other words, a barrier between one order of 
reality30 and another ("real" and representational). Each of the two 
entities in the representational relationship must be on different sides of 
the barrier. But in formal terms it does not matter which is on which side: 
each of the apple and the line drawing can be the "real" or the 
"representation". 
There is also a chaining effect in play. Every representation can become 
a represented; and what is the representation of it in turn? Consider the 
charcoal drawing of a black-and-white photograph of a Cezanne still-life 
30 I owe this term to Bateson's Steps to an Ecology of Mind, but do not discuss it here as 
it is not a technical terns in Steps and it seems self-explanatory in the context of this 
discussion. Saussure also uses the term "orders" for the elements of this relation: "... 
one is dealing with the notion of value. In both cases, we have a system of equivalence 
between things belonging to different orders." (80) 
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painting of an apple amongst other fruit, the painting being recognizable 
as "apple" only to viewers familiar with the conventions of Western art. 
What does a "real" apple have to do with any of that? And which of the 
entities in this chain is the represented and which is the representation? It 
does not matter where you stop in a chain of representations. That is 
what makes the relationship dynamic: switch them around, follow the 
chain of representations of representations, either way, we are talking of 
relations as much as (rather than?) "things". 
When I say "switch them around", I am referring to the actual objects 
designated by the signifier or signified, not the signifier or signified 
themselves. In other words, it is the "ordinary objects" of Morris' 
definition of semiosis that can be manipulated in these ways in their 
relationship to the sign, not the signifier and signified as elements of the 
sign structure. However, the signifier or signified can also be rearranged. 
For example, a further diagram in Cours gives the example 'tree' as the 
concept of the Latin word (sound pattern) "arbor" (67): 
  
• 
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Figure Two: Saussure's second model of the sign 
But the concept "tree" can itself be divided into signifier and signified. A 
"concept" is some belief we have in our head: that there is a thing called 
a tree, with certain semantic features (has roots, has trunk, has branches, 
has leaves or needles). So we have a cultural unit (Eco 66) "generic 
tree"; but in fact we do not have images in our heads of generic trees 
we always think of a specific tree, so that everybody's concept "tree" is 
actually a specific tree, all of these images having enough in common so 
that people agree, in rough terms, on what word to use when confronted 
with a "real" tree. From this point of view, the signifier is the specific 
tree-image people carry around in their heads to exemplify to themselves 
the cultural unit "tree" and the signified is the cultural unit "tree".31  
But the specific image people carry around in their heads as a sample 
"tree" rarely corresponds to the trees they meet in the world. Therefore, 
we can think of the tree-image as a signified and the patterns of sensory 
impressions that people organise into "tree" (if they perceive that these 
sensory patterns are to be classed as trees 	 think Impressionist 
landscapes) as the signifiers. Or vice versa. At this point, there's no point 
in keeping directionality in our chain 	 and if there is no directionality, 
then there is no point, either, in distinguishing a signifier as such from a 
31 It can be argued that Saussure disallowed this interpretation of his diagram by making 
the signifier first a "sound pattern" (which, as we will see, is not a sound in itself, but 
the inner representation of a sound). But semiotics and semiology (and Saussure 
himself in Chapter f.T, page 	 explicitly takes non-verbal and non-aural phenomena 
as signifiers if they are part of a system of signifying conventions. 
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signified. There are only entities that correspond in some relation of 
identity 	 identity across different perceived "levels" or orders of 
meaning, or systems. 
That is the role of systemic boundaries (dialect boundaries, social 
identities, modes): they create a difference across which we make an 
identity, the process itself creating, for a moment, a duality which 
Saussure called a "sign". 
The sign as a unity 
We have seen that extending the logic of representation to the sign means 
that the sign can be a chain of entities as well as the duality of Saussure's 
Cours. Eco, following Peirce, calls the chain "unlimited semiosis" (69). 
Derrida gets at this dynamic through the logic of the Western notion of 
phonetic writing (see Chapter 3). Briefly, the dynamic makes every 
signifier the signified (object) of a further signifier, since you can grasp 
nothing "in itself'. You can, however, keep chaining signifier/signifieds, 
converting each signified to a signifier as you pass along the chain. 
What you can't do as you pass along the chain is stop on any one link. 
That is, the minute you focus on any one half of the sign (for example, is 
the imaged tree a signified or a signifier?), the sign collapses 
	 because 
no one link in the chain is either a signifier or a signified without the 
other. Saussure says this too: 
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Any linguistic entity exists only in virtue of the 
association between signal and signification... It 
disappears the moment we concentrate exclusively on just 
one or the other. We are then left with a pure abstraction 
in place of a concrete object. There is a constant risk of 
taking one part or other of the entity and believing that we 
are dealing with the totality. (101) 
If you flip this around, any entity analysed as a sign is an entity that 
MUST be taken as a whole, and cannot be divided into a signifier and a 
signified. A signifier has no meaning by itself, and therefore no existence 
except as an empty functive: "the X that stands for Y". The same goes 
for the signified. 
Eco following Hjelmslev calls the sign a "sign-function" (48-9) instead, 
for this reason: "Properly speaking there are not signs, but sign-
functions... A sign-function is realized when two functives (expression 
and content) enter into a mutual correlation; the same functive can also 
enter into another correlation, thus becoming a different functive and 
therefore giving rise to a new sign-function..." (48-9) Eco's formulation 
is tricky because with his terms "functives" he reifies again the two parts 
of the sign — which actually don't exist unless they are "functioning" 
(recall that "something is a sign only because it is interpreted as a sign of 
something", above). 
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Thus, in every conceptual effort, one must focus on a pair to have a 
"sign". There can be no signified without a signifier, and vice versa. The 
sign in this sense is always already, just as meaning is always already: 
there is no way to grasp non-meaning. Try this thought experiment: think 
of a signifier without its signified. If you have managed that, give an 
example. Now try the same thing with the signified — is it conceivable 
without being signified by a signifier? I cannot do it. 
To go back to the link between sound pattern and concept: the phonetic 
identity ("sound pattern") of syllables is based on the differential 
meanings of their phonemes. A phoneme is a phoneme only because of 
its value in relation to all of the other phonemes in a particular system. 
For example, in its phonemic system English distinguishes [p] and [b] as 
separate phonemes; they are the distinguishing sign between the words 
"pat" and "bat", and the distinguishable meanings of "pat" and "bat" in 
turn help to maintain the perceived difference between the sounds [p] and 
[b]. This is distinctive variation — a variation in sound which maintains a 
variation in meaning. English does not, however, distinguish between 
[bh] and [b] — although Thai does, and in Thai the words [bhat] and [bat] 
have different meanings solely by virtue of a significant (i.e. meaning-
making) difference in the sounds of the two syllables. 
My point is that we cannot say which comes first — the difference in 
sound (value) or the difference in meaning. Each maintains the other. A 
differentiated sound cannot exist, even as an analytical abstraction, 
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without a value or meaning. Otherwise it would not be perceptible as a 
differentiated sound. The sound [tri] has no significance if it does not 
"mean" anything; and the "meaning" tree does not exist unless there is a 
sound-signal (or other material signal) for it. 
Referring to Saussure's diagram of the sign which heads the previous 
section, the arrows on either side of the divided circle representing the 
sign illustrate that the link between sound pattern and concept is two-
way: "... each triggers the other" (66). It is not that concepts have sound 
patterns attached, or sounds have concepts attached 	 every linguistic 
unit is value/meaning in the same instant. 
The signifier and signified cannot be conceived of, do not exist in any 
possible world, without a prior relationship having been established 
between them. So, although the sign is fundamentally a duality, it cannot 
be taken apart. 
Value 
If the sign cannot be taken apart, how is it that we perceive it as a 
duality? As Thibault points out, Saussure's shift from the terms 
concept/sound pattern to signification (signifier) and signal (signified), 
"marks a shift to the system perspective" (158) or to the sign in its 
system. This perspective is crucial to Saussure's sign. The sign exists 
ONLY in relation to neighbouring signs within a closed system: 
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... it is a great mistake to consider a sign as nothing more 
than the combination of a certain sound and a certain 
concept. To think of a sign as nothing more would be to 
isolate it from the system to which it belongs. It would be 
to suppose that a start could be made with individual 
signs, and a system constructed by putting them together. 
On the contrary, the system as a united whole is the 
starting point, from which it becomes possible, by a 
process of analysis, to identify its constituent elements. 
(112) 
For Saussure the sign is created when a system is analysed into its parts. 
Those parts are signs. It is the division between neighbouring signs that 
identifies them in their singleness (thus giving their individual meanings 
the transparent sign), and also in their duality32 (in their value 
opening up the possibility of transformations33). 
It is value which also makes the sign "arbitrary" (67), according to 
Saussure. The term "arbitrary" has unfortunate connotations. It does not 
mean that the meaning of the sign is arbitrary; it means that the 
connection between signifier and signified is arbitrary. This latter 
connection has more to do with semantic value than with meaning. 
32 It identifies them in their duality because it is only the coming together of two orders 
of reality that articulates them in the first place. 
33 I use the term transformation following Hodge and Kress, 162-203. 
162 
Saussure explains the distinction between meaning and semantic value 
thus: meaning corresponds to the "concept" part of the original sign; 
value, on the other hand, is the "meaning" of the sign when the sign is 
seen in juxtaposition to all of the other signs in the same system (112-
13). A now famous example of value is the difference between the 
English word "sheep" and the French word "mouton". Although they 
seem to have the same meaning if each is taken in isolation, they have 
different values when their respective language-systems are compared. 
The French word covers both live sheep at pasture and the meat served at 
dinner, while the English word sheep is only the live animal and a 
different term, "mutton", covers the remainder of the value of the French 
word "mouton" (114).34 
Semiotics is concerned with value; as such, every sign, without 
exception, functions only from within a system. It is the entire system, all 
of the signs taken together, that create the value of each one. At the same 
time, value and meaning are not opposites; in any given context, 
meaning and value will be seen as the same. 
In Chapter Three I argued against Derrida's conception of writing as the 
purest example of the principle of secondarity in semiosis by saying that 
semiosis involves a move "to complete identity... within the sign, from 
34 This difference between the two sets of values only becomes clear when we set up the 
two languages as closed systems; that is, assume that all terms within the system of 
French are in a fixed relationship to each other, maintaining each others' place in the 
system; and that all terms in the system of English operate in the same way. 
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binariness to the collapse of the signifier / signified distinction." This 
"collapse" is not an event in time, but rather a rhetorical device to convey 
(as Derrida does) the dynamic nature of the sign-function. Creole 
transcription shows that any particular signifier (e.g., the graphemes and 
grapheme clusters of the English spelling system) can be linked with any 
particular signified (e.g., the phonemes of the creole inventory). Once 
linked, they become meaning-ful; and as meaning, they do not stop and 
say to the reader "I am a signifier standing for a signified"; they simply 
mean. Value can only be perceived by an observer of the entire system; 
or by an observer juxtaposing two separate systems in order to arrive at 
the value of a single entity. 
In context, one does not compare two entities to arrive at the meaning of 
each, or indeed, look at the entire system to establish the value of a single 
token; in context, value is meaning. This is because the context is both 
the defining limitation for the value of the sign as well as the key to 
changes that re-create entire systems. This follows from my observations 
in Chapter Four about error and innovation in relation to the boundaries 
of a linguistic system. 
Finally, single signs in their contexts (the sign as a unity) are transparent 
their meanings are completely accessible, but not their values. On the 
other hand, when a text analyst is working out transformations, it is the 
arbitrariness of signs that is more salient. Put another way, meanings are 
always contextual, while values are always the artefact of analysis. 
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The place of the analyst 
There is another aspect to the transparency and opacity of signs, and that 
is the social position of the reader of the signs in relation to the producer. 
In "Against arbitrariness" Kress correlates the transparency of signs with 
access to the meaning: what I called in the previous chapter 
"intelligibility". Intelligibility is of course always relative to the reader of 
the signs, not the producer. But the term transparency allows for the 
position of the producer as well in accounts of intelligibility: a sign is 
transparent to the degree of social closeness or distance between 
producer and reader (178). 
Transparency has a different but related meaning in Social Semiotics 
(88-9): it is a certain connection between the sign and its meaning. 
Hodge and Kress use Jakobson's phonological energy / constraint code, 
as well as his colour symbolism to exemplify the type of connection they 
mean. Energy / constraint refers to the way in which sounds in human 
languages are produced in the vocal tract (vowels are produced with an 
open tract, unconstrained by larynx, glottis, tongue, or teeth — energy; 
consonants are produced in different ways, on a cline between a 
relatively open and relatively closed / constrained vocal tract). The 
"transparency" of this symbolism springs from the human body and its 
role in the production of all meaning-making. 
These types of signs (motivated signs) are only meaning-potentials, 
however: they do not "mean" anything until they appear in context. This 
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fact creates the theoretical relationship between motivatedness and 
transparency; for meanings are only recoverable from the context of the 
sign, not its sign-function; and the sign-in-context is only transparent to 
the degree of social closeness between producer and reader of the sign. 
Nevertheless, the sign is the entry to the meaning of a text for the analyst 
/ reader. For the analyst of social semiotic transformations, motivation 
and transparency are working hypotheses: there is a recoverable 
relationship between the meanings intended by the producer of this sign 
and the characteristics of the sign itself (c.f. "Against", 177). But, since 
the interest of the sign-producer is always different from that of the 
reader, opacity (or arbitrariness) is the analyst's mode of operation. 
This is what I meant in the first section to this chapter when I said that 
"meaning" is a theoretical construct that makes a link between system 
and subject(ive) meaning. According to Saussure, meaning is the link 
between concept and sound pattern in a word; it is the sign outside its 
system. But since signs cannot exist outside their systems, meaning is a 
working hypothesis leading a reader (or observer, or text analyst) to 
search for that meaning from a position in which they can only really talk 
about values. Values allow the analyst to extrapolate meanings and re-
contextualise them, thereby ultimately creating their own text. 
This is necessary to sign theory because arbitrariness is the only thing 
that allows for interpretation: unless the sign is arbitrary, or theoretically 
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free to "mean" anything, there is only one possible reading, which it is 
the analyst's job to recover (i.e., recover the meaning of the sign as 
opposed to its value). Recall Eco's "Every time there is possibility of 
lying, there is a sign-function: which is to signify (and then to 
communicate) something to which no real state of things corresponds." 
(58; emphasis in original). Eco does not mean that there is no reality; he 
means that an arbitrary sign allows for different versions of it. 
Kress' rejection-in-principle of the arbitrary sign leaves the position of 
the text-analyst out of social semiotic theory, for the analyst is a reader 
like any other, and must allow that hers is only one of a number of 
possible meanings. Denying this (that is, claiming that a text analysis is 
the only one possible) gives the text analyst a different theoretical status 
than any other reader, which is a state of affairs that must be covered by 
the theory. Otherwise the theory is incomplete: 
If I am building a theory of how people make meaning 
socially, can I build a theory of my own theory-building? 
If I can't, my theory can never be complete, and since my 
theory-building is just the sort of thing I want to make a 
theory of [i.e. social meaning-making], a theory that 
didn't cover that wouldn't be much of a theory at all. 
(Lemke Textual Politics 156) 
Implicit in this passage is the assumption that a theory is a part of the 
system it describes; that a theory does not appeal to a different 
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ontological order. This problem is more obvious in the construction of 
theories about semiosis than in the construction of theories about, for 
example, space debris. Most theorists do not reflect on the 
ideas/assumptions/categories implicit in the code they use to describe 
and explain phenomena. The code, or meta-language, or "grammar" an 
analyst uses to talk about the phenomenon she wishes to explain and 
describe is only important when the focus of explanation and description 
is meaning-making; when the focus is some other phenomenon, we 
happily and quite rightly assume that the most comprehensive or 
satisfying meta-language to hand, given an acceptable degree of 
conventionality or social circulation, is good enough for the purpose. 
But when the problem is how to find a way of describing texts that 
allows for the multiple interpretations we know are the result of readers' 
differing social positions, the problem of theoretical self-reflexivity 
comes into focus. 
Systemic boundaries are recreated with and within every sign 
Each sign is doubly articulated; for each sign is not just the coming 
together of two entities, a concept and a sound pattern, but of two orders 
of reality, which, because of their juxtaposition, are "articulated" into 
parts. The following passage was quoted in Chapter Three to explain 
how very different dialects can share the same grapholect. Here I am 
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more interested in the precise mechanism of articulation, according to 
Saussure: 
The characteristic role of a language in relation to thought 
is to ... act as intermediary between thought and sound, in 
such a way that the combination of both necessarily 
produces a mutually complementary delimitation of 
units... But what happens is neither a transformation of 
thoughts into matter, nor a transformation of sounds into 
ideas. What takes place, is a somewhat mysterious process 
by which 'thought-sound' evolves divisions and a 
language takes shape with its linguistic units in between 
those two amorphous masses. (110) 
What is also important about this passage is that Saussure draws on the 
notion of different orders of reality (thought and sound) or different 
natural elements (air and water) in order to stress their fundamentally 
dissimilar nature and the strength of the boundary between them. In order 
for signs to exist at all, there must be a coming-together of two 
perceptibly dissimilar phenomena. The distinctiveness of material 
phenomena is social; that is how contrastive analysis in phonetics, for 
example, works. (See Chapter Three on distinctive variation, e.g., "right" 
vs. "light"). 
In a previous section, I also said social / material distinctions are the role 
of systemic boundaries (dialect boundaries, social identities, modalities): 
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they create a difference across which we make an identity, the process 
itself creating, for a moment, a duality which Saussure called a "sign". A 
sign in our bi-dialectal written texts is created by our awareness of the 
boundaries of standard English; but more generally, any sign consists of 
elements from two perceptibly different spheres. They can be 
"amorphous masses"; or they can be already segmented masses (as in the 
juxtaposition of any English dialect with the English grapholect; see 
Chapter Three). 
Eco seems to suggest something similar in his re-working of the 
Hjelmslevian sign (50-2). However, he understands a "code" to be 
always in place before the juxtaposition of two orders of reality. This 
code correlates an already-structured system with a second already-
structured system; and once these systems are "aligned", the sign-
function is what correlates individual signifier and signified (50)35. In an 
elaboration, Eco goes on to define a code in semiotics as that which 
"establishes the correlation of an expression plane (in its purely formal 
and systematic aspect) with a content plane (in its purely formal and 
systematic aspect)... " (50-51). That is, a code is a convention or device 
that puts two previously-established systems together. Their alignment 
creates the conditions for the signs of any particular system. 
35 I am simplifying somewhat to keep to the line of my argument; in this model Eco is 
also concerned with type/token relations. 
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To be sure, in each of Eco's two "planes" or orders of reality, there is a 
pre-semiotic continuum, Hjelmslev's "purport" (51), or what Saussure 
called "amorphous masses" (above). But, while this purport "remains, 
each time, substance for a new form" (52), it is never articulated 
directly, as in Saussure's vision of semiosis. It remains amorphous, "the 
unformed material from which the [semiotic actor] obtains discrete 
elements to be used as expressive devices" (50); and the expressive 
devices are in turn given value by a further system or structure of "empty 
positions". Thus Eco sees the sign as generated by a pre-given code, in 
several different stages, while I, with Saussure, see the code (i.e. system) 
as the result of the same social processes which create a sign. 
We have seen that an important quality of the sign is that neither signifier 
nor signified exist outside or beyond their instantiation in a sign. If a 
sign-function is really the coming together of two amorphous masses, 
then the system itself does not exist except at that moment when the sign 
comes into being. A further conclusion must be that this moment of 
instantiation creates the entire system, just as a sign-function creates a 
sign.36 My interpretation of semiosis, then, is not that a third system 
arises between two already-structured systems, but that, at the moment of 
perceived contact, both original masses become systematized in an 
36 This correlates with my observations in Chapter Four about every utterance being a re-
definition of the boundaries of the language. If every utterance is a new sign, and every 
new sign creates a new system, then the boundaries of the language — and the grammar 
— are re-arranged in every utterance. 
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arrangement dictated by the particular difference at play in the particular 
sign. 
The "particular difference at play" is in turn dictated by the interest of the 
sign-producer. This means that Kress' transparent sign is also part of a 
system — a system that is constantly being re-created according to a 
motivating sign. That is why a language is a practice rather than a 
"thing", for, as argued in Chapter Four, each instance of meaning-making 
is a re-definition of the rules / patterns, starting from the individual sign 
and reaching outwards to every part of the system in which it is an 
element. I quote the relevant passage from Cours again: 
... the language system as such is never directly altered. It 
is in itself unchangeable. Only certain elements change, 
but without regard to the connexions which integrate them 
as part of the whole. It is as if one of the planets circling 
the sun underwent a change of dimensions and weight: 
this isolated event would have general consequences for 
the whole solar system, and disturb its equilibrium...It is 
not the system as a whole which has been changed, nor 
one system which has engendered a second. All that 
happened was the element in the original system changed, 
and that sufficed to bring a new system into being. (84-5) 
This can only happen if the system is a closed system, that is all terms 
within the system are in a fixed relationship to each other, maintaining 
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each others' place in the system. It is because each term is defined by all 
of the others in the same moment that a change in any one term 
necessarily changes the entire system. 
This explains why Allen and Brand must uphold the grapholect while 
breaking its norms; there would be no other way to recreate the creole, 
except through English writing. 
This is the principle behind contrastive relations in semiotics and 
linguistics. It is a principle involving materiality-as-meaning as well as 
closed systems. Any one bit of matter acquires systemic meaning if it can 
be contrasted with at least one other bit. An example would be a 
hypothetical two-term system of red-green on traffic lights: red means 
not-green (not-go); green means not-red (not-stop). The two bits are a 
closed system of two; and any material variations, such as different 
shades of red or green (pink, orange; or turquoise, blue) become co-opted 
by the system to mean either one of the terms already there. 
However, if a new item enters the system as a differentiated 37 token of 
material / meaning, it will change the meanings already in the system; so 
that if yellow enters the system, it will change the meaning of red (now 
red means stop right away); and of green (now green means you are clear 
to go). Yellow takes up some of the "territory" of the closed system, 
some of the meanings of the former red (yellow means slow or stop 
37 Through a negotiation in social context. 
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because the light will soon change to red) and of the former green 
(yellow also means go, but only if you cannot stop, and go carefully). 
The process in a closed system would look like this: 
       
RED 
GREEN 
 
RED 
   
     
 
YELLOW 
  
     
     
     
Figure 3: new terms change 
value / meaning of old terms 
In both Eco's and Saussure's models, "[t]he value of any one element 
depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others" (Saussure 
113). 
Conclusion 
So far, we have established that value and meaning are present in every 
sign. Any time value, indeed a sign, is created, a closed system is also 
created. This closed system has been confused with things like "a 
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language" and therefore "the" grammar of the language38, but in fact the 
system is only momentary, and any system which is created by a 
sign/value only "exists" (semiotically) for a moment. 
In this chapter as well, we have unearthed some formal principles in the 
relationship between materiality and meaning. In order for a meaning to 
be perceptible, it has to be carried by a material distinction — which must 
be motivated by social forces (e.g., conventionalised material / meaning 
distinctions such as phonemes, social categorial distinctions). This will 
become important in Chapter Seven, when deconstructing social 
categories such as gender and "race". But it is also important in the next 
chapter, when we consider which aural / social / political characteristics 
of spoken creole are transferred to written texts by Allen and Brand. 
38 It has been expanded in theoretical linguistics in to a Universal Grammar which is 
homologous to the configuration of the human mind 
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Chapter Six 
PROJECTION AND MODE 
In Chapter Five I looked at the behaviour of signs, alone and within their 
systems. I explored systems in order to discover how the boundaries of 
systems or codes participate in semiosis. This was a way of explaining 
why and how "a language" as a conceptualised closed system creates 
social meanings; what happens formally and symbolically when a term 
within the system is changed; and how social / material distinctions arise. 
In this chapter I look at the role of systems as signs in the work of Allen 
and Brand. The working notion "a language", when translated into the 
language of sociolinguistics, becomes dialects, diatypes, and (in this 
chapter) modal patterns. 
Brand makes full use of code-switching of various types and on various 
levels to make meaning. When applied to modes (speech and writing) we 
begin to make better sense of transcribed creole, not as written, but as 
written to be read as if heard. That is, the very same formal and social 
semiotic principles that come into play in the making of meanings across 
two "languages" come into play in the making of meaning by reference 
to different juxtaposed modes. 
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Allen, on the other hand, uses the strong standard of the English spelling 
system to give force to her spelling "deviations"; the choices she makes 
about when and where to use phonetic spellings has most to do with local 
emphasis and with connotations of Jamaicaness or of the reggae / dub 
sub-culture (i.e., the meanings of these connotations at that particular 
point in the poem). Like Brand, her practice is clearly a projection from 
one material context to another. 
Projection 
Up to now, I have been implying that each speaker speaks one language, 
controls one variety. Traditionally, as well, descriptions of 
sociolinguistic variation are monolithic, according to region and/or social 
class: geographical dialects, social, and temporal dialects (see Gregory 
and Carroll). I generally speak middle-class Canadian English of the 
1990s; my grandmother may speak lower-class New York City English 
of the 1950s. A character in a Henry James novel may "speak" upper 
class Boston English of the eighteen-nineties. 
These categories are meant to describe sociolinguistic variation as if each 
speaker controls one "language"/dialect with one set of signs 	 a 
relatively discrete, unitary system. But speakers actually manipulate 
more than one perceived "language"/dialect, or set of verbal patterns. 
Speakers produce as well as understand a number of dialects, each of 
which is considered a bounded system. Changing between these systems 
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allows speakers to say the "same thing" in different social contexts. 
While delivering an academic paper at a conference in Cardiff a few 
years ago, I used (quite unconsciously) London English to a largely UK 
audience, even though I had only recently moved to England. When I 
moved back to Canada three years later, I quickly dropped a relatively 
large number of British English lexical items from my everyday 
vocabulary and replaced them with the Canadian semantic equivalents 
(e.g., washing up liquid / dishwashing soap). 
These changes might be described as situational variation: people use 
different dialects according to their general social context. But the 
dialects I use are not just indicated by the context. I may use dialects 
metaphorically, in a marked, unexpected way to create an implicit 
meaning that is added to my message. For example, though I generally 
use middle-class Canadian English, I might use a quasi-British accent 
while reading a Beatrix Potter story to my son, to stress the narrative 
function of my voice: "In the time of swords and periwigs and full-
skirted coats with flowered lappets..." My projection of British English 
into a non-British situation carries meanings indexed by a different 
accent, modifying the references of my sentences (in this case, the 
inferential meaning is "this takes place in another world"). 
Here I will bring in a useful distinction from social semiotics, between 
semiosic and mimetic meaning. In the following passage, Hodge and 
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Kress have been discussing the message as a unit of analysis for social 
semiotics. Then they make the following distinction: 
... 
 
The message] is oriented to the semiosic process, the 
social process by which meaning is constructed and 
exchanged, ... [it] takes place in what we will call the 
semiosic plane.... [the message is also] connected to a 
world to which it refers in some way, and its meaning 
derives from this representative or mimetic function it 
performs... [on] the mimetic plane. (Hodge and Kress, 5) 
In other words, the mimetic meaning is what we would normally think of 
as the "what" of the message; and the semiosic meaning is the "how" of 
the message, or the style of the message, which determines the ultimate 
meaning of the message. It is not until we understand the message on the 
semiosic plane (for example, what is the dialect it is delivered in; what 
are the paralinguistic cues signalling "irony") that we can say what the 
message "means". This is an aspect of context; and context, as I said 
earlier, is an indispensable part of the meaning of any message. 
In the story-reading example above, the direction of the projection, or 
code-switch, as well as the fact of switching itself, makes a difference to 
my message. If I want my son to come to me in a public place, and 
saying "Come here" (in English) doesn't work, I will switch to Spanish 
to reinforce the command, because Spanish is the language of family 
interaction: "Ven" (c.f. Gumperz). 
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In the sociolinguistic literature on code-switching, these two examples 
are two types of code-switching: participant-related, and discourse-
related (Auers). Participant-related code switching functions to modulate 
the relationship between speakers. According to Myers-Scotton every 
speaker in a multilingual society knows the usual, or "unmarked" choice 
of dialect for each type of interaction, given also their social position or 
identity in relation to that of the other participants in the interaction. 
Code switching is "a strategy which is followed when speakers perceive 
that their own costs-rewards balance will be more favourable for the 
conversation at hand through engaging in [code switching] than through 
using a single code" (152). 
For example, a speaker may wish to emphasise their own high status 
when dealing with a traffic policeman, using a code indexed for high 
status in that cultural context. But they may code switch into the 
policeman's own dialect when they want to renegotiate their relationship 
with him and put the exchange on a basis of solidarity. All marked code-
choices, Myers-Scotton says, "can be subsumed under one general effect: 
to negotiate a change in the expected social distance holding between 
participants, either decreasing it or increasing it" (132). 
Discourse-related switching is used for the communication of non-verbal 
nuances or of inferential meanings. The focus here has usually been on 
the local meaning of the switch rather than on the identity or relationship 
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of the participants. Gumperz lists six such discourse-related functions of 
code switching: 
• quotation or reported speech 
• addressee specification 	 directing the message to one of several 
possible addressees 
• interjection or sentence filler 
• reiteration 	 to clarify or emphasise the message 
• message qualification 	 to add information about the main part of 
the message 
• personalization versus objectivization (93-94) 
The last is more than a single function, because it changes meaning 
depending on the textual context. It can distinguish talk about action 
from talk as action; the degree of speaker involvement or distance from 
the message; whether a statement reflects personal opinion or public 
knowledge; or whether it refers to specific instances or "has the authority 
of generally known fact" (94). 
Largely in the light of the last.function, Gumperz comments that 
...the direction of the shift may... have semantic value. In 
a sense the oppositions warning/personal appeal [in a 
command]; casual remark/personal feeling; ... personal 
opinion/generally known fact can be seen as metaphoric 
extensions of the "we"/"they" code opposition. (93-4) 
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The over-arching communicative principle of code switching, in 
Gumperz's view, does not have as its goal just signals of social identity 
between participants, but, by extension, signals of communicative intent 
about the referential message. This reinforces the fact that meaning and 
social identity are linked in every message. 
I might accent a word with a Midwestern American twang in order to 
bring out a certain aspect of my meaning: "That's OK baa me", I might 
say if I want to say, "in a very relaxed way, that's very much OK by me". 
The stereotype of the indexed social identity (mid-Western American) 
modifies the meaning of my "referential message" or mimetic meaning. 
I would in fact expand the dualistic schema of code-switching to 
"projection" (see also LePage "Projection", LePage and Tabouret-
Keller), so that speakers may project any of a large number of dialects 
through markers, stereotypes, and styles. Essentially, we have a social 
universe in which different, marked types of verbal patterns (accents, 
dialects, even languages) conventionally index different social groups or 
activities, and therefore verbal behaviour may "project" these indexical 
patterns into any context to create different meanings. 
Code-switching in Brand's "No Language Is Neutral" is often a very 
clear demonstration of this principle of production. In verse paragraph 
four of "no language is neutral", there are code-switches between creole 
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and standard that re-create speakers as well as define their 
relationships:-9  
This time Liney done see vision in this green guava 
season, fly skinless and turn into river fish, dream  
sheself, praise god, without sex and womb when sex  
is hell and womb is she to pay. So dancing an old 
she to pay 
man the castilian around this christmas living room 
castilian 
my little sister and me get Ben to tell we any story he 
remember, and in between his own trail of conquests 
and pretty clothes, in between his never sleeping with 
pretty clothes 
a woman who wasn't clean because he was a 
scornful man, in between our absent query were they 
scornful women too, Liney smiled on his gold teeth. 
The castilian out of breath, the dampness of his 
shrunken skin reminding us, Oh god! laughing, 
sister! we will kill uncle dancing! (No Language 25) 
In the first sentence, Liney is rendered in free direct speech by a passage 
in creole, from "This time" to "she to pay". Creole elements include 
391n the following layout, creole words and passages are underlined, standard are not, and 
words and passages that may be read as either creole or standard (i.e., they are code-
ambiguous) are repeated on two lines, once underlined, once not. Although code-
ambiguity is a very important issue in considering the themes of this text, they will not 
be taken up here; the ambiguities in the data, on the other hand, have been represented. 
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"done see", "guava season", "sheself', and past tense "fly", "dream" and 
"is". "Womb is she to pay" is both word-play in standard and left-
focusing of "womb" in creole: an existential copula is inserted to 
transform "she to pay [for] womb" into "womb, [it] is she to pay" 
(Winer, p.c.). In the second sentence, a switch to standard, from "So 
dancing" to "living room", establishes a change in speaker from Liney to 
the original speaker. In the main clause of this sentence, another switch 
to creole, from "my little sister" to "remember", establishes a child 
speaker. Creole markers in this clause are: the first person object pronoun 
"we", past tense "get", and third person past "remember".4°  
The participant-related switching I would like to draw attention to is 
between this child-speaker and Ben. The exchange goes something like 
this: 
• children (creole): ask Ben to tell them a story 
• Ben (creole): tells stories; remarks that he never slept "with a 
woman who wasn't clean because he was a scornful man" 
• children: (standard): ask whether the women were scornful too 
Ben's creole speech is indirectly represented in either the entire phrase 
"his never sleeping with a woman who wasn't clean because he was a 
40The tense of the verbs "get" and "remember" may be ambiguous, because the main verb 
of the next clause rand in between ... Liney smiled on his gold teeth") is in the past, 
but the free direct nature of this child-dialect encourages a present-tense reading of the 
actions of getting and remembering. 
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scornful man", or perhaps only in "because he was a scornful man". The 
creole marker is "scornful man": in Trinidad, to be "scornful" is to be 
fastidious or easily disgusted. 
In reply, the children switch to standard. The switch is emphasised by the 
formality of the introductory noun phrase: "our absent query were they 
scornful women too". We know the children's direct speech is in standard 
because creole yes/no questions do not have the reversed verb-subject 
order of this standard question. Also, the creole third person plural 
pronoun is "them", not "they" as in this sentence. 
This passage creates a speech exchange in which participant-related 
code-switching takes place as a marked choice: one set of participants, 
the sisters put as much social distance as possible between themselves 
and the other participant, Ben, by switching to a different, unexpected 
code. Their reasons for creating this distance are embedded in the 
complexities of the verse, which I will not comment on, since my 
purpose here is simply to illustrate an extended passage of code-
switching by Brand 
Modal projection 
Descriptions of variation can also be carried out according to the /'unction 
of the speech act. 
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Gregory and Carroll have schematized a set of "diatypic" (functional) 
varieties. The first type of functional variation is field: it roughly 
comprises the specialized items of vocabulary or clause patterns I might 
use to talk about a specialized object or field of activity 	 or the lack of 
these items in my speech. For example, I might speak with the 
specialized vocabulary of my academic field to my colleagues, using a 
higher proportion than normal of passive clauses. Or I may speak in the 
field of aviation when discussing repairs with a mechanic at the hangar. 
The second diatypic variety is tenor, or the style or level of formality I 
might use depending on my relationship to my addressee: I usually speak 
in a very informal, intimate style to my partner, but would address a 
judge in a very formal tenor. Baby talk is a specific, well-defined tenor. 
The third and final type of functional variation is mode: I use different 
types of verbal patterns depending on the medium (speech, writing, etc.) 
Mode refers to the patterns rather than the medium: I might use speech to 
make meaning in a mode which has been written to be heard (play script) 
rather than read (novel). 
These three functional types of variation 	 field, tenor, and mode 	 are 
aspects of one speech event. People use verbal patterns according to 
time, place, and social space as a whole. If the field of a verbal pattern is 
academic, its tenor is likely to be formal and its mode more often written, 
or spoken as if written, than spoken. 
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Diatypic patterns can be projected, so that the field of military 
terminology can be used by police to lend authority to its part in a 
controversial arrest. Baby-talk projected out of context, to a peer, for 
example, would be considered mockery. Mode as it is defined by 
Gregory and Carroll already recognises the possibility of projection: 
according to them, certain widely recognisable features of spoken verbal 
patterns can be written to project "speech", and all of its social meanings 
and associated tenor, into a written text (e.g., play scripts, speeches, 
fictional interior monologues). 
These projections, as with projections of dialect, can be either the 
projection of an integrated body of signs (or text) into an unexpected 
context; or merely the projection of a few "stereotypes" (the linguistic 
variables that are popularly ascribed to a group; see Labov Language  
248; and Chapter Three). In the first case, I might speak Spanish in a 
context in which English is expected; in the second case, I might use a 
few variables of Spanish only to sketch "Spanishness". The novelist 
Potok's projection of French stereotypes into an English text, signalling 
that the dialogue is in French, is a good illustration of the latter. 
Although I quoted it in Chapter Three, it is worth another look: 
"Mrs. Levy," I said. "Where do the wife and two children 
of Lucien Lacamp live?" 
"Wife and one child. The other child died." 
"I am sorry to hear that." 
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"She had the asthma. They live now on the Rue 
d'Aboukir in the Second Arrondissement...." 
"Thank you," I said. "I am in your debt." (Potok 197) 
While "markers" (Hodge and Kress 79, and see above, page 131) carry 
social significance, and thus are always recognised, "stereotypes" are not 
only recognised, but recognised as such, that is, as a kind of joke or 
explicit sign of a group considered Other. Markers are, by definition, 
accurate: the moment they do not mark the meaningful group any more 
(because members do not actually use them), they cannot function as 
markers. They tend to be used within groups in which social roles are in 
flux and therefore differences need to be marked. Stereotypes, on the 
other hand, may be inaccurate, and they are often used of groups with 
whom the speech community is no longer in contact. 
Stereotypes thus hold an interesting position beyond the implicit signals 
given by speakers to each other about their social position at any given 
moment (markers). The use of a stereotype can signal a wish by the 
speaker to have her utterance understood for the moment as produced by 
a member of an out-group while she retains her membership in her own 
group through the "matrix" verbal patterns. 
For example, Blom and Gumperz noticed that for the university students 
among the subjects in their 1972 code-switching study, "the distinction 
between dialect and standard is not so sharp... their behaviour shows a 
range of variation rather than an alternation between distinct systems" 
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(431). During an informal conversation these students used a modified 
"standard", which was not a complete shift to the standard, while 
speaking of public events outside of the village or while making 
authoritative statements. Blom and Gumperz perceived "an erosion of the 
linguistic boundary between [standard dialect] and [local dialect]...the 
tendency is to switch toward standard phonology while preserving some 
morphophonemic and lexical dialect features of [the local dialect]" (429). 
There are striking similarities between this description of the students' 
linguistic behaviour and Gibbons's description of the behaviour of Hong 
Kong university students. Gibbons calls this behaviour "code-mixing" 
and adduces the work of Kachru (see Gibbons 8 or Myers-Scotton 63) 
who first gave currency to the term. Code-mixing "entails transferring 
linguistic units from one code into another..." (as qtd. in Myers-Scotton 
63). Mixing is thus felt by speakers to be a single code, rather than a 
series of rapid switches. This is the case of Gibbons' and Blom and 
Gumperz's university students, who did not want to give up either their 
status as university students or their membership in the local community. 
A stereotype allows a kind of double-entendre that a marker does not. 
Projection in the written texts of Allen and Brand 
This point is especially relevant for media such as alphabetic writing, 
which make references to another substance (sound, through the spelling 
system) without actually being that substance. The verbal patterns of the 
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written mode can be the matrix to stereotypes of speech. That is, written 
English is a "language" in which certain grammatical and morphological 
rules apply regardless of the speaker's native dialect (see Chapter Three, 
Ong's "grapholect" p. 86). Any speaker must follow these rules when 
writing regardless of what rules they follow in their speech. I may be a 
speaker of Canadian English or Standard Jamaican English, but I will 
always translate the verbal patterns I use in my speech into the verbal 
patterns of written English. 
To signal "plural" in written English, for example, I would use the graph 
"es/s" on the end of a regular noun, regardless of how I signal its plural 
in speech. The same nouns in speech will have a range of endings to 
signal plural, from [s] to a selection of [z] [iz] [az] [Iz] [Is] [as] [0] 
among others, according to convention. An even better example is 
French: the French grapholect signals plural with a word-final "s" on the 
noun, but in speech word-final sibilants ([s], [z]) are never used (to signal 
number on the noun). 
Thus, diatypical patterns of speech cannot be projected as an integrated 
mass into the matrix patterns of writing. This limits the meanings that 
either semiotic material, or mode, can create. At the same time, the 
notion of the boundedness of writing as a self-contained system with a 
very strong standard at all levels (from syntax to spelling) in itself allows 
the matrix/stereotype meaning-relation that lets the writer project one 
mode onto another. 
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The following is a passage from Brand's long poem "no language is 
neutral": 
... Nothing is a joke no more and I right 
there with them, running for the train until I get to find 
out my big sister just like to run and nobody wouldn't 
vex if you miss the train... 	 ( No Language 29) 
In this extract, the morphology of Trinidad English Creole (which is an 
oral language) is written: double negatives ("nothing is a joke no more"; 
"nobody wouldn't"), a zero copula ("I ... there"), and Creole person and 
number agreement ("my sister... like" [to run]). And yet, in writing, 
these meanings would normally be represented with the following signs: 
a single negative, the copula "am", and the suffix "-s" on the verb to 
indicate it agrees with a third person singular pronoun. 
The perceived boundary of writing, policed as rigorously as the 
boundaries of "languages" are policed, allows Brand to insert clearly 
recognisable stereotypes of creole — which is both an ethnic variety and a 
spoken language. Her use of stereotypical creole morphology signals 
which set of verbal patterns she has in mind as a spoken correlate to 
these written patterns. That is, here she is not interested in "writing" us a 
message; she is interested in "speaking in writing" to us a message. 
Stereotypes can be inserted into matrix patterns at various linguistic 
levels. Special lexical items are often stereotypical, and for these the 
writer must make a decision as to whether to render the stereotypical 
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word with English spellings, as a part of the grapholectal system, thereby 
claiming it, and the indexed group, as partially (but only partially) 
members of the in-group; or to render it as a non-word of the 
grapholectal system. 
Consider the aspect marker [dAn]41, rendered in writing by Brand as the 
English perfect past tense marker "done": 
... How to fly gravity, 
how to balance basket and prose reaching for 
murder. Silence done curse god and beauty here, 
people does hear things in this heliconia peace 
a morphology of rolling chain and copper gong 
now shape this twang, falsettos of whip and air 
rudiment this grammar. (No Language 23; emphasis mine) 
The projection of TEC in this very lyrical passage is accomplished with 
the insertion of the stereotypical "done", signalled as partially written 
because its spelling does not break the orthographic standard. This 
creates a projection whose function appears to be a sudden increase in 
emotional intensity for a native creole-speaker / writer, rather than a 
projection of a different identity. 
Allen, on the other hand, uses phonetic spellings. This is for two reasons. 
Firstly, disrupting the boundaries of the spelling system paradoxically 
makes the spelling system "sound" again, because it dislodges the 
41 Since creole is not a written language, I am using the IPA to represent the spoken word 
which is the stereotype. 
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integrity of the system. In disrupting its boundaries, the function of 
individual elements in the (phonetic) system can once again be the focus 
of reading. 
So what so what so what 
So your years of schooled craft 
have created fine poems 
so it ended pollution 
so it stopped wars 
(Women Do This 127) 
Dub poets in general spell creole morphology42 as outside of the 
grapholect. [all] is rendered in writing by Linton Kwesi Johnson and 
others as "dun", iconically signalling with a "broken" standard a "Broken 
English" (the name for creole in the Caribbean through much of the 
twentieth century). It is a powerful visual reminder of the social agenda 
of dub poets, and of their very strong differences with the Eurocentric 
cultural establishment. 
Another visual flag of identity is the dub term "riddim" (see Chapter 
Two, "Dub"). "Riddim" is the motivating, creative force for any poem 
but also for social action and political protest; for the "roots" (Africa) 
oriented poets, it is also a reference to a quintessentially African 
inheritance. It is synonymous with "dub" (the original title for "Riddim 
42 A fair number of JEC particles and prepositions have apparently English lexical 
origins but arc markers in a different system of tense and aspect (the JEC), which is 
closer to West African systems (Winford Predication). 
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an' Hardtimes" was "Riddim on Hardtimes" (Allen "360 Degrees 
Black")). 
"Riddim" is also the phonetic spelling of "rhythm" in JEC; and it is in 
fact an accurate rendering through the conventions of English spelling. 
For example, as [0] ("th") is phonemic in English but not phonemic in 
JEC, "th" is replaced by "d" (ridim). The second vowel receives full 
value in this spelling as well, indicating the syllable-timed pronunciation 
as opposed to the stress-timed English one which reduces the value of 
the second vowel. Finally, since inter-vocalic [t] in American and 
Canadian English is habitually reduced to a flap, an extra "d" is inserted 
to stress its full value (which would be heard as an extended [d] by North 
American ears). 
Its phonetic qualities are not the whole story, however. In the following 
poem, "rhythm" and "riddim" are placed one above the other. "Rhythm" 
has enormous visual emphasis: 
R h y t h m 
riddim 
rebel 	 revolt 
resistance 
Revolution 
44 The UK system of race on a very general level. 
194 
if these words are not poetic 
then poetry has no means to free me 
(Women Do This 31) 
It seems Allen spaces out the letters in the first "rhythm" to stress the 
printed word-as-object; and it is tempting to read the phonetic spelling of 
"riddim" as a code- (or mode-) switch. But the meanings of this poem do 
not support such an interpretation, because all of the other words in the 
poem are in standard spelling. "Riddim" here comes to mean another 
word, with a different meaning from "rhythm". It has thus evolved into 
not a phonetic spelling of a JEC word, but a new English word (it has 
been lexicalised, within Allen's idiolect); it has become, in a sense, 
silent. As in the following poem, "rhythm" is a larger philosophical term, 
while "riddim" is symbolic of a sub-culture (see discussion of "riddim", 
p. 80). 
In "Dis Word", the word "rhythm" is spelled in standard within a poem 
in which all words but one are standard: 
dis word breeds my rhythm 
dis word carries my freedom 
dis word is my hand 
: my weapon 
(Women Do This 87) 
The only word spelled outside of the conventions in this poem is "dis". 
Again, "dis" is an accurate rendering of its sound; but again, this is only 
a small part of the function of the spelling. By referring to its sound, and 
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to its status as a term in an oral language, Allen is making a reference to 
its concreteness. When we read "dis word", we are meant to realise it 
refers to the very ink on the very page we are holding in our hands. 
On the mimetic plane, "dis" has the meanings of the English "this" — it is 
a deictic, a concrete grammatical index of a very specific time and place, 
which cannot be referred to in any other way (specifying the time and 
place in other words immediately invalidates the reference when the time 
and place changes; and Allen means whichever time and place the reader 
is reading the poem). However, on the semiosic plane, "dis" is a 
Jamaican word, not an English one; the meaning then becomes "this 
Jamaican word breeds my rhythm", etc. 
The function of emphasis for this phonetic spelling means all of the other 
words, which are spelled in standard orthography, are meant to recede in 
focus. With reference to "rhythm", then, the decision to render the same 
word in phonetic spelling or in standard spelling depends most on local 
decisions about emphasis and meaning, as well as sound. 
Allen's account of her practice is similar: 
WB: ... In some of your poems you spell the words 
phonetically, and in others you don't. Why do you shift 
back and forth? 
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LA: That has to do with what I think is the best vehicle to 
carry not only the message but the artistry of the piece. 
It's like the medium, the form — it creates part of the form. 
... (Bartley 19) 
We can say that Allen and Brand are manipulating the boundary between 
orality/writing and creole/English, or that they are hovering at the 
"edges" of the standardised codes (writing; English). In both cases, it is 
the very existence of the boundary, the very notion of systemic integrity, 
or signs within systems, that allows them to make meanings in this way. 
Orality and the body 
Brand never writes entire poems in creole. The function of creole 
passages in No Language is Neutral and Land to Light On is to create 
the conditions for code-switching. In some passages, Brand even blends 
creole and non-creole English in a sort of code ambiguity: 
I lift my head in the cold and I get confuse. 
It quiet here when is night, and is only me 
and the quiet. I try to say a word but it fall... 
... I did not 
know which way to turn except to try again, to find 
some word that could be heard by the something 
waiting. My mouth could not find a language. 
1 find myself instead, useless as that. I sorry. 
I stop by the mailbox and I give up. (Land to Light On 5) 
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Her use of code ambiguity gives Brand access to meaningful syntactic 
ambiguities. In this passage, since the creole past tense and the non-
creole English present tense have the same structure (e.g., zero dental 
suffix on the end of "lift", "confuse", "try", "stop"; unmarked tense in 
"get", "find", "give"), the consciousness of the speaker constantly and 
easily shifts between narrator (past tense) and participant (present tense) 
of the action; but it also shifts in the same manner (but not in the same 
moments) between a literary, relatively assured persona, and a creole-
speaking, apologetic and "sorry" persona. It is both of these who "give 
up" in the final line. 
The line "My mouth could not find a language" captures Brand's 
conception of the relationship between the grapholect, orality, and the 
body. The cultural duality I have been describing, that of the object 
"language" (the official version, the grapholect, the prescribed grammar) 
versus the alternative but severely repressed "word that could be heard" 
(speech, orality) is strongly linked to the body in her poetry, so that 
orality is "the language" of the body ("my mouth"), which, however, is 
not an official object "a language", but "myself, useless..." 
Creole, even written creole, is strongly tied to orality even though it can 
be transcribed, because the material affordances of writing and speech 
can be and often are subordinated to the social meanings of each 
technology. In Brand's poetry, the body has a way of saying things that 
is not the public language of "the something / waiting". Her body ("my 
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mouth could not find a language") speaks creole. By implication, creole 
is not a language; and the meaning of "a language" suddenly becomes 
historicized and politicized. 
The next step is to note that orality, in itself and as part of a cluster of 
symbols, is the embodiment of verbal meaning-making. In performance 
the connection between orality and embodiment is direct: if a text is 
spoken (oral), there is a specific body with a specific somatotype and 
movement style, with a specific voice quality, timbre, and pitch, making 
its sounds (the text is embodied). 
Orality is not necessarily spoken, however. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, orality can be written in medium but spoken in mode (that is, 
writing meant to be read as if spoken). Just as we can "speak" writing 
(reading aloud a bed-time story, for example), we can "write" speaking. 
Writing speech forces the writer to choose who is speaking. This is 
because the verbal patterns of present day written English are much more 
uniform than those of the range of Englishes spoken throughout the 
world; and any one .set of spoken verbal patterns (dialects) is a trace of 
the provenance of its speaker. 
Speakers are unavoidably embodied. Each one of us is white, Black, 
Asian, woman, man, child, old, young, or on continua between with 
these or similar identities as idealized references. This is not to say that 
the grapholect does not have its own varieties signalling social identities; 
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only that the English grapholect, because of its uniformity across 
different English dialects, is used to signal or connote universal 
disembodied values in contrast to the emphasis on the local, embodied 
nature of spoken verbal patterns. 
Since Caribbean English Creoles are functionally oral languages (that is, 
they have no official written counterpart), they are an even better 
resource for signalling orality in writing than most other spoken verbal 
patterns (`dialects'). However, using creole also means negotiating a 
complex network of intertexts in the mass media and in different 
discourses. As stated in Chapter Two, these include images of creole 
speakers as the underclass, the poor, and the Other. Stereotypes also 
include connotations of Black identity as unlettered and ultra-somatised 
(Fanon 1986), as well as other chestnuts of the essential African in the 
European Orientalist imagination. 
For Allen and Brand, these stereotypes are double-edged, because it is 
precisely these images they turn to in re-creating their position as black 
women in diaspora. For example, in Have Been Losing Roads", Brand 
uses written creole on two levels: as an interior, private language; and as 
the language of a publicly "raced" woman: 
If the trees don't flower and colour refuse to limn 
when a white man in a red truck on a rural road 
jumps out at you, screaming his exact hatred 
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"Is really so evil they is then 
that one of them in a red truck can split your heart 
open, crush a day in fog?" (Land to Light On 4) 
Hinting at the vulnerability of the speaker, Brand shifts from written 
English to Trinidad English Creole at the creole third-person plural 
ending on "colour" (not "colours" as in written English). This creole in 
the line suggests an inner emotional reality contrasting with the outer 
reality of events in the third line, which is rendered in unambiguously 
written English.: "jumps out at you, screaming his exact hatred". The 
final three lines, placed in quotation marks, are of course in Trinidad 
English Creole. Through this more emphatic code-switch, bolstered by 
the conventions of print (quotation marks), Brand performs the switch in 
identity the racist in the truck has forced on her. The speaker has gone 
from a neutral written identity to a marked, embodied, spoken-in-writing 
identity, effected by the obscenity of the racist. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I applied the view of language developed in Chapter Four, 
that is, that speakers create language boundaries, but only in relation to 
the context and to the configurations of the situation. I made the point 
that working with more than one "language" deploys the language as a 
metasign, allowing negotiations of meaning on the semiosic plane. 
However, projecting one perceived 'language' (whether dialect, national 
language, or verbal mode) into another requires a working notion of 
systemic boundedness. With this crucial working notion, we produce and 
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understand things like dialect projections, modal projections, and 
phonetic spellings. 
Allen and Brand's non-standard spellings and syntax disrupt the standard 
of the grapholect, without, however, destroying the integrity which 
allows it to function as a marker of group identity. They also draw 
attention to an order of difference on the same scale as the difference 
between standard orthography and non-standard — that is, a difference in 
mode (speech / writing). 
The move from considering the written texts of Allen and Brand as 
multilingual to multimodal (although still written) opens up an enormous 
range of material connections in their texts. Although still written, their 
poetry is also oral; if oral, then also embodied; if embodied, then also 
participating in discourses of race, gender, sexuality, and a host of other 
systems of social organisation and individual identity. In the next 
chapter, I will explore this aspect of the relationship between spoken 
creole and written English in some texts by Allen and Brand. 
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Chapter Seven 
EMBODIED METASIGNS 
Recently, while waiting for calaloo in the Caribbean take-out shop 
around the corner from our flat, I had a conversation with the dark-
brown-skinned cook. Where did I live, he asked? "Up near Ruskin Park", 
I said, wishing to share my pleasure in the park, and belatedly aware that 
I was also overtly indicating privilege. On the edges of Brixton as we 
are, one's choice of names is a statement of social allegiance. Did I like 
London? Yes; well, I liked Brixton (again, impulsively sharing my 
pleasure, but now aware of the signalling of allegiances). Where was I 
from? As always, a second of hyper-awareness, of computing contexts: if 
I had been speaking Spanish, I would say "Cuba", though I was an 
immigrant to Anglo-Canada at age five; when I lived in bilingual 
Montreal I would say "Ottawa", the bilingual border-city where I grew 
up; but here in London, I say "Canada", letting the semiotics of dialect 
and skin colour convey erroneous signals. I am only white English-
Canadian in certain times and places. 
Was I here alone? "No, with my partner, you might have seen him 
around, he's from Guatemala..." here I stopped, at a loss, since my 
partner has roughly the same migrant history as I. Why did I say he was 
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from Guatemala, while I was "Canadian"? I tried to explain: "You might 
have seen him pass by... He has black hair, sort of dark, looks very Latin 
American." 
But the cook didn't know what "Latin Americans" are supposed to look 
like. "Black?" he asked. "Dark white," I firmly replied, and found 
myself facing yet another of those moments of grinding gears, of 
referential vertigo. The first I ever had was when an American roommate 
in university asked me, "So, how does it feel to be non-white?" "I'm not 
non-white," I protested immediately. But if I lived in the United States, 
as a Cuban immigrant I would be a "minority" (an alternative American 
term for non-white). My quick response revealed to me then the size of 
the investment I had in being on the "right" side of white. 
A few weeks later, I happened to be in the take-out shop with my partner 
and I introduced him to the cook. I asked, "What would you call him?" 
The cook formed his lips to say "BI-", and then asked him, "What's you 
name, anyway?", and when informed, "I'd call him Eduardo." 
Despite the cook's grace and my own hapless embroilment in "race"-ist 
categories, I realized that the cook subscribed to a larger British binary, 
that of "white" and "Black". "White" is "us" by whomever it is used; 
"Black" is everybody else, or, as they say in America, "non-white" (non-
"us"). Even for the cook, although "Black" has strong inclusive 
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connotations, it is an Other to a more powerful, and therefore exclusive 
"us"—white. 
In this chapter I describe closed-system grammars of social identity that 
are always in flux according to changing historical and geographical 
contexts. These grammars are very similar to the grammars of languages 
in the sense that they are maintained in very local negotiations of error 
and correctness; fundamentally, these are negotiations of social position, 
which in turn affect the grammars used to carry them out. At the same 
time, a metaphysics of presence relating to embodied signs of identity 
drives the energy with which people manipulate the grammar, in the 
sense that they believe embodied signs are transcendent. Just as the 
personal is political, the socio-political is personal. 
I will be using the term grammar in the revised sense developed in 
Chapter Four: a description of the realities people set up by behaving "as 
if'. But a grammar is also a medium of exchange (of ideas, relationships) 
and that is why its shape changes quickly, in accordance with changing 
ideas and relationships. In other words, a social semiotic grammar cannot 
describe an object such as "a language" without also describing how 
people make and change terms such as English and creole, black and 
white, man and woman; and how they define themselves by reworking 
the terms in systematic ways. 
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Metasigns 
In Chapter Six, my explanation of projection depended on the notion of 
homogeneous codes. That is, in order for projection to work, there has to 
be in the minds of speakers both an idea of a certain dialect, style, 
language, or other such "code" as well as what that code "means" 	 e.g., 
"Frenchness, or "upper classness". Hodge and Kress refer to such codes 
as metasigns, or signs about signs (77). 
What the code often signifies is a group of people, socially distinguished 
within a community that agrees to distinguish that group. Thus the group 
of people distinguished as "American" by the verbal markers they use 
(accent) are distinguished by all English speakers for a variety of reasons 
having to do with history and collective identity, but not with any 
necessarily objective feature of American-ness. 
How these conventions of social identity and their indexical verbal 
patterns are then used to mean even more specific things depends, as I 
have said, on the specific context of the interaction. Recall the American 
twang I mentioned before: "That's OK baa me", I might say if I want to 
say, "in a very relaxed way, that's very much OK by me". 
An American accent is a good example of a metasign. A metasign is a 
sign or set of signs which acts as a marker of group allegiance (Hodge 
and Kress 79). As such, metasigns are signs that "primarily refer to 
relations in the plane of semiosis (the production of meaning) rather than 
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the mimetic plane (what is referred to)" (82). That is, they are about the 
identity of the speakers or the context of the utterance; these are both 
necessary indicators of how a message is to be read. 
A metasign is a sign in itself. As such, it behaves within the same 
constraints and with the same contradictions as all signs, discussed in 
Chapter Five. For example, a national language is a metasign that, 
formally, works as an element in a system of signs that might be called 
"languages" (Swahili is one element of a system composed of numerous 
languages). The reason it is crucial to insist on the place of Swahili as 
only one metasign taking part in a system of metasigns / languages is 
because it is only through the constant awareness of the difference of 
Swahili in relation to other languages that its "Swahiliness", its identity 
(and that of its speakers) is maintained. 
By emphasising the systemic context of metasigns, I draw attention to 
the work that goes on every day in maintaining, adjusting, and redefining 
metasigns, through the deployment of markers. Any use of a marker — 
and markers are unavoidable in any utterance — constitutes a redefinition 
of the metasign in relation to all of the others in the same system. This is 
how the boundaries of English are negotiated, as I showed in Chapter 
Four. At the same time, it is the relative status of participants in an 
interaction that determines what is (re)defined as group membership, i.e., 
whether one is or is not a member, whether a material signifier is or is 
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not a marker. Like languages, social groups, that is social identities as 
metasigns, are constantly being (re)defined. 
Metasigns are not always linked to verbal production (accents, dialects). 
Some metasigns are embodied, that is, are physical characteristics that 
are used as social identity markers. Embodied markers of race or gender 
can be deployed as signs in themselves. And, just as speakers' defence of 
the boundaries of a language is a way both of negotiating their relative 
status as well as mutually re-creating "the language", speakers 
negotiating their identity in terms such as "American" or "black" are 
taking part in the re-creation of these systems of signs while negotiating 
relative status. 
Metasign systems, or grammars 
Just as a conventional grammar is the description of a set of patterns 
acting as markers (socially identified as "a language") a grammar of 
social categories is a description of a set of patterns acting as markers. 
However, each of these patterns has (collectively) already been identified 
as a metasign, e.g. "Irish". That is, a grammar can be a set of markers or 
set of metasigns at different levels of complexity (see Table 1). 
a 
V 
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A grammar is a closed system. A closed system is a set of metasigns or 
markers, each of which structures the system as a whole through its sign-
function. Sets of metasigns (i.e. social category grammars) are 
logonomic systems (Hodge and Kress 266-7), which are constraints on 
(and offer possibilities for) and who is able to say what under what 
circumstances and how. In this aspect as well, logonomic systems are 
"grammars" in the popular sense. 
Social category grammars are generated by systems of differences 
similar to Saussure's "system[s] of pure values" (110). There are 
grammars of ethnicity, of dialect/language, of colour, of nationality, of 
religious allegiance, of gender, of sexuality, of "race, of age ... There is 
no exhaustive list of these metasign systems, since they are extremely 
local and also contingent on changing social and political relations. 
They are all, however, closed systems in which each term is defined by 
all of the others. For example, within a certain grammar of race 
metasigns44 the term "black" stands in opposition to "Asian" and 
"white": "black" is meaningful only in relation to its opposites, "Asian" 
and "white". In such a scheme, "the value of any one element depends on 
the simultaneous coexistence of all the others" (Saussure 113). 
This sets up a dynamic of meaning-making rather than a set of (possible 
or actual) meanings. In such a system based on differences, each sign 
must be arbitrary (in the Saussurian sense): 
i'-‘0STO 	 C 
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The processes of linguistic change amply demonstrate this 
correlation. It is precisely because two signs a and b are 
never grasped as such by our linguistic consciousness, but 
only the difference between a and b, that each sign 
remains free to change in accordance with laws quite 
unconnected with their signifying function. (116) 
Social category grammars change in accordance with relations of power. 
It is a highly imbricated process, since social and semiotic exchanges are 
inseparable: social relations depend on the exchange of symbols while 
the exchange of symbols always affects these relations (Lemke "Action, 
Context, and Meaning"). 
In the rest of this section I am going to deconstruct the term "race"45  
through a description of its constitution in several local grammars. Race 
is the name of a code that includes the terms black, white, Asian, Latin-
American (or Hispanic), Oriental, and so forth, in different combinations, 
including some potential terms and ignoring others because of the history 
of its place. For example, the history of the Caribbean includes white 
Europeans, black Africans, Chinese, and South Asians in various 
configurations of dominance and subversion; it is this history that 
participants in the culture live out and carry forward through constant 
negotiation of their relations to each other in these and other terms 
45 In the rest of the section I will not put terms in quotation marks in the interest of visual 
neatness. 
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(female, working class, educated, homosexual, Caribbean, etc.). It must 
be understood from the outset that these are not essential terms — there is 
no such thing as "a black" or "a female" — but relative terms — black as 
non-white, female as non-male. People behave as if these terms are 
"true"; and that is the fundamental insight of semiotics. Recall Eco's 
"[e]very time there is a possibility of lying, there is a sign-function; 
which is to signify (and then to communicate) something to which no 
real state of things corresponds." (58) 
As I have said, at the level of everyday interaction, the local values of the 
term black are created and recreated through historical relations of power 
between self- and Other-defining groups. Black in English North 
America, for example, means a person with any African ancestry; in 
Haiti, it means a person with wholly African ancestry; in England, 
informally it means a person with a non-European ancestry, non-East 
Asian ancestry. This gloss of different signifieds for the term black 
comes from the history of its usage in each locale. The sign shifts as a 
function of the shifting relations of power that the use of "black" 
indexes; for in each of these locales, status / solidarity negotiations are 
performed in the everyday, and each performance, in theory, changes the 
system. 
Participants in different race systems in different locales may use the 
same terms, e.g. white. They may use them to denote different things. 
They will, however, use them systematically, according to their 
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community's conventionalized race grammar. There is a regular system 
of differences between the signifiers (terms); there is another system of 
differences among the denoted signifieds, or values; and the interface 
between the two is the occasion for the creation of signs. 
Since meaning by difference on the signifier plane (e.g., colour terms) is 
arbitrarily linked to meanings on the signified plane (e.g., skin colour), 
neither the signifiers nor signified are ontologically prior. Each plane is 
in constant flux. At times one side of the grammar / social-structure 
relationship is the more stable (as when the signifier black is widespread, 
but used of different signifieds); and at times the other (as when 
signifiers for non-us in the United States shift from non-white to ethnic 
to minority). 
The link between signifiers and signifieds is dynamic in other ways. 
Race is only one cluster of systems; social identities are practiced across 
different systems, which sometimes overlap (e.g., class, race, ethnicity). 
These systems also affect each other through the multivalent signs 
(Volosinov) that they arrange. For example, the historical enslavement of 
New World Africans has been construed, in the context of American 
racism, as identical to the emasculation of African men (see Brathwaite 
The Arrivants). Black feminism (see Chapter Two) is concerned with the 
dynamics of this type of intersection and its impact on black women. 
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It's important to keep in mind that the entire social category grammar is 
also contingent. This follows from the fact that every value in the system 
functions only in relation to all of the others and to the system as a 
whole. The very idea of gender, for example, is a product of a certain 
binary system in which the terms masculine and feminine define each 
other (Butler). Without their differential relationship, gender could not 
exist. 
Performativity and the body 
As I have said, social identities rely on more than verbal modes in their 
circulation. Body language, facial expressions, qualities of the voice, and 
other embodied signs are used to signal and mark identity. 
Commonsensically, there is a difference between markers that are in our 
semi-conscious control, such as verbal language and body-language, to 
those that are not often changed, such as skin colour. But in some gender 
(Butler) and social semiotic theory (Lemke "Towards a Social 
Semiotics"), the difference is a continuum between two poles: 
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Our community teaches us specific, if often inexplicit 
procedures for identifying, classifying, segmenting, and 
evaluating the semiotic body. We read bodies, and with 
them, patterns of movement, facial expressions and 
gestures, body lexis, stance, attitude, somatotype, vocal 
style, etc. We construct, by these social practices 
characteristic of our community and the subcommunities 
we belong to, socially meaningful semiotic bodies and 
their texts. The criteria, the categories, the procedures all 
have little in common with those of the physicist or 
biologist. They construct a different sort of material 
individual. (Lemke 5) 
While the examples Lemke uses are oriented to describing how we 
distinguish individuals, the same mechanism is used within communities 
to distinguish groups. 
The distinctions practiced and read in the body depend on very specific 
historical contexts. For example, physical features constructing an 
Irishman in eighteenth-century London were apparently clear to all, as 
were those constructing a Jew in 1930's Vienna (Epstein). In the same 
way, physical features constructing a woman are only visible in contexts 
in which a gender distinction is important. Although the markers are 
material, it is the signifieds ("Irish", "Jew", "female") which fuel the 
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semiotic embodiment of the signifiers, since it is only the importance of 
their politico-historical meanings that gives them semiotic value. 
It is important to emphasise here the dialectic between material signifiers 
and the grammars of identity I have been describing. There is no way to 
signal embodied identity without a body; on the other hand, there can be 
no body without, or before, its participation in identity grammars. 
The negotiation of a metasign (the boundary of the system of markers 
that constitutes it) is done through negotiations of group membership. 
That is, participants in any interaction, sometimes verbally, more often 
not, establish (and re-establish) their social identity through markers of 
membership in a social group. This was the point of my introductory 
anecdote. 
In Chapter Five, I worked out that the boundary between signifier and 
signified is also the boundary between material phenomena within the 
sign (such as grapheme and phoneme, or thought and sound, as in 
Saussure's example). Material phenomena are always semioticised in 
social terms. This explains how the semiotic body works as a mode. 
The rest of the chapter looks at texts created by Allen and Brand from the 
point of view of how they make bodies into meanings, how they put 
meanings into bodies, and related questions of representation and 
embodied identity. A significant amount of Allen and Brand's work 
attends closely to the black female body: the black female body's 
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constructed nature; blackwomaness in relation to self. They site 
meanings clearly in their bodies, clearly practiced by their bodies; and 
these meanings, made as embodied subjects, reverse the perspective of 
social oppressions aimed at the black female body as object. 
Embodied meanings 
Allen and Brand are acutely aware of the social constructedness of 
bodies as objects, and of the instability and contradictions that result. 
Strictly speaking, in a social constructivist view of the matter, there is no 
(semiotic) body prior to its "being" in gender and race systems. Their 
approach sees a body as meaning, and meaning as necessarily embodied. 
The elision of meaning/body and body/meaning allows them to explore 
the link between 1) the body as socially constructed (through the 
performative cultural constructions gender / sex / sexuality and race / 
colour / ethnicity), and 2) their experience of the body as self. 
"Meaning" in this sense is seen as something alternative, subversive, and 
even radical in relation to dominant meanings / bodies. In these last few 
lities from "hard against the soul", Brand gathers some of the themes of 
the book through the terms "body" "myself', "a place", "tongue". 
...I saw my own body, that 
is, my eyes followed me to myself, touched myself 
as a place, another life, terra. They say this place 
does not exist, then, my tongue is mythic. I was here 
before. 	 (No Language 51) 
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Tracing the relationships between these substantives with variable first-
person pronouns, she begins as subject of the body, the "I" that "saw". 
Then she adds the body in its Westernized object position, although 
claimed with a possessive pronoun and intensifier: "my own body". 
Next, an element of that same object-body — "my eyes" — assumes a 
subject position, and becomes an agent with the verb "followed". The 
object of the subject-body is again the self, me, in object position 
which, however, is a tangible, corporeal self in "touched myself'. 
In other words, Brand creates a relationship between body as subject and 
body as object in which the object is also "another life", a real 
alternative. The apposition of "a place" and "another life" names the 
ampersand problem — how to exist as an embodied being in a culture 
which denies a place to that subject position. Next Brand conflates body 
and language through "tongue": "They say this place does not exist, then, 
my tongue is mythic." That is, palpable experiences of corporeality, 
lesbian sexuality, and oral language share a certain power to bypass the 
determinisms of Western history. 
The allusion to "place" picks up on a theme in Caribbean literature in 
which the Caribbean is seen as politically and culturally "nowhere", 
much like other colonies, in contrast to the metropolis, which is "a 
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place"46. In "Return", Brand suggests that the route to circumventing this 
damaging duality also lies in the link between her body and (its) 
meaning. She shows how the locale has meaning as a physical impact on 
the her body; it is not named or spoken, but physically experienced: 
So the street is still there, still melting with sun 
Still the shining waves of heat at one o'clock 
The eyelashes scorched, staring the distance of the 
Park to the parade stand, still razor grass burnt and 
Cropped, everything made indistinguishable from dirt 
still I suppose the scorpion orchid by the road, that 
fine red tongue of flamboyant and orange lips 
muzzling the air... 
...still the crazy bougainvillea fancying and 
nettling itself purple, pink, red, white, still the trickle of 
sweat and cold flush of heat raising the smell of 
cotton and skin... (Brand No Language 10) 
Introducing each item on the list with the refrain "still", Brand somatises 
the experience of a return to a tropical streetscape. She recreates the 
observer, arriving with the exclamation "so the street is still there"; she 
subtly personifies the street with the preposition "with" in "melting with 
sun" (by analogy with "she's gone crazy with sun" perhaps, rather than 
the unmarked "melting in the sun"). She calls up the daily routines that 
filter the human, social experience of the landscape "at one o'clock"; and 
46 Throughout "no language is neutral" Brand has contrasted "nowhere" and "a place", a 
"place" being a mythic locale in which colonial subjects are valorised, in contrast to 
"nowhere", a name given by V.S. Naipaul to the Caribbean as a colonial backwater. 
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she inserts the embodied experience of the heat again with the sensation 
of "scorched" eyelashes and the effort of keeping the gaze level in fierce 
sunlight in "staring the distance". 
These are not "objective" memories. Both eyelashes and razor grass are 
repressed by a combination of harsh climate and patriarchy (the latter 
evoked through the military object "parade stand", as well as the 
"cropped" grass and the military conformity of "everything made 
indistinguishable from dirt"). The role of femininity in this locale is 
captured in the personification of the orchid as a hyper-sexualised 
woman loitering by the road, whose "tongue" (language) is lipstick 
("flamboyant and orange lips"), emblems of a retrograde heterosexuality. 
Her lips "muzzle" the air — like the grass, the air is a life principle 
repressed by the history of oppression in this locale. The bougainvillea is 
a daft, inane ("crazy") poseur ("fancying... itseln, performing 
masochistic acts of female vanity ("nettling itself purple"). 
The speaker's body finally "talks back" to the locale, through its flushed 
response to the heat and the women, its recoil ("the cold flush of heat"), 
its concrete intrusion into the written passage ("raising the smell of 
cotton and skin"). These body-memories are gendered in complicated 
ways. It is the body that "speaks" this landscape, in two senses: 1) what 
the landscape means, what signs it makes (through its bodies); and 2) 
how the speaker's body lives in it. 
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The body draws together more vividly than most modes the tensions 
between pre-symbolic, sensual phenomena and the inevitability of social 
structures as part of the sign. In other words, even bodies, as modes, are a 
positioned practice. 
Dub 
Although Brand may speak (and "body") to us in writing, Allen actually 
speaks. In performance, Allen exploits the body as both medium and 
mode. Whereas the body discussed in the ife-x-t--to-last section (the body 
in writing) was a mode, in the performances of Allen the body is both 
medium and mode. 
What does the added element of the medium do, what impact does it 
have on Allen's ways of making meanings, and the things that she 
"says"? A material body and a written body (as mode, that is, way of 
saying things) have more in common than might at first be imagined: 
because a material body is still a semiotic body; it is, in Butler's term, 
"performed". 
A body is performed in the same moment a poem is performed. By 
performing her poetry and using distinctive qualities of voice, distinctive 
rhythms, and personal gestures, Allen creates a connection that allows 
her to explore the "meaning" of her body in two senses: what meanings it 
creates (in particular contexts); and what these are in relation to the 
meanings "female" and "black". The latter is because her meanings / 
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texts / signs are the instantiations of the semiotic qualities of her body 
(female and black as well as others). 
As I said in Chapter Two, Allen's poetics both nurture and feed from her 
conviction about the primal connection between physical and 
political/spiritual realities. I mentioned "Birth Poem", which in print is 
minimal but in performance is the extraordinary dance/chant/song of a 
woman in labour. According to Habekost, 
It is impossible to grasp the full effect of "Birth Poem" in 
print; marked by a consistent structure of repetition, the 
text gives but a vague idea of the magic and the power of 
the poem in performance...the central section is a 
compelling mixture of chants, groans, signs and word 
chains. Allen's breathtaking performance of "Birth Poem" 
never fails to mesmerize her audiences... her face distorts 
in pain, her gestures provide staccato punctuation as she 
rants a fast, rolling, wave-like rhythm culminating in the 
onomatopoeic "baps". (207) 
It is the very fact of the physical, not the body as such, that Allen 
exploits for impact. In other words, in order to make the meaning of this 
poem, it must be done through the body as a medium rather than just a 
mode. 
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Allen also uses the techniques of concrete poetry to create a physical 
impact on the page. In the following poem I wish to draw attention to the 
way in which Allen links "self / race gender / history" in a concrete, 
visual cross pattern to make an image of her experience of the 
intersection of these aspects of identity: 
You have taken my abstractions 
broken my images 
carved images-of-broken on my mirror 
data process needs 
package dreams on TV 
separate me from self 
race 	 gender 
history 
We who create 	 space 
who transform what you say 	 is 
send you scurrying 
scurrying to the dictionary 
to add 	 new words 
We, we are the subversives 
We, we are the underground 
(Women Do This 40) 
There is a concern that post-structural "images-of-broken" separate the 
poet from "self / race 	 gender / history". This is not a reactionary 
essentialism, but a recognition that the embodied experience of self is as 
much a tangible experience as a social construction. In the written 
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version, Allen creates concrete spaces between the three terms "race, 
gender, history", or perhaps arranges them on the page this way to avoid 
a-lining them (as print). The cross pattern they make together with "self', 
as I have said, suggests an intersecting relationship for all four terms. 
Again, "space" is created visually; and in the next line, the visual space 
between "create" and "is" gives two senses to the line: "we who 
transform what you say "exist" (in creole); and "we who transform what 
you say is the case", with space around the predicate "is" emphasising its 
unrelated, unrelating autonomy.47 The final two lines are in boldface 
visually to signify not just louder volume, but also a collective voice 
(signified in sound by a chorus of female voices). 
In all of her poetry Allen insists on the connection between words and 
action. It is a connection that has no spaces between the two entities: 
words are action: 
dis word breeds my rhythm 
dis word carries my freedom 
dis word is my hand 
: my weapon 
((Women Do This 87) 
As I have said (Chapter Six), the poem is self-reflexive; unless "dis 
word" is itself rather than a representation of a word, the poem has no 
47 I have said elsewhere that Allen is not a post-modernist, but simply aware of crucial 
relationships between social position, power, and meaning-making. 
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meaning. When we read "dis word", we are meant to realise it refers to 
the very ink on the very page we are holding in our hands. 
In sound texts, Allen draws attention to the materiality of the moment 
through "natural" sounds such as screams of protest and protest chants 
(dub poetry is a protest genre). A shriek is an eminently transparent 
signifier. Other sounds, expressing essential experiences of a female 
body (such as birth labour), are used to break taboos about women's 
experience, to make an emotional link with female listeners, or simply to 
voice experience in a way that short-circuits the codings of a dominating 
language. 
For example, her vocalisations imitate sounds that bring up strong 
emotions, such as ambulance and police sirens. Allen's "Rub A Dub 
Style Inna Regent Park", opens with the sound of a human voice 	 just 
perceptibly a human voice—imitating a siren. This sound has an 
immediate meaning, that of "siren" and all its experiential and emotional 
associations: fire, urban violence, disaster 	 and thus, pain and/or 
apprehension. Interestingly, this sound has ambiguous meanings 
depending on the addressee. For listeners in dominant social and cultural 
positions, it has the meanings I have just presented; but for the listeners 
from whose point of view the ballad is sung, inhabitants of an inner city 
housing estate who are the target of racist police violence, the sound of a 
police siren includes the meaning "racist state oppression and 
community-internal conflict". 
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In "So What (Perspective Poem)", Allen contrasts the high literary poetic 
tradition as transmitted through the discipline of English literature 
(always written, never musical) with the enormous social power of an 
activist's song: 
So what so what so what 
So your years of schooled craft 
have created fine poems 
so it ended pollution 
so it stopped wars 
so it fed starving children 
so it gave life to the dying 
so it brought peace to one single land 
so no one should imperil its form 
so, so self assured and turgid 
so what if I write a poem like a song 
(Women Do This 127) 
The final line's meanings depend on imagined spoken inflections. "So 
what if I write a poem like a song" (i.e., what difference does it make if I 
write a poem like a song? — angry, exasperated); or it might be, "so, what 
if I write a poem like a song" (i.e., therefore why don't I write a poem 
like a song instead — suggesting an alternative); or even "so, what if I 
write a poem like a song?" (i.e., what would happen if I wrote a poem 
like a song? -- speculative). All of these inflections depend on the spoken 
voice. 
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In the centre of the poem there is a turn from the ironic ("so it brought 
peace to a single land") to the direct ("so no one should imperil its 
form"). The sudden turn, the juxtaposition of the two lines, and the 
choice of the verb "imperil" (evoking also "imperial") raises the 
economics of European canonical literatures as forms of cultural 
imperialism: the rise of the nation states coincided with the growth of 
vernacular literatures, followed by the colonial expansion of the 
European nations. Thus English literature and its forms are not just 
irrelevant, but, through their role in the colonisation of many parts of the 
world, life-destroying. 
By "life", Allen means human, physical life as well as cultural life. By 
performing her poetry, through the tension thus created between 
expressions of local essentialisms (including her and her audience's 
subjective experience of being there) and political analysis of the link 
between racism and neo-imperialist economics, Allen is able to show 
what exactly the connection is between poetry and human life at the most 
basic level — a level literature does not have a language, a theory, to 
approach. In the poem, through its performance, Allen shows that literary 
language excludes her body's language (as performance); and she 
embodies her poetry to realise a "language" or system of meaning 
alternative to the colonising literary. 
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Conclusion 
If meaning-making is a practice in social context, bodies are 
performances played in the everyday. These performances may be in a 
range of different media; the mode of the body, however, is created and 
maintained through grammars that are analogous to the grammars of 
language in their social functions. Extending Butler's notion of 
performativity and her description of the oppositional system of gender, I 
have described "grammars" of oppositional relations such as race, 
ethnicity, class, etc., all of which intersect through the material, 
multivalent signs they arrange. In this chapter I have also showed how 
Allen and Brand explicitly perform these grammars, using them to re-
create and re-direct meanings about their race and gender through the 
tangible nature of their experience. They site meanings clearly in their 
bodies, clearly practised by their bodies; and these meanings, made as 
embodied subjects, reverse the perspective of social oppressions aimed at 
the black female body as object. 
Allen and Brand explore the "meanings" of their bodies in several 
directions. Brand is interested in the articulatory power of her body, and 
the relationship of its "language" with different senses of that term: what 
language her body speaks; and the relationship of her body's language to 
languages about her body (see also Chapter Six). She has written with 
attention to the link between racism as an issue of physical appearance 
and sexism as a force that targets the female body, while showing the 
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effects of social and political oppression on her sense of body-as-self. 
Allen explores similar questions through performance, including a 
concern with literary language and verbal forms that exclude her body's 
language (as performance). Thus, Allen and Brand embody their poetry 
to realise "languages" or systems of meaning that are usually excluded 
from the written. This allows them to experience their bodies as a 
primary locus of meaning and to refashion the meaning "female and 
black". 
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Chapter Eight 
CONCLUSION 
Post-modernism asks: whose body, whose gaze, whose 
history, whose personality, etc. etc. The response 
embedded in my work is not the disembodied "I," nor is it 
everyone's "I," both of which are rooted in faulty and 
debilitating versions of history, in notions of power and 
control over both persons and nature central to modern 
European culture, to its cult of individualism, and to the 
Americas. Nor is it the naïve "I" of autobiography. 
Instead it is the "I" of specific body, the African body, the 
female African body, as well as the "I" of imagined, and 
selectively structured, narrative context... (Harris 31) 
I begin my conclusion with Harris' clear statement of the role of the 
body in her work for the larger issues that it raises. Harris is an African-
Caribbean woman poet, also Canadian, also, like Brand, a poet, essayist, 
and cultural critic. The similarity of her concerns to those of Allen and 
Brand are a reminder that there is a very defined African-Caribbean 
feminist poetics, although the poets who practice it live in various 
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corners of Canada, the Caribbean, and the UK48. In Chapter Two I used 
as example of one of the common elements in their work the theme of 
exile; but the female, African body and its subjectivity, used as a wedge 
into a denunciation of the specific injustices which prop up the West, is 
actually far more central to their poetics. 
Han-is' (and Brand's and Allen's) insistence on the specific body as the 
ground of meaning is, for me, a white female reader, a liberating 
experience. Considering my "race" (white) locates my experiences more 
specifically, and within the context of other "races", other histories and 
points of view. In this awareness of specific difference lies the 
beginnings of community. It also inserts the sensorium of my 
experiences into my explanations of those experiences to myself. This is 
liberating because, without my realising it, I had missed that sensorium, 
the meanings of my senses located in my specific body, in explanations 
of experience that are on offer outside of black feminism. 
This was the initial, visceral attraction of the poetry of Allen and Brand. 
But there were numerous other reasons for carrying out the theoretical 
work in this thesis. 
I originally read in the poetry of Allen and Brand both meanings that 
speak for me and meanings / forms that challenged in specific ways the 
literary, linguistic and sociolinguistic approaches I had available to me to 
48 Harris lives in Calgary. 
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explicate those meanings. Their practice extended the scope of my 
search. As I went through the usual socialization of disciplined academic 
subjects, I kept in mind the original reasons why I had turned to 
linguistics as a student of literature: to find a way of reading literary texts 
that was more answerable to their form and context than the language of 
aesthetics, high literary criticism, or literary theory. 
My initial linguistic models of language had to be expanded, sometimes 
replaced; theoretical (generative) syntax, being purely formal, could not 
talk about meaning, nor about the uses of language; applied linguistics 
(systemic-functional), while good on the everyday uses of language, had 
the severe limitations of its functional roots (and its semantic grammar). 
Sociolinguistics had the best chance, but I had to mix on an ad hoc basis 
empirical studies based on different underlying approaches (e.g., 
anthropological-interactional of Gumperz; ethnomethodological of 
Saville-Troike; variationist of Myers-Scotton - all studies in code-
switching, itself a general, under-theorised term for a perceived 
sociolinguistic behaviour). 
Variationist sociolinguistics, probably the dominant school in North 
America, had a methodology based on a naïve set of social categories 
(socio-economic class, race, etc., with no theorisation of these terms or 
development in a social theory). It was also heavily invested in empirical 
work and lacking a theory, or even a coherent research project - given 
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that investigating, or even assembling a description of, social variation in 
language does not seem to justify itself as a project - at least to me. But 
more to the point, these studies were not meant to be applied to written 
texts, to imaginative texts, to uses of language that were self-reflexive 
and sometimes deliberately subversive of the type of language that 
mainstream sociolinguistics assumes is "language" in its investigations, 
all the while taking the object "language" as a given. In other words, a 
linguist's notion of what "language" is differs markedly from a literary 
writer / reader's. 
Social semiotics has only recently come under the rubric 
"sociolinguistics" (see Downes' Sociolinguistics, 2nd edition - at the 
publication of the 1st edition there was no social semiotics, although 
Downes was involved, also at that time, in the birth pangs of critical 
discourse analysis and social semiotics). Many (of the more 
unimaginative) North American linguists, however, would question the 
critical turn taken by British sociolinguistics, a turn both motivated by 
and inclusive of discourse analysis and social semiotics. First of all, 
politics is excluded by the practices and focus of a science (even a social 
science, in positivist America). That is the "social" of social semiotics. 
Secondly, non-verbal (and even non-functional) systems of 
communication are explicitly excluded from "language" by linguists (e.g. 
visual, musical, mythological, etc.). That is the "semiotics" of social 
semiotics. Finally, the fundamental unit of analysis in social semiotics is 
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the sign; and this means that both form and meaning are included in 
principle in any social semiotic analysis. In linguistics, on the other hand, 
form is the object of study (the structure of language, or the patterns of 
language use and variation) and meaning is considered un-measurable or 
unverifiable. 
Literary writers/readers, however, also include meaning and form in any 
analysis - often as inseparable elements. The statement that form is 
meaning is commonplace in literary studies, but a severe challenge to the 
orthodoxy in North American linguistics. At the departmental level, a 
linguist is a linguist because she sticks to her linguistic system of 
description. Anything not describable in terms of that system is not 
considered a part of the object of study of (that) linguistics. Because I 
have looked for things which challenge those system(s) of description, 
and modified or rejected them by a literary measure - how can this help 
me to articulate my response to this text? - I am not a linguist. 
Social semiotics, on the other hand, takes any text or semiotic practice 
(including texts considered literary, or on the borderlands of the literary) 
as both a challenge to and exemplar for the (social semiotic) theory. So I 
might have a question, a typical social semiotic question such as, "What 
affordances (possibilities for meaning-making) does the "same" text have 
in writing and in sound?" 
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However, one doesn't "find" a theory and apply it uncritically, like a 
garden hoe. Every application of a theory ideally changes that theory, 
sharpens its perceptions, prods it to evaluate both its assumptions and its 
tenets. A social semiotic project on the surface uses texts to exemplify 
points in the development of the theory; but in reality, all texts, including 
the selected ones, are ways of testing a theory (in this case a theory of 
meaning-making). A good theorist looks for texts that test the theory. 
The texts of Allen and Brand have tested social semiotics in specific 
ways. The research I have carried out has the following implications for 
social semiotic theory: 1) the model of the sign has been developed to 
account for the role of systemic boundaries in the textual practices of 
Allen and Brand. This has meant a refinement of the terms "arbitrary" 
and "transparent". 2) The influence of this model on a description of 
generative social category grammars, which incorporate Harris' principle 
of specificity: whose body? This is turn has implications for the social 
semiotic production principle of "experiential meaning-making", which 
could be revised to "embodiment" to account for the shaping influence of 
social categories on one's perception of and experience of material 
phenomena. I will expand on these implications below. 
Summary of the argument 
In this section I will summarise my argument; in the next, I will discuss 
its implications for social semiotic theory. 
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In Chapter Two I introduce the poetry of Allen and of Brand by placing 
their work in Caribbean literary-historical context and in the context of 
Black American women writers, and finally in the context of black 
feminism. The point of black feminism is that it is only black women 
who really have an opportunity to see the function of intersecting 
categories, in the positioned-practice "female and black". Non-black 
feminists tend to ignore the effect of race on their position (that is, they 
forget that to be white is to be in a position of historical dominance in 
relation to "black"); black men tend to ignore the effect of gender on 
their position (that is, to be male is to be in a position of historical 
dominance in relation to "female"). My argument is that this may also 
lead to an awareness of the contingency of all social categories (but 
especially gender and race). Both Allen and Brand would reject a view of 
their thinking on race and gender as social constructivist; they are, 
however, convinced that race and gender oppression must be fought 
together; and their approach relies on the concreteness of the black, 
female body to keep this awareness in the forefront of their meanings. 
Chapter Three contains the seeds of much of what follows in the thesis. It 
is an attempt to find in Derrida's sign theory a linguistic / semiotic model 
for the relationship between speech and writing — that is, creole speech 
and English writing. Without that final modification, it may be that 
Derrida's argument in "The End of the Book and the Beginning of 
Writing" (Of Grammatology) explains the relationship between two 
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autonomous systems (writing and sound); but when put against Allen's 
phonetic spellings of Jamaican English Creole (through the English 
orthographic system), it becomes evident that Derrida's arche-writing is 
based on an impoverished notion of representation. 
The relationship between the letter and its sound is autonomous; in this I 
agree with Derrida. In the case of English this autonomy has arisen partly 
because of the huge temporal and geographical variation that arose in the 
dialects of English since the initial rough standardisation of the spelling 
code. However, Derrida is right to ascribe this characteristic of the letter-
sound relationship to the secondarity of the sign-function — the sound 
will always be only represented by letter, and there is no meaning-
relationship here to anchor this relationship of pure representation. 
Derrida then applies this principle to other domains of semiosis, for 
writing is the perfect metaphor for semiosis, he says: it is the most 
obvious demonstration of the general semiotic principle that there is no 
signifier, no originary, only the movement from symbol to sign, and only 
the perpetual trace. 
However, if we look at the success of Allen's creole transcription, we see 
the proof against Derrida's position. Allen achieves two things with her 
phonetic spellings — indications of how certain words are to be 
pronounced, creating connotations of their culture (Jamaican); and the 
performance of a social position outside the written standard. In order to 
do this, Allen depends on ephemeral public knowledge — the sounds of 
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Jamaican English Creole — as signifieds for her signifiers. Allen takes 
advantage of the power of a very strong norm (standardisation of the 
English spelling code) to strengthen the meaning of deviance from the 
same norm. An final important point is that she (and all dialect writers) 
manage to do this "through" the English system of orthography. The 
verbal and social standard is a necessary part of the meaning of 
"deviance". 
Any verbal utterance, spoken or written, takes part in the positioning of 
its speaker by reference to standards of error / correctness. Chapter Four 
follows up on this insight and ends up considering questions with 
implications for linguistic methodology: what is a language? and, what is 
a grammar? It looks more closely at the description of certain Caribbean 
English Creoles as dialect continua rather than a set of discrete 
"languages". The argument is by now becoming familiar in 
sociolinguistics: that creole continua argue for an interactional approach 
to language study. 
However, my focus in this and the following chapter is not on this 
approach, but on the symbolic dynamics that must be at work in the 
behaviour of speakers when they create language boundaries. In other 
words, the aim of Chapter Four is to work out the sociolinguistic theory, 
guided by social semiotics, which explains how the boundaries 
established by the notion of discreet languages as well as verbal systems 
at all levels (spelling, dialectal (standardisation), diatypical, etc.) aid in 
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making the sorts of meanings Allen and Brand make. The aim of Chapter 
Five is to create a formal model of how these principles work, with the 
aid of the sign. 
These principles, developed in Chapter Four and formalised through 
Saussurian semiotics in Chapter Five, are: 
• the sign is unique in every production; each instance of meaning-
making changes its system 
• all signs are created by socially-meaningful similarities and 
differences; all instances of meaning-making assert / negotiate 
social identity 
• the producer of meaning is always also the reader, and a reader is 
always also a producer; all readings (signs) are motivated by the 
interest and social position of the producer / reader 
Chapter Five works out the properties of signs within systems that must 
obtain for these things to be true. (Later, in Chapter Seven, I work out the 
dynamics of social category grammars; in this chapter, I am working out 
the generative principles -- motivated by the sociolinguistic theory in 
Chapter Four. The approach is, in effect, generative-linguistic.) 
Every sign is really a sign-function during which two symbolic systems 
are generated at the same moment and only for the purposes of the 
immediate interaction. In order to do this, the two systems must be 
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closed systems. What creates a sign-function when they are 
simultaneously generated is the strength of the boundary between the 
signifier and the signified, which is constituted from the boundaries of 
the closed systems. 
This is the very same boundary that speakers in social interaction 
negotiate in establishing their standing through verbal error / correctness; 
they make reference to the perceived boundaries of a national language 
(whether some verbal pattern is "inside" the language or excluded by the 
language i.e. incorrect), or to some sociolect as a sub-set of the language. 
It is also the boundary between material phenomena (such as grapheme 
and phoneme). 
The implicit references to systemic boundaries in the everyday 
deployment of social categories such as national language, "race" and 
gender, the boundaries people use to position themselves and each other 
socially, are the very same boundaries that constitute these categories; so 
that, contrary to the common-sense belief that these categories "exist" 
transcendentally, Saussurian semiotics can show that they are constituted 
and re-constituted as systems in each moment of interaction. The same 
applies to modes such as languages, the voice, writing, the semiotic 
body; by looking at the sign, we can see that these systems of material 
distinctions are socially-defined and maintained. 
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Chapter Six shows how boundaries of verbal systems (dialects, diatypes, 
verbal modes) are re-created and deployed to make certain meanings in 
the poetry of Allen and Brand. It explains Allen's phonetic spellings as 
both visual and aural strategies, but, apart from the general principle of 
boundary-making, each spelling makes its meaning in the immediate 
context of the poem, the surrounding lines, the surrounding spellings. 
There is no general interpretation for Allen's phonetic spellings except 
by reference to the social semiotics developed in Chapters Four and Five: 
every sign is really a sign-function during which two symbolic systems 
are generated at the same moment and only for the purposes of the 
immediate interaction. 
In Chapter Seven I take up this and further insights from Chapter Five in 
relation to embodiment and codes of identity: what I call social category 
grammars. Like the grammars of languages, social categories are not 
transcendent and immutable, but constructed in interaction in the 
everyday (i.e., in texts such as Allen's and Brand's). "Race" is the name 
of a set of grammars that includes the terms black, white, Asian, Latin-
American, Oriental, and so forth, in different combinations, including 
some potential terms and ignoring others according to the history of a 
particular place. These are not essential terms — there is no such thing as 
"a black" or "a female" — but relative terms — "black" as "non-white", 
"female" as "non-male". People behave as if these terms are "true"; and 
that is the fundamental insight of semiotics. 
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The term "metasign" from Social Semiotics is useful as a way of 
remembering the contingent qualities of these codes: their constituent 
signs, which are very often embodied (dress, posture, skin tone, voice 
quality, and so forth) are signs about signs, that is, they are indications of 
how signs denoting content are to be read; they are not (just) signs in 
themselves. In other words, instead of "whiteness", there is a quality or 
style of "white" conditioning all meanings made under its aegis. The 
analogy to keep in mind here is that of the popular notion of "a 
language" — the content of an utterance may be comparable in French or 
English, but the mode is different — making the meaning different. And, 
just as speakers' negotiation of the boundaries of "a language" is a way 
both of establishing their relative status as well as mutually re-creating 
the language, speakers negotiating their identity in terms such as 
"American" or "black" are taking part in the re-creation of these systems 
of identity metasigns while negotiating relative status. 
This last step is crucial as an explanation of the role of embodiment in 
the poetry of Allen and Brand. Their aim is not to destroy discourses of 
race and gender, which would not only be an impossibility but also a loss 
to their sense of self; their aim is to bring these discourses, which 
circulate in embodied signs, into both literary culture and the written 
mode. 
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Implications for Social Semiotic Theory 
As I have said, the research I have carried out has two main implications 
for social semiotic theory: 1) the model of the sign, and 2) experiential 
meaning potential. 
Experiential meaning potential is a production principle in Kress and van 
Leewen. Production principles use the materiality of the medium, not the 
conventionalised mode, to make meaning; "filn fact, signification starts 
on the side of production, using semiotic principles which have not yet 
sedimented into conventions, traditions, grammars, or laws of design" 
(Kress and van Leeuwen Multimodal, 22). As an example of this 
production principle, Kress and van Leeuwen give "the textural 
characteristics of sound qualities (as when singers adopt a soft, breathy 
voice to signify sensuality)" (22-23). 
In Chapter Seven I take up the position of feminist theory (and Lemke's 
social semiotics) that semiotic bodies are socially constructed; in light of 
this, even physical sensations and actions are experienced through a filter 
of personal identity as shaped by power / gender / race relations. The 
implication for multimodal discourse analysis is that as much attention 
has to be paid to the social ways bodies are shaped and experienced in 
their negotiations of meaning with the world as to the way meanings are 
produced through universally experienced, a-social bodies. Chapter 
Seven contains a reading of a poem by Brand that verbalises the specific 
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meanings made by her specific body during a return to the tropics 
("return I"). 
To take up the example of the textural characteristics of the voice: Allen 
is acknowledge to be a masterful artist of the voice; she is in full control 
of an astounding range of vocal sound effects during her performances. 
Yet she would be the first to deny that "a soft breathy voice" signifies 
sensuality; Allen's sensuality is projected in megawatts at different 
moments. Her jazz performance poems, in which the quality of 
sensuality is often the focal point of the piece, (e.g. "Jazz You"), contain 
few soft, breathy sounds. 
The soft breathy sound of Kress and van Leeuwen is the 
conventionalised sound of the female pop singer during, yes, moments of 
sensuality. Sensuality here means the quality of sexual attractiveness. 
This sound is already gendered, shaped by an ideology that prefers its 
women soft and physically powerless (although I take the point that 
breathiness is also an index of certain physiological effects of arousal). 
Our connotations for breathiness are spirituality (breath is the 
embodiment of the soul), in a cultural semiotics that splits off the body 
from mind and spirit (see Chapter Two). This vocal convention therefore 
takes part in the (sexist) virgin / whore dichotomy. Allen's practice gives 
an alternative for female sexuality. Neither of these expressions of the 
body's meanings are, however, pre-symbolic; they depend on a semiotic 
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body that have always already been socialised. The body, as I have said, 
is a mode; not just a medium. 
My point is not that Kress and van Leeuwen are sexist in their analysis; 
only that they have not accounted for the presence of the symbolic in 
their conception of the body as ground of meaning-making. 
The distinction between medium (the material) and the mode also has a 
bearing on the first implication for social semiotic theory that I 
mentioned above: the arbitrariness of the sign. A mode or convention is 
often seen as arbitrary, whereas the medium or material is considered 
transparent, or pre-symbolic. As I tried to show in Chapter Five, the 
arbitrariness of the sign, the transparency of the sign, and the position of 
the producer and reader of the sign have implications for one another. 
In Kress' discussion of the transparent sign in "Against arbitrariness" he 
points out that the relationship between a signifier and signified is always 
completely accessible to a particular person in a particular place and time 
with a particular interest. This is part of an argument against the 
arbitrariness of the sign, which he reads as a Sassurian overstatement 
(Social Semiotics 21). However, I pointed out that the issue is really one 
of social position or point of view, rather than an objective property of 
the sign. Given the effect of social position on any particular instance of 
meaning-making (a strong principle in social semiotics), arbitrariness 
245 
allows for the multiple readings that necessarily arise around the same 
material text. 
For example, creole transcription shows that any particular signifier (e.g., 
the graphemes and grapheme clusters of the English spelling system) can 
be linked with any particular signified (e.g., the phonemes of the creole 
inventory). The context is the defining limitation for the value of the sign 
(its meaning) as well as the key to changes that re-create entire systems. 
In other words, the transparency and opacity of signs depends on the 
context, the social position of the reader of the signs in relation to the 
producer. In "Against arbitrariness" Kress correlates the transparency of 
signs with access to the meaning: a sign is transparent to the degree of 
social closeness or distance between producer and reader (178). 
For the literary critic, non-arbitrariness and transparency are working 
hypotheses: there is a recoverable relationship between the meanings 
intended by the producer of this sign and the characteristics of the text 
itself. They are therefore theoretical (and popular) constructs that make a 
link between system and subject(ive) meanings. Arbitrariness, however, 
also allows for interpretation: unless the sign is arbitrary, or theoretically 
free to "mean" anything, there is only one possible reading, which we 
know is not the case. 
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Stylistics; or, can linguistics really describe a literary text? 
This is also a thesis in the theory of stylistics, with social semiotic theory 
considered a model of language analogous to a linguistic theory. 
Although it is "about" certain literary texts, its aims are broader than a 
description or critical reading of those texts: as I have said, it takes the 
texts as both an exemplar for and a challenge to social semiotic theory. 
Its primary aim is to develop social semiotic theory, though it attempts to 
describe in a new and interesting way certain moments in these texts. 
If I were writing a thesis from within the discipline of English literature, 
I would bring into my readings of the texts of Allen and Brand any 
number of theories and practices in an informal way, relying on 
plausibility to validate both my readings, and, circularly, the 
methodologies and/or theories of language that I had used to arrive at 
these readings. The approach I am using is an attempt to implement a 
more principled approach to reading literary texts. 
My development of social semiotic theory is meant to be a contribution 
to social semiotics from the perspective of the literary, so that, in the 
long term, social semiotics includes in its account of meaning-making 
the sophisticated, fluid uses of literary language and the multivalent, 
sometimes quasi-ineffable meanings created in literature; and from the 
other direction, this project will be a contribution to literary studies if 
social semiotics becomes an illuminating way to account for the 
247 
meaning-making practices of literary texts. My idea was to bring two 
disciplines into confrontation by using a literary text as a test case for a 
linguistic model and making the linguistic model able to account for the 
meanings made by the literary text. The result, hopefully, would be a 
linguistics capable of explicating aspects of interest (from a literary point 
of view) in the literary text. 
A purely literary approach would be comprehensive in its treatment of 
the material texts - the manuscripts, the extant corpus of the writer, etc. - 
and of certain contexts of the texts - "influences" of other literary works 
historically and geographically, cultural conditions of production, etc. It 
would take the texts as central to the thesis rather than the theory. I 
cannot create the sort of comprehensive reading of these texts that a 
traditional literary project would accomplish, because there is no 
linguistic or textual theory capable of covering as much ground in and 
around the texts as the traditional informal approach. Partly this is 
because the focus of the two activities is different (a specific text versus 
some aspect of meaning-making). 
For this project is more specifically an exploration of the applicability of 
social semiotics to problems raised for literary studies by texts previously 
considered outside of the canon but, because of rapid change both from 
within and without the discipline, texts now being consciously used to 
expand both the canon and literature as a discipline. To include these 
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texts in anthologies and university courses is only part of an effective 
move to expand the canon; the other part must include the principled 
development of a metalanguage to talk about these newly-included texts 
-- about their language and their meaning-making practices. 
My focus on the poetry of African-Caribbean women in diaspora 
addresses one of the functional roots of English literature as a discipline: 
to develop the consciousness of students as national subjects. In core 
literature programmes in English North America, for example, the object 
"literature" is distinguished into parts by nation-state and art-historical 
era (i.e., British, American, Canadian; Medieval, Renaissance, 
Eighteenth-Century, Romantic, Victorian, 20th Century). There is also an 
unacknowledged definition of the literary by ethnicity, gender, colour, 
and class - most texts by non-Anglo/American, non-male, non-white, and 
non-educated writers have, until very recently, been excluded from "the 
literary". However, post-colonial studies has pushed the historical 
functioning of this agenda into the limelight, foregrounding the imperial 
role of literary studies; as a critical turn in literary research and teaching, 
it has created the need to include in the account we give of (English) 
literature attention to the intersections of race, gender, sexuality, class, 
and especially historical and geographical locus within the Anglophone 
world. 
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Canon expansion includes, necessarily, expansion of modes and media 
(performance and sound as well as writing), and time-frames (the very 
contemporary, even ephemeral texts of orature). These last two areas of 
expansion are a necessary consequence of the implication of the 
traditional project and subjects of "the literary" with its medium: printed 
books. Only white and / or relatively well-off literate males have had a 
reasonable entry into publication through the printing and publishing 
industry (have I said this?). This industry is the gateway to "literature" 
conceived of as a project of national-identity formation and maintenance 
through the development of a collective aesthetic sensibility in relation to 
verbal art. In its role as a cultural gateway, book publishing has excluded 
the oral literatures of indigenous and formerly-enslaved peoples in the 
Americas right up to the present day; and it still excludes the projects of 
verbal artists developing an expression of their identity as subjects of 
both orature and literature. No matter the sincerity and ingenuity of 
efforts to transpose the sound and motion of orality into print, the 
meanings of sound and motion are not those of print. 
Literature as verbal art 
Moving our focus away from the written texts of certain imperial 
subjects as constitutive of the literary to "verbal art" as constitutive of the 
literary has certain advantages. However, I am also uncomfortable with 
the assumptions embedded in the language used to talk about literary 
texts-as-art. The practice of Western aesthetics, in the cultural practice of 
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art/literary history and criticism for example, depends on the 
persuasiveness of the critic. And the particular type of persuasiveness, in 
much literary criticism, depends on appeals to unstated, unexamined 
notions about the world. 
If we conceive of the literary text, the literary critic (primary reader), and 
the reader of the literary critic (secondary reader) as being in a triadic 
relationship, then certain questions arise about that relationship. The 
authority of the critic rests on her ability to convince the secondary 
reader that her aesthetic response to the literary text is worth witnessing, 
that it will add to or stimulate the secondary reader's own response to the 
literary text. On the surface, it involves the secondary reader in the same 
aesthetic response that the critic underwent; but since this is an 
impossibility, it is stimulating an aesthetic response in the secondary 
reader based on the critic's reading, writing, and invocation of cultural 
touchstones in her reading of the primary literary text. Thus a critic 
might emphasize the "compactness" or "brilliance" of the prose of the 
literary text; she might also appeal to the secondary reader's aesthetic 
sensitivity, demonstrating where possible her own claim to the 
appropriate sensibility. But like the conspiracy around the Emperor's 
clothes, this conspiracy between readers can only work within a secure 
network of power relations. Beauty is a term used to gather the qualities 
valued by the culture, and their invocation in proximity to a literary text 
does not validate the critic's reading, it merely articulates the position of 
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power she is taking in order to talk about a literary text (itself requiring 
that such a position be taken because otherwise it would not be 
"literary"). 
In any case, a critic's reading is always, in principle, unique. Her 
function is to articulate this reading for the enjoyment of the secondary 
reader, and in the process the literary text undergoes a translation, from 
"itself' to the critic's version of it. What is it that underwrites her 
authority in this process of translation from literary text to literary-
critical text? In the end, only the aesthetic response of the secondary 
reader, consisting of his/her participation in the same process as the 
critic's. Roughly, this would be a strong engagement with the text's 
ideational complex (verisimility in relation to the world (for the critic) or 
to the literary text (for the secondary reader)); and pleasure underwritten 
by the familiar cultural constructions of beauty, always contextually 
appropriate. If literary criticism is this derivative, there is not much to 
choose between a poem and a critic's reading of the poem, in experiential 
terms; and the only honest response to a good poem is to write another. 
It is not that criticism is parasitic; it is that it has not grasped its 
contemporary social value in the relationship it maintains with literature. 
What is a literary text? How does it differ from other kinds of texts? The 
most important point I am making about modern literary studies is that it 
has not been able to create a better warrant for the practice of literary 
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criticism than aesthetic value. And, although it has often claimed 
disciplinary privileges based solely on the special (aesthetic) qualities of 
literary texts, it has not managed to define or describe those qualities that 
make a text literary. 
An alternative view of the matter, starting from social semiotic 
principles, would deny the unsemioticised status, but not the reality, of 
the literary text, so that it cannot be "translated"; the critic's reading is 
then only an additional text, within the same order of reality as the 
literary text. The secondary reader is then only reading two different 
texts about two different things (e.g., for a novel, a "literary" text about 
narrative events, and an expository text about the critic's imaginary). 
There is no translation, and no literary text "itself'. This re-construction 
of the triadic relationship as dyadic does away with the power differential 
between critic and the secondary reader, because there is then no appeal 
to the authority of the primary text. From this point of view, then, the 
illuminating focus for considering the literary is not some essential object 
"literature" as such, but the framing of this debate (the "real" meanings 
of the literary text, the "real" essence of literature) in specific, local 
relations of power. In other words, literature is co-constructed through a 
filter of disciplinary, national, racial, gender, and personal politics. 
Although both Allen and Brand have worked at the boundaries between 
speech and print, performance and script, the trajectory of their technical 
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development has been from opposite directions. Allen for a long time 
presented her poetry as performance, printing "versions" privately along 
the way; only her last two books of poetry have been widely distributed 
by independent publishers. Brand, on the other hand, began by writing 
poetry for print publication and only later developed extended passages 
transcribing Trinidad English Creole to bring a more defined orality to 
her work. Brand's orality is the familiar reader's subvocalisation, and her 
work raises the question, "how does material sound come off the page"? 
Allen's orality is concrete, and her printed work raises the question, 
"how does literature read this page?" In other words, how do the familiar 
categories of Western meaning-in-print confront Allen's determined 
transduction49 from embodied performance to print? 
Allen's confrontation is one of the reasons I have been working towards 
an embodied social semiotics: a metalanguage that includes the raced, 
gendered body in its account of meaning-making. Such a semiotics, as 
theory, should offer a platform from which to critique entrenched 
Eurocentric linguistic interests (in the sense that traditional linguistics 
recreates the ampersand problem (see Chapter Two) across all social 
categories by ignoring, and therefore perpetuating, the social divisions 
that Allen and Brand problematise). However, it also offers an alternative 
poetics and grammatics, whose text analyses avoid recreating the very 
meanings deconstructed by these writers / artists. My hope is that such an 
49 See Kress Early Spelline 2. 
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approach gives us a chance to read with more depth these important 
texts. 
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